Mexico and Drug Cartels

9

Mexican Drug Cartels

Abstract

As the country’s attention remains focused on the Covid-19 global pandemic which continues to ravage the nation’s health and economy, it is easy to overlook the profound threat represented by Mexican drug cartels. Indeed, some authorities estimate that as many as one hundred thousand people have died in drug cartel conflicts since 2006, and this figure does not take into account the tens of thousands of American lives that are lost in the federal government’s ill-fated war on drugs. Against this backdrop, it is reasonable to question why tens of billions of scarce taxpayer dollars continue to be spent on a “war” that is claiming thousands of American lives each year without any substantive return on these investments. The purpose of this paper is to provide a systematic review of the relevant literature concerning Mexican drug cartels to identify the extent of the problem, its primary antecedent causes, and what steps have been taken in recent years to combat these violent international drug organizations. Finally, in recognition that these past efforts have largely been ineffective in stopping Mexican drug cartels, an analysis of potential solutions is followed by a summary of the research and key findings concerning these issues in the paper’s conclusion.

Mexican Drug Cartels: Present Danger, Future Threat

Today, Mexico shares one of the world’s longest borders with the United States and is one of its largest trading partners (Mexico economy, 2020). Despite some political wranglings over immigration policies, the United States and Mexico have enjoyed an excellent relationship over the years and current indications suggest that this solid relationship will remain in place well into the foreseeable future. Notwithstanding these trends, however, there are still some major challenges facing both countries in terms of violent gangs of narco-traffickers known as Mexican drug cartels that continue to generate billions of dollars in criminal proceeds while simultaneously exacting an enormous toll in human lives. To determine the facts and what can be done, the purpose of this paper is to provide a systematic review of the relevant literature concerning Mexican drug cartels to identify the extent of the problem, its primary antecedent causes, and what steps have been taken in recent years to combat these violent international drug organizations. Finally, in recognition that these past efforts have largely been ineffective in stopping Mexican drug cartels, an analysis of potential solutions is followed by a summary of the research and key findings concerning these issues in the paper’s conclusion.

Review and Analysis

Background and overview

In many ways, criminal elements in Mexico are well situated to take advantage of the market represented by the 300 million citizens of the United States. For instance, according to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), “No other country in the world has a greater impact on the drug situation in the United States than does Mexico: the result of a shared border, Mexico’s strategic location between drug producing and consuming countries, and a long history of criminal enterprises that specialize in cross-border smuggling” (Hoover, 2019, p. 2).

Although precise figures are unavailable, some authorities have estimated that Mexican drug cartels have already claimed the lives of more than 60,000 people in Mexico, one of America’s most important trading and strategic partners. To place this alarming figure into context, this estimate indicates that about one person dies every hour due to Mexican drug cartel-related violence (Rizer, 2015). Even more troubling still, other observers suggest that these estimates are far too low and fail to take into account the deaths that go unreported each year, meaning that the actual figures may be twice as high or even greater (Rizer, 2015). Moreover, even the most disturbing estimates do not take into account the tens of thousands of American lives that are lost to the illicit drug use that is fueled by Mexican drug cartels each year (Rizer, 2015).

Some indication of the severity of the illicit drug problems that are caused by Mexican drug cartels can be discerned from a recent study by Mega (2019) that found, “Across Mexico, drug-related violence has been on the rise for more than 12 years. The country documented 33,341 homicides last year -- a record – [and] much of the surge was driven by a rise in increasingly violent drug gangs” (p. 37). Beyond the foregoing human costs, Mexican drug cartels are also responsible for an increase in the incidence of human trafficking across the U.S. border and beyond. In fact, there is a growing body of evidence that indicates Mexican drug cartels have forged expansive networks throughout South and Central America that channels thousands of unaccompanied minors across the U.S. border each year, destined primarily for southwestern states (Rizer, 2015). The networks that are currently maintained by the three main cartels in Mexico are depicted in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1. Networks of cartel influence in Mexico

Source: Mexico rejects U.S. intervention (2019) at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-50577522

Taken together, it is clear that Mexican drug cartels represent a significant threat to the well-being of American citizens, but the huge amounts of money that are being generated by these criminal organizations each year make meaningful law enforcement by Mexican authorities and the international community especially difficult since bribery and corruption are thought to be rampant in regions of the country where these gangs operate. Indeed, during a hearing in June 2020, Senator David Perdue advised the Senate International narcotics control caucus that Mexican drug cartels were generating more than a half trillion dollars each year, a sum that makes these organizations more lucrative than Walmart, but without the concomitant tax burden (Rizzo, 2019).

The types of illicit drugs that are being manufactured and distributed by Mexican drug cartels are also far more dangerous than the marijuana that was their main focus in years past. Today, Mexican drug cartels deal primarily in truly life-threatening illicit drugs such as methamphetamines and cocaine, but there are also indications that these organizations are responsible for fueling the rapid increase in opioid addictions and overdose deaths from the powerful drug fentanyl and similar opioid compounds (Dhillon, 2020).

The DEA does not discount the adverse effects of cannabis smuggling, but the agency does acknowledge that times are changing with growing numbers of states legalizing marijuana in some capacity which may account for the change in focus to more powerful and potentially deadly drugs that are easier and faster to produce and smuggle across the U.S. border. As the DEA head points out, “Mexico is an opium poppy-cultivating/heroin-producing country and nearly all of the heroin produced in Mexico is destined for the U.S.” (p. 2).

In sum, Mexican drug cartels have historically been a force to be reckoned with, and recent trends suggest that these problems are going to continue to intensify well into the foreseeable future as the people of the United States are forced to deal with the psychological toll that has been caused by months of combined existential crises and illicit drug use increases as a result. Unfortunately, despite the rising death toll exacted by Mexican cartels in recent years, there have been some significant constraints to implementing interventions that partner the United States with the Mexican government to combat the threat posed by Mexican cartels as discussed below.

Mexican Cartel Interventions by the United States and Mexico

To its credit, the Mexican government has long recognized the threat represented by the cartels operating within its borders and has implemented a number of counter-measures in response. In this regard, a study by Chi and Hayatdavoudi (2014) with the U.S. Department of Justice notes that “Mexico’s previous policies for addressing the violence focused on military assaults on all violent drug trafficking organizations, reduction of illegal drug flows, and decapitation of top trafficking kingpins” (p. 4). It is noteworthy that in this context, the latter reference is intended both figuratively and literally. Under previous administrations, the U.S. and Mexican national governments cooperated closely in implementing timely interventions targeted at Mexican cartels with mixed results, but the impetus was still on international cooperation to effect meaningful changes but the Mexican government was also committed to the deployment of its own security forces as well.

The ambitious 5-year plan launched in 2014 by then Mexican president Calderon was intended to “weaken the financial and operational capacities of criminal gangs through seizures of drugs, money, and weapons” (as cited in Chi & Hayatdavoudi, 2014, p. 4). Moreover, President Calderón was clearly serious about the Mexican government’s efforts to combat the cartels, investing around $2.5 billion on new security forces in 2007, $4 billion in 2008, and $9.2 billion in 2010. In fact, by year-end 2011, the Mexican government had dispatched almost 50,000 security forces with the mission to stop the illicit trade by the cartels, a figure that represents a 10-fold increase over the number that was deployed in 2008 (Chi & Hayatdavoudi, 2014).

More recently, though, the international effort to combat the illicit trade in drugs, weapons and humans by Mexican cartels has been stymied over the past several years due in large part to tensions between the leaders of Mexico and the United States who remained at odds concerning the best approach going forward. In fact, the United States has essentially placed this issue on the backburner during the recent turbulent presidential election and transition, but there were signs before then that things were not entirely copacetic between the two nations with respect to interdiction efforts directed at cartels. For instance, in late 2019, Mexican president López Obrador has rejected an offer from the U.S. government to increase the military response to Mexican cartels, stating that a negotiated settlement would be in everyone’s better interests. In this regard, a report from the BBC notes that the Mexican president has “opted for a non-confrontational approach to the cartels, instead making tackling inequality central to his efforts under a policy dubbed ‘abrazos, no balazos’ - hugs not bullets” (as cited in Mexico rejects U.S. intervention, 2019, para. 3).

The Mexican government has also strongly rejected the proposal by the United States to designated Mexican cartels as terrorist organizations, fearing that the step would simply exacerbate the problem and create a situation where Americans would be perceived by Mexican citizens as an invading military force. For example, according to Ward (2019), “It’s a terrible idea in part because it will reduce Mexican cooperation as many in Mexico fear it’s a first step toward some kind of military intervention, which Trump keeps mentioning when he talks to Mexican presidents” (para. 3). Immediately following this failed attempt to forge a military-based intervention with the government of Mexico, however, the United States started experiencing its first cases of Covid-19 infections and the issue of Mexican cartels has received far less attention despite the continuing severity of the threat.

Complex problems clearly demand complex solutions and eradicating the evil presence of Mexican cartels from the Northern Hemisphere is certainly no exceptions. Despite the billions of dollars that have been invested in combating the problem over the years, Mexican cartels remain firmly entrenched in their respective areas of operation and continue to defy interventions by the Mexican government. A study by the U.S. Institute of Politics (2012) identified a number of potentially more effective, broad-based strategies for dealing with the Mexican cartel problem, including the following:

· Specialize portions of its military forces to deal with specific facets of the war on drugs by significantly reforming military training procedures, departmentalizing the military and integrating these departments into a larger bureaucratic system, and,

· Launch a more aggressive public relations campaign specifically targeting the major leaders of the cartels in order to reduce the culture of fear and helplessness created by the cartels (Liu & Taylor, 2012, p. 6).

In addition, in order to root out and eliminate governmental corruption that allows cartels to operate with virtual impunity, the Mexican government should also:

· Revise its federal reelection process to create greater accountability mechanisms for politicians in office;

· Strengthen its community-level efforts by building strong communities in which people have a wide set of options for legitimate careers by greater subsidizing education and focusing on community initiatives;

· Implement a more transparent fund flow between federal and state governments;

· Allow for greater public participation in the selection of judges, and,

· Reform the wage system, and improve training, resource allocation, and accountability mechanisms for law enforcement officers (Liu & Taylor, 2012, p. 6).

Conclusion

Over the past decade, a massive rise in Mexican drug cartels has been witnessed. During this period, headlines realized that many of Mexico’s most prominent and productive urban regions were not contemplated as the most dangerous cities worldwide. These areas became homes to many of the over 600,000 drug-trafficking-related mortalities (Seguridad, 2013). This traditional shock operates in parallel or has triggered a reign of terror, which has expanded to include public display of violence, kidnapping, robbery, and extortion.

Moreover, the victims increasingly count on government officials, military, law enforcement, journalists, and ordinary citizens. Currently, the United States’ enforcement efforts focus mainly on minimizing drug flows through and from Mexico. Violence depreciation has been a secondary issue at best and has been predominantly considered a potential side-advantage of drug flow minimization policies (Langton, 2011). Until currently, the Mexican authorities have directed their attacks on main organized crime groups’ upper leadership. This has been in decapitation efforts to minimize drug flows and attempt to solve the threats to public safety. The violence connected with these decapitation efforts and drug flow minimization has developed a public interest, particularly in Mexico, for approaches that will reduce the violence more effectively.

The Mexican elected president, Enrique Peña Nieto, has mentioned that his administration will change the focus away from drug flows for prioritization on violence minimization and crime prevention. Given that both the administrations of Obama and Bush acknowledged that the United States’ market for illicit drugs is greatly responsible for motivating the Mexican drug trade, there is a moment of strategic opportunity for changing the technique to violence prevention and drug trafficking (Langton, 2011). This research shows that targeted enforcement’s strategy to address security issues and minimize violence in Mexico holds absolute promise. By utilizing the existing enforcement and administrative infrastructures, the United States could allocate present resources to target the most violent drug-trafficking organizations in Mexico distinctively. This technique is a tale in varying respects.

While targeted enforcement is consistent with drug flow-minimization goals, the strategy supports enforcement resources in the U.S. to effect Mexican violence minimization. Moreover, since it is a hindrance approach, targeted enforcement needs authorities in all areas to publicly and recognize the target and tell that violence will no longer be accepted as a way of doing business (Murphy & Rossi, 2020). The target will also encompass the entire violent drug-trafficking organizations, not just sole criminals, which raises individual offending costs through the internal organization’s pressure. The violence-minded policy alternatives placed forth here keenly contemplates the present local, state, and federal budgetary challenges. Other strategies by which these alternatives can be measured include community impacts, political and implementation feasibility, intelligence demands, violence, and crime minimization. It is evident that not only is the approach of the United States’ adoption of targeted enforcement possible within available frameworks, but it also has considerable potential for minimizing the side violence in Mexico.

It is essential to create local intelligence abilities. Creating regional allies is crucial to identify people and behaviors instead of geographical units. The individuals within the local non-governmental organizations and communities ideally know when and where violent happenings occur and who participate in them. A program to develop or professionalize insider agents would effectively target violence and crime than any centralized, top-down approach. It is also crucial to emphasize cognitive therapy over the improvement of public space. The main activity of preventing Mexican-implemented crime is workshops of values and abilities, yet the one, which gets the most resources, is urban interventions. Urban interventions such as the development and improvement of public space have been linked with reduced violence and crime, only in Colombia and Medellin. Still, no proof is available, indicating this is replicable. Rather, the evidence seems to suggest that behavioral interventions are affordable and firmly effective. Indeed, urban interventions have the political advantage of being visible, perhaps because of their popularity.