Military assistance funding for Indonesia

U.S. Military Assistance Funding to Indonesia

The Causative People, Events, and Factors

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This case study examines the issues surrounding the influence, intervention, sanctions, and programs applied toward Indonesia support. Key to this study will be the individual people, groups, and institutions surrounding the successes and failures in this assistance and the motivations, perceptions, and agendas involved.

Historical Overview of Indonesia and United States' National Security Interests

According to the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

, Indonesia is a strategic key to our National Security interests. Located strategically alongside several important international maritime crossroads, ingress to the United States from the sea must be managed from such strategic locations.

The United States enjoys a reliable relationship with Indonesia at this time; playing a significant role in its independence and supporting its anti-communistic position during the Cold War has worked to repay our nation in 'cordial and cooperative relations' today.

Jemaah Islamiyah -- a terrorist organization -- made its presence known to Indonesia during terrorist attacks on Bali (October 2002) and Jakarta (August 2003). Occurring so close to the United States attacks of September 11, 2001, the alliance -- although not a formal treaty -- has meaning and value to both countries.

U.S. Military Assistance Prior to Sanctions and How Funding was Used

Prior to the 1999 military sanctions placed on Indonesia for "human rights abuses which followed the vote for independence in East Timor (Manning, 2003)"

the United States provided support and arms to Indonesia for the Timor invasion and other military objectives. Admittedly cloaked by an official 'embargo', secret Washington authorization and then President Clinton's "refus[al] to discuss with Australia and other countries the formation (of an international force)" enabled a pogrom with violence easily avoided but for the fact the "administration dithered for days."

Since 1993, U.S. President Bill Clinton invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 37 times against 31 countries, one of them Indonesia.

Sanctions

Economic and military sanctions were placed on Indonesia for its repression of the former Portuguese colony of Eastern Timor; labor rights and lack of human application were included in the reasons for the sanction.

Sanctions against Indonesia arose due to the political corruption, terrorist activity and crime, and abominations against humanity with the pogrom waged against Eastern Timor. According to the Indonesia News, the newly elected President -- Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono -- has put his government workers on notice, demanding they 'sign a pledge of professionalism, honesty, loyalty, and hard work.'

Those who decline to sign or comply have been warned of 'certain ... sanctions.'

Further, Randal K. Quarles, Assistant Secretary of Treasury for International Affairs, cites money laundering and counter terrorist finance laws as largely sanction-initiating causative factors.

In a December, 2004 statement from the United Nations year end meetings, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) has approved loans and grants for 17 developing countries; Indonesia will receive a portion of the $88.4 million for "development of marginal upland and costal communities."

According to UNAMET Spokesman David Wimhurst, Presidential-driven change is still largely seen only in larger cities but this change is providing a greater comfort level for easing economic and agricultural sanctions against the people of Indonesia.

For ease of reference, a listing of sanctions against Indonesia is provided in the table located in Appendix A.

Aim

The primary aim of this case study is to reveal those individuals, organizations, and associations behind the Congressional face with reasons and force enough to enforce sanctions or influence lifting them. In meeting this aim, individuals, in particular, with hidden agendas will be exposed, humanitarian motives will be explored, and economic, social, and power influences will be laid open to the harsh scrutiny of truth.

Objectives

This thesis will explore:

Who has been the driving force behind Congressional sanctions;

Who has attempted to influence the sanctions in either direction -- enforcement or abolition; and Efficacy of these efforts.

The Informal Universe

In a Wall Street Journal article, referenced during a May 2001 gathering of the United States House of Representatives, and written by the Director of Foreign Policy Studies of the Brookings Institution, Richard Haass

cites the popularity -- on all local and national levels -- of government sanctions. In this article he recommended several conditions by which sanctions should be measured:

Use sanctions sparingly;

Avoid unilateral sanctions;

Resist secondary sanctions;

Tailor sanctions narrowly;

Don't hold major bilateral relationships hostage to a single issue;

Include humanitarian exceptions in any comprehensive sanctions;

Issue a policy statement to Congress before or soon after a sanction is put in place;

Include an exit strategy in every sanction plan;

Allow the president discretion in the form of waivers; and Challenge the authority of states and municipalities to institute economic sanctions.

In a discussion on the individuated personalities and agendas which drive sanctions, these points will all be brought to bear in the continuing discussion found in this work.

Rebecca Hersman -- a former Pentagon and Capitol Hill worker -- has been hailed as offering the 'most informative account of how executive -- congressional interactions actually work.'

Coining the 'informal universe', Ms. Hersman discusses this world as a place of interaction where issue leaders personalities drive the process. When differing agencies engage in pet causes or strong agenda-driven issues, congressional allies and advocates -- inside and outside governmental arenas -- are drafted for the ensuing struggle.

Examples such as arms sales to Turkey, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and international sanctions -- of which Indonesia is but one -- are rife with express and implied arguments of favoritism, power plays, and 'suffering from the inattention to the more [important] complex world of trade and economic issues.'

Within this slim book, an argument is made for the real power in government -- the personality and ability of the wielder of such to influence Congress to do its will. The 1787 Constitutional Convention convened to create a government of 'separated powers'; a check and balance system designed to keep each branch of the government separate yet accountable to the other two.

What has evolved instead is a world of "separated institutions sharing powers" (Neustadt, 1969). If this premise is valid, then, the strongest, most charismatic personality wins the day -- and the Indonesian military assistance funding bill(s) before Congress.

Post cold-war, the country is riddled with concern over the executive-legislative relationships which deal with international sanctions and other weighty matters of global economization. If indeed, the personality conflicts and disputes reported between the President and Congress are to be the bellwethers of the United States' successful ongoing foreign policy, the diversity must be placed in proper and honest context. Hidden agendas must be laid out in the harsh light of exploration and destroyed with the agility necessary for the common good of all peoples.

How, then, will this personality-driven, private agenda process and its currently generalized acceptance -- i.e., looking the other way - affect foreign policy and sanction setting?

Issue Leaders

Overview

While individual power explains many of the ways Congressional representatives affect foreign policy, it does nothing to help understand who is influenced or driven to participate.

There are always partisan loyalties and personal relationship links, but Ms. Hersman argues the primary role falls to the 'issue leader'. She explains that any member of Congress can become an issue leader if they are inclined to champion the issue at hand.

Not a new concept, informal power and manipulation for favored issues have been around for many years. This process is growing, however, due to numerous factors; the end of the cold war; demise of the Soviet Union as a world power; declining Congressional urgency; disincentives to 'pound the stump'; the general public's disinterest in foreign policy; and complexity make the foreign issue champion a member of an elite and relatively small group.

This elitist group plays a 'disproportionate role' in setting issue relativity. Depending on personal interests, committees, and other positions, the issue of the day may be the one a Congressperson has awaited a long time.

Many fingers are found in the pie of political sanctions; individual Congressional representatives, the U.S. Administration, lobbyists, special interest groups, several former Presidents, and so on.

Indonesia Players

Who are the issue leaders in the sanctions against Indonesia? From an economic standpoint, the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) -- an international but non-governmental lobbyist organization -- Greenpeace, and the Sierra Club lobbies for sanctions against everything from rain forests to ramin wood.

Small cities in the United States -- Takoma Park, Maryland, for this example -- take up sanctions against such foreign countries as Myanmar and Indonesia, citing 'human rights abuses' and 'deadly force against Christians' as reasons to invoke economic sanctions. No big deal? PepsiCo owns 40% of the bottling company supplying Indonesia with soft drinks; with the public sanctions in place, market share dwindles exponentially as long as the government does not implement human rights strategies for all people.

Congress has several issue leaders in the Indonesian amphitheater. On November 8, 2001, the U.S. Senate passed several new conditions before direct 'military-to-military relations can be restored with Indonesia including the punishment of the individuals who murdered three humanitarian aid workers in West Timor, establishing a civilian audit of armed forces expenditures, and granting humanitarian workers access to Aceh, West Timor, West Papua, and the Moluccas."

Following are two very recent bills and rulings by the U.S. Congress concerning the Indonesian presence, changes, and sanctions.

In the House resolution, number 666, Burton (R-IN), Wexler (D-FL), and Blumenauer (D-OR) congratulate the Indonesian people and government for a successful election process, supported Indonesia in political and economic transformations, expresses gratitude to Indonesian leadership for arresting 109 terrorists, supports the emerging legal framework, commends Indonesia for "discovering new ways of working with regional law enforcement and intelligence communities in a sincere effort to root out domestic radicalism, and urged Indonesia to conduct ongoing and strategic political, economic, and security initiatives between their country and the U.S.

In resolution 744, the same representatives call Indonesia an "important friend of the United States."

Note: Congressman Burton serves on the House International Relations and Government Reform Committees; Congressman Wexler serves on the House International Relations and Judiciary Committees; and Congressman Blumenauer serves on the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee.

It is further significant to note that Senators Kennedy (D-MA), Wellstone (D-MN), Boxer (D-CA), Hutchinson (R-TX), Kerry (D-MA), Wyden (D-OR), and Mukuliski (D-MD) all stood in strong opposition to lifting the sanctions against Indonesia and to a person, all called for strict political policy to hold these sanctions as long as the conditions were not met.

Institutional Linkage

Human Rights Watch

The Human Rights Watch Group

-- in conjunction with the Congressional International Relations Committee -- has issued a public challenge to the United Nations to "stop dragging its feet in creating a Commission of Experts to review the judicial processes in Jakarta and Dili and propose a bona fide judicial process that will bring to justice those responsible for the violence."

Several human-rights organizations have taken up the appeal, stating "it's also time for the United States, Australia, Japan, and EU countries to realize that they should not do [any] business with Jakarta on anything related to the military so long as Indonesia protects war criminals within its ranks," said Adams. "The scope for military reform is bleak so long as the military is incapable of cleaning its own house of human rights abusers."

Nike

During a flurry of abusive labor practice allegations by international, regional, and consumer advocacy groups and committees, Nike hired Andrew Young, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, and his consultancy firm, GoodWorks, to conduct an audit of Nike facilities in Indonesia and two other countries. Citing hidden, profit-driven agendas, the U.S. World Trade Report stated that the "methodology employed by Ambassador Young was disturbingly flawed: he spent very limited time at each facility; interviewed workers at random on company premises; and conducted the interviews with the assistance of company-supplied translators." Further, former Ambassador Young's report affirmed that Nike was 'generally respectful' of human rights and no 'blatant' patterns of widespread abuse had been obvious when he visited.

The Asia Monitor Resource Center and the Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee reported the opposite, citing labor rights violations, worker representation (lack of), and outright human abuses.

Nike, Andrew Young, and GoodWorks continue to hide behind personal agendas -- i.e., financial gain -- and deny any misconduct or misrepresentation of the facts. Significantly, investigations by Ballinger & Olsson's (1997) research unearth the Congressional investigation into industry practices by Nike, WalMart, Reebok, and many others in Indonesia.

United States Military Collaboration

We have considered the individual players in the sanction game with Indonesia ranking from political leaders to economic behemoths. Clearly, there are many agendas resting on lifting these sanctions to further individual and agency causes. This section will look into military and police-initiatives and how these sanctions are being lifted without fear of reprisals.

On November 8, 2001, the U.S. Senate introduced several new conditions before direct military-to-military relations can be restored with Indonesia including the punishment of the individuals who murdered three humanitarian aid workers in West Timor, establishing a civilian audit of armed forces expenditures, and granting humanitarian workers access to Aceh, West Timor, West Papua, and the Moluccas.

According to the Human Rights Watch group:

Shortly after September 11, the United States officially announced a decision made over the summer to increase military-to-military contacts with Indonesia. Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri was the first head of state to come to the United States after the attacks, and President Bush used the opportunity to express his willingness to cooperate with this majority Muslim state. In a joint statement issued September 19, Bush and Sukarnoputri agreed to discuss ways to "strengthen bilateral cooperation on counter-terrorism" and enhance military and civilian defense relations. As part of reform efforts, members of the Indonesian military will travel to the United States to take part in training and joint exercises. Bush said he would also ask Congress for $400,000 in "Expanded IMET," a variation of the IMET program that would give Indonesian civilian officials training in defense issues. In the same statement, Bush opened the door to transfers of certain military equipment by lifting sanctions on commercial sales of nonlethal defense equipment. On October 1, Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayuda said that the United States and Indonesia had discussed plans to share information or organize joint training sessions in the fight against terrorism. Admiral Blair conditioned "full military cooperation" on the Indonesian armed forces' accountability for 1999 violence in East Timor. In a November 27 speech, Blair said, "We are ready to resume the full range of bilateral cooperation, when the military reforms which the TNI [Indonesian armed forces] is undertaking reach maturity." Indonesia suffers from widespread domestic unrest in several regions, and despite President Sukarnoputri's expressions of concern about human rights, government and guerilla violence and impunity continue. Although the negotiations with Indonesia were not related to September 11, the United States should make sure it does not weaken its human rights conditions on military assistance in its effort to maintain support for its war on terrorism.

It is apparent that the Human Rights Watch group is critical of Bush's agenda to rid the world of terrorism at almost any cost.

Issue Clusters

Military assistance funding to Indonesia -- despite formal political and economic sanctions -- is ongoing and public. Several of the reasons for this contra-action against U.S. sanctioned political and military embargoes will be discussed in this section.

In a statement to the House of Representatives International Relations Committee, Matthew P. Daley, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs made the NADR accessible and available to the Indonesian government for several reasons. Cited were the largely Muslim population and inherent interest to the U.S. toward enhancing that relationship, Indonesia's emergent democracy and the U.S.' moral obligation to assist, U.S. commercial and environmental interests, Indonesia's recent reforms as a model for terrorist-laden Muslim countries, and democratic rule overriding all.

Military and anti-terrorism were key facets of Mr. Daley's appeal to the IRC. Citing a potential breakdown in law and order would "accelerate the spread of terrorism, crime, illegal drugs, infectious disease, and trafficking in persons." He continued to exhort that we -- i.e., the United States -- must "assist Indonesia with its effort to create a just and democratic society." His plan involved funding to combat terrorism and offer police assistance and initiatives. Stating that the NADR account will fund the Indonesian National Police (INP) in "the formation of a counterterrorism unit," millions of dollars were so earmarked.

Mr. Daley went on to discuss 'military-to-military relations' and even admitting that the military has "not kept pace with Indonesia's broader democratic development" and "the lack of a track record on accountability for human rights abuses" -- one of the primary reasons for the sanction in the first place -- "is of particular concern," with the Papua investigation clearly pointing to American murders by the Indonesian military, the funding to the military marches on. Citing additional reasons for lifting economic sanctions -- avoiding inevitable trafficking in persons (TIP), sexual abuses, kidnapping, religious freedoms, and murders in violation of clear human rights bills, particularly the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) -- the spirit and intent of the Indonesian sanctions has clearly been nullified with this agency.

Not left to mere Ambassadors and Agency Directors, agendas come from all directions. Note the current Administration's agenda.

In an effort to strengthen "frontline" states' abilities to "confront transnational terrorist threats on the soil, and to gain the cooperation of regimes of geostrategic significance to the next phases of the "War on Terrorism," the current administration is disregarding normative restrictions on U.S. aid to human rights abusers."

Despite this common and reputable knowledge, Indonesia military aid will exceed $400,000.00 from the IMET group alone, up from $0.00 in 2000.

The demining project provides U.S. Government funding for "humanitarian mine action" through the Department of Security, Department of Defense, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Mine clearance and education in Indonesia is a costly process and with the military and insurgency factions, a problem which never totally disappears.

According to the Federal Government's Department of Defense:

Within DOS, the Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs (PM/HDP) manages two separate accounts to support mine action. Under the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Projects (NADR) appropriation, DOS funds both commercial and nongovernmental organizations' initiatives supporting a host country's program and its progress towards Sustainment. Overall Sustainment is achieved when the host nation is successfully managing and conducting humanitarian demining operations, and can sustain those operations by directly soliciting donors for support, if national resources are insufficient. DOS also provides direct non-cash support to military demining organizations within a mine-affected country, to include the provision of equipment, technical assistance, training, and other services. NADR funds also are used to support programs conducted by international organizations such as the United Nations and the Organization of American States. NADR is not limited to funding commercial, NGO, or international organization operations. NADR funds can be channeled to a U.S. embassy or to an operational element of DoD to support the acquisition of services and equipment. FY02 NADR funds total $40 million; an additional $3 million was received for Afghanistan. Overall, U.S. mine action support from NADR has totaled over $180 million since 1997.

Assessment

Sanctions have not been in widespread use for many years. The United States government rarely used them and when it did, ensured the sanction had 'teeth' by which the sanctioned country could tell there were consequences to its actions. Notably, Saddam Hussein was reported to be affected by such a sanction prior to the fall of Iraq.

Today, the pendulum has swung the other way. Sanctions are called by the Federal government, state, county, and local entities; even individuals call for specific sanctions when the cause warrants the action.

Ordinarily, this would not be a problem, except that we have agents, agencies, and other people in political power who disenfranchise such sanctions and move ahead with their political, economic, and personal agendas.

President Bush has made sanction concessions with Indonesia to combat the global problem of terrorism, Congress stands and decries the actions of a corrupt military yet lines their pockets to sell arms, infuse the coffers with more money, and so on. Business conglomerates use the Indonesian laborer as property; poor working conditions, abusive human treatment, low wages, and harsh practices make our companies little more than 17th century slavers.

What's the answer to sanctioning a country that lives by terrorist mandates, killing Americans for sport, each other to make a point, visiting genocide upon their own people? Is this the United States' business? Are we, as the world's superpower morally obligated to intervene, costing our own country millions of dollars in economic sales of goods and services? Do we have a right, a responsibility to mediate on the world's behalf.

This writer believes the answer is yes. We did not become a superpower without cost and wisdom. Protecting the world's "underdog" against the slavering beast of horrific treatment and abuse should be our first mandate.

This appears to be the United States' objective in all foreign policy dealings; we need to either stand behind our sanctions or not impose them at all. We are, in effect, teaching the world what they can believe of us. That must be the rights of human beings to exist without terror and abuse.

Appendix A

Call for an International Military Embargo against Indonesia

We are organisations and groups concerned about human rights in Indonesia and about the adverse impact on human rights of Indonesia's military relations with other countries. This statement arises out of our alarm at the complete deterioration of conflict resolution and military reform efforts in Indonesia and the concurrent rise in the Indonesian military's lawlessness and brutality. Recent developments include:

* the massive military offensive in Aceh following the Indonesian Government's declaration of martial law on 19 May 2003;

* an ongoing military campaign currently underway in the Central Highlands of Papua;

* the Indonesian military's failure to cooperate with independent investigations into its suspected involvement in the 31 August 2002 killing of one Indonesian and two American schoolteachers inside the Freeport copper-& -gold mining project area in West Papua;

* the military's well-documented assassination of respected and non-violent community leaders and its perpetration of numerous massacres in Papua, East Timor and Aceh and its failure to engage constructively in peace initiatives such as the establishment of Papua as a Land of Peace;

* military training and funding of violent militias in Aceh and Papua;

* military noncooperation with Indonesia's ad hoc human rights court on East Timor;

* draft legislation prepared by the Indonesian military (TNI) that grants it authority to carry out operations without prior presidential order; and * the TNI's continuing resistance to budgetary transparency and proper civilian oversight of its finances.

The TNI, which has not needed to defend Indonesia against an external attack for 40 years, has regularly used weaponry and combat skills obtained in part through foreign training and military assistance programs against civilians, including Indonesians, East Timorese, West Papuans, Acehnese and others.

The military offensive in Aceh, which is Indonesia's largest military operation since the invasion of East Timor in 1975, is now proceeding at a level that is causing widespread civilian loss of life and the destruction of Aceh's public infrastructure. Human rights groups fear massive violations of human rights and are especially concerned about the safety of human rights defenders and civil society activists. Numerous reports of extra-judicial killings and torture are emerging from Aceh, including of students and boys as young as 12. Several NGOs have been forced underground because of dire warnings from the Martial Law Authority. Their activists have been threatened with arrest and as a result many have gone into hiding. Acehnese communities are being targeted in Jakarta and other cities outside Aceh. In an attempt to isolate Aceh and suppress the truth about the war, the Government has banned foreign aid workers and international NGOs from entering Aceh and rendered the position of those already there extremely tenuous. It has imposed severe restrictions on press freedom. Tens-of-thousands of people have been internally displaced and villagers are afraid to tend their land. The military says it plans to forcibly relocate up to 200,000 civilians. The UN has expressed concern about a looming humanitarian crisis as food supplies run dangerously low.

In Papua, the military continues to provoke situations designed to strengthen its power there and to undermine peace and stability in the territory. Indonesian special forces (Kopassus) personnel, presumably carrying out orders from the military leadership, assassinated popular Papuan community leader Theys H. Eluay in November 2001. In April of this year, Kopassus and other military units launched a widespread operation in Papua's Central Highlands, causing more than one thousand villagers to flee their homes. The military have detained pastors, human rights defenders and others, one-35-year-old detainee has died whilst in custody, and additional deaths among internally displaced civilians suffering from lack of food and shelter have been reported.

Although there have been strenuous efforts by the U.S. administration to restore full military ties with Indonesia in furtherance of the "war against terror," and President Bush has thanked President Megawati for her co-operation, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee agreed on 21 May 2003 to reinstate a ban on military training for FY 2004 unless the administration certifies that the Indonesian Government is co-operating fully with the FBI investigation into the killings in the Freeport project area in August 2002. Indonesian police and NGO investigations have implicated the TNI in the attack.

The TNI is infamous for its brutality and lack of accountability in areas of conflict. The Indonesian Police, especially the special forces known as Brimob, also has an appalling human rights record.

In September 1999, the U.S. imposed restrictions on arms exports and military relations with Indonesia following the TNI's campaign of murder and mayhem in East Timor. The EU introduced similar restrictions at the same time, but they were lifted after four months.

There has been no meaningful progress towards reform of the military or the ending of impunity in the intervening period. On the contrary, the TNI is seeking to enhance its political role. The proceedings at Indonesia's ad hoc human rights court on East Timor have helped to entrench impunity rather than end it. Recently, the most senior officer charged with crimes against humanity, Major-General Adam Damiri missed several days of his trial in order to help prepare the TNI for its assault on Aceh.

Military equipment supplied by other countries - especially the U.S., the UK, Germany, France, and the Netherlands - is now being used by the TNI in Aceh and has been used extensively in Papua and East Timor in the past. We hold those countries complicit in any attacks with such equipment on civilians and regard those countries as accessories to consequent breaches of human rights and international humanitarian law.

Although there is currently a ban on the transfer of U.S. weapons to Indonesia, the TNI is using weapons supplied before the ban. OV-10 Bronco counter-insurgency planes are rocketing villages in Aceh while C-130 Hercules transport aircraft have dropped hundreds of paratroopers over the region. Indonesia is preparing other U.S. equipment for use, including F-16 fighter jets, S-58 Twinpack helicopters and numerous small arms.

British-supplied Hawk aircraft and Scorpion tanks have been deployed to the area. The Hawks are reportedly being used to attack and bomb villages. Government ministers and TNI spokesmen have said that they have no intention of complying with assurances given to Britain that the equipment would not be used for counter-insurgency purposes, for offensive operations or to suppress human rights.

Warships from the former East Germany, sold by Germany, have also been deployed to Aceh and may be used in a naval blockade of ports there in violation of contractual restrictions stating that they would not be used in any domestic conflict. There is evidence that French AMX-VCI and Russian PT-76s, BTR-50s, and BMP-2s armoured vehicles are also being used. Russia recently signed a deal to supply four Sukhoi jet fighters and two MI-35 helicopters to Indonesia.