MDMP and Military Strategy

Military Decision Making Process Exam (MDMP)

Movement Estimate of the Operations

Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs)

Commander's Judgment

COA Analysis, Comparison & Recommendation

Movement Estimate of the Operations

The POW Camp

The planning for the liberation of American and Allied prisoners held in a compound at Pangatian is to be done at central Luzon. The camp was five miles east of Cabanatuan.

The primary hindrance to the plan would be the rapid and frequent movement of the Japanese troops on the highway in front of the camp where the PoWs were held. The compound, in addition to being behind enemy lines was also the mainstay of Japanese troop movements. The Japanese retreating troops moved at night and rested during the day and the POW camp is one such resting place. The roads in the Pangatian area are regularly used by Japanese tanks. Dense troop concentrations are also reported in the Cabanatuan City and Cabu.

The camp is 600 by 800 yards and has 3 layered fencing on three sides with outpost at the main gate and in the rear side of the camp. The main gate is locked with a concealed sentry in guard.

Given the chances of being spotted by the Japanese, the march would be conducted primarily in the dark especially just before entering the enemy territory. The actual attack would also be done after sunset.

There was not much time at hand as the Japanese had already moved some of the POWs form the camp they were held in and if the rest of the POWs were to be saved swift and quick movement of the forces was necessary. It is estimated that at the pace the Japanese forces are retreating the area, the rangers should not have more than a week to plan and execute the rescue operations.

Aids in Planning

The planning is to be done on the basis of aerial photographs. Air reconnaissance would reach the 6th army from the Air Corps who would then send the intelligence to a forward base at Guimba from where the intelligence is to be transferred to the Rangers over SCR 694 radio.

Ground surveillance of the objective would be done by the Alamo Scouts who would leave the Rangers' base camp at Calasiao on the afternoon of 27 January to go to a guerrilla headquarters at Guimba. From there they would be escorted and supported by the guerrilla guides to Plater three miles north of the POW camp. The objectives of the surveillance would be to know the number of Japanese troops, the guards their routines. The information would be given to the rangers after they reached the spot.

Rangers Movement

Base Camp to Lobong

It is estimated that at a comfortable place starting from the base camp, it would take two days for the Rangers to reach the objective -- the POW camp.

The Rangers start marching for Guimba, about seventy-five miles east of base camp, on 28 January where they would be joined by an eighty-man guerrilla force and native guides. At Balincarin, about five miles northeast of the objective, the Rangers would Alamo Scouts and a second eighty-man guerrilla force on January 29.

If the march begins at 0500 on 28 January in the truck convoy and it would reach Guimba at around 1400 hrs from where native guides could take them south east to a guerrilla camp near Lobong about five miles away and should reach the place by later afternoon.

Lobong to Balincarin

At the same pace of movement, the Rangers would be able to cross in to the enemy territory about a mile south of Baloc after nightfall, after walking through open grasslands and rice paddies. At around midnight, the team would cross the Talavera river at around 0000 hrs and reach and cross Rizal Highway at around 0400 hrs the next day -- 29 January. In a couple of hours they would reach Balincarin.

The route, as selected and advised by locals and the guerrillas, the soldiers should rest for the day and start march towards Platero about 2.5 miles south after 1600 hrs. The pace of the march, so far help by the Rangers should take them to Platero at dusk.

The team is again advised to rest and wait for the final assault here.

On January 30, at around 1700 hours, the team should leave Platero for the final assault.

The team should reach a clear spot about a mile away from the objective camp in about an hour moving cautiously. It would be dark by then and the element of surprise would help the Rangers to achieve their objective.

Return Path

The safe return of the POWs would ensure the complete success of the mission and hence the return journey is as much of importance and the onward march.

The Rangers and the POWs would first stop in Platero for reorganization and some food. The rescued POWs would have to walk to Balincarin the same night as soon as possible.

The next stop for the column would be at Matoas Na Kahey and they should reach there by around 0200 hrs on 31 January given the expected slow pace of the POWs.

It is advised that the most dangerous leg of the return journey would be after crossing Matoas Na Kahey as the column would be required to cross the Rizal highway and that too the cross over entailed a one mile long walk along the highway. At the pace expected from the weakened ex-POWs, it should take about an hour to traverse the stretch of the highway. It is expected that the column would reach Sibul at around 0800 on 31 January. The column should feel safe when it reaches here and given sufficient contact with the base camp can also expect evacuation trucks and ambulances at this spot.

Role of Locals & Guerrillas

On March to the POW Camp

The locals and the guerrillas would help the Rangers every step of their way. The Alamo Scouts would be helped by local guides and guerrillas would help in surveillance of the camp.

The route would be selected by locals to ensure maximum safety of the Rangers and availability of food and water on both journeys.

The guerrillas under Prince and Pajota will arrange all-around security, a carabao-cart train for 200 liberated POWs and food for 650 men along the return route.

The civilians of on the route, on instructions of the guerilla will pen all the chicken and muzzle all the dogs so that there is no sound while the rangers march along.

The Rangers would be provided with food, water and shelter by the locals at Platero.

The guerrillas will also help the mission by setting up road blocks on the highway on both sides of the POW camp to stop Japanese troops entering the area before and during the attack

Return Journey with POWs

The locals will arrange for carabao carts for the POWs on the south bank of the Pampanga River. The returning column will be provided food and water by locals at Platero and the guerrilla doctor would treat the sick and wounded.

At Bahncarin, the returning column will get more food and water from local people and there is a possibility of getting more carabao carts. Similarly it is expected that food and water would be given by the local civilians at Matoas Na Kahey and additional carabao carts.

The Problem

METT-TC analysis.

Mission.

The mission is to free POWs comprising of American soldiers and soldiers form allied forces taken hostage by Japanese forces and kept in a camp that is reportedly heavily guarded.

The commander's intent is to utilize the resources available and freeing the POWs a=with as little damage to the rescuing forces as possible.

The intent includes the following tasks:

Surveillance, discrete marching, striking with surprise, neutralizing the enemy, freeing the POWs and returning safely with them to the base camp.

Implied tasks are securing help from the Filipino guerrillas and the locals on the way and back.

Enemy:

The enemy includes the 75 Japanese army men posted and guarding the camp as well as the retreating Japanese forces from the area that are regularly using the highway in front of the camp. The heavy Japanese presence in the two towns of Cabu and Cababatuan City and the movement of new Japanese force of approximately a division strength heading towards Bongabon from the Southwest are the problems.

Another problem is that in case the Japanese is able to alert the troops placed at these two towns, then they can reach the camp very quickly using the highway and the tanks that the enemy possess can cause heavy damage to the Rangers.

Terrain and weather.

One of the major problems for the Rangers is that the stretch of land about mile away from the target is barren and there is no way that the troops can march and not be detected. There are 12 feet high guard posts in the camp and any movement a mile out by the Rangers can be seen and detected by the enemy.

Another problem lies in the return journey just outside of Matoas Na Kahey where the large column including the slow moving POWs would have to cross the highway and walk about a mile on the highway before they can cross it due to the inhospitable terrain on the other side of the highway.

Troops

The troops are among the best that are available for the mission and aided by the guerrilla fighters, the mission has a formidable troop presence.

Time available

Time is a porblem for the mission. It is reported that the Japanese had already moved away some of the POWs form the camp and could do so with the rest to kill them to prevent them from being captured. Therefore the Rangers do not have more than week at the most to strategize and execute the operation.

The Rangers also has to avoid being seen since they would be moving in large numbers and hence the bulk of the march, especially inside the enemy territory needs o tbe done in the night. This is another problem for the mission.

Another problem is the limited time that the return column would have considering that the POW number and their health condition. The speed of the return party with the wounded and the POWs in carts is a cause of concern given the limited time for the safe return of the POWs to the base camp and into friendly territory.

Civilian considerations

Civilian support is one of the most critical factors in the mission. It is expected that the civilians would support the mission. However there is a possibility of a clash between the American forces and the Communist Huk guerrillas operating in the area of the base camp and hence this is a problem for the mission.

The Mission

(a)

According to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, the meanings of the following words are:

Liberate: to set free an individual or a group of persons from imprisonment or bondage or to free a region or an area or a nation from the clutches of control of a foreign power or an oppressive government.

Raid:

The process where the army or the security forces conduct an operation to temporarily seize control of an area with the aim of securing information, confusing the adversary or the enemy, to capture personnel or equipment or to eliminate and destroy a capability of the enemy is termed as a raid. A raid starts with a planned incursion or offensive and ends with a strategized and well planned withdrawal after the completion of the objectives of the assigned mission.

Secure:

This terms is generally used in operations or in the context of an operation and it refers to the gaining of possession of a position or terrain feature, with the help of or without the help of force, thereby creating a situation that would enable the prevention, as far as possible, of destruction of the forces or loss incurred by enemy action.

(b)

The appropriate term to that should be included as the essential task in the Rangers mission statement is the word raid. Though the overall objective of the mission is to free the POWs, the mission cannot be completed without a proper and effective raid on the camp holding the POWs. While the word liberate could have been used, it is not the most important term as this liberty can may be gained from other means also like through deliberations or barter or exchange of POWs. However given the present scenario of the mission and the conditions of the mission, the only way to liberate the POWs is through the use of the element of surprise and which is only delivered through an effective raid. The term secure need not be included in the statement as securing of the camp is implied when the Rangers take control of the area through raid and furthermore, the securing is only a temporary requirement as the Rangers would leave the camp as soon as the task is completed.

Purpose and Task

The Filipino Guerrillas: the most important task is providing cover security for the Rangers during the entire operation and ensuring that the additional Japanese troops placed nearby do not come to the camp.

The purpose of the contribution is to ensure that the Rangers are able to us eth element of surprise and are able to safely return to the friendly territory with the POWs. The guerrillas kept the Japanese forces at bay while the Japanese continued to attack the guerrilla's positions during the evacuation of the compound but remained unable to gain ground

The Alamo Scouts

The Alamo Soucts (Task) conducted vital surveillance of the POW camp so that the Rangers could finalize the assault strategy (Purpose). The scouts compounded the information that the guerrilla captains had provided about Japanese troop movement in the area.

The Filipino Civilians

The Filipino civilians (Task) supported the rangers with food and water at multiple places so that the troops remained fresh and healthy during and after the raid (Purpose). The civilians also penned their chicken and muzzled their dogs so that they did not make sound while te Rangers moved through the area.

The Radio Team in Guimba

The radio team received the all the information about the air reconnaissance and transferred it to the Rangers (task) so that the Rangers could formulate their strategy with relation to Japanese troop movements in the surroundings and the situation at the POW camp. The radio team also managed to get in touch with the base camp of the 6th U.S. Army and secure trucks and ambulances for the returning column containing the POWs, many of whom needed medica attention.

The 6th U.S. Army

The Rangers were able to start planning their rescue mission of the POWs and the

6th U.S. Army division established a solid front for the Rangers to conduct the operation and use the 6th U.S. Army as a base camp. During the return of the Rangers with the POWs, the 6th U.S. Army division arranged for the trucks and the ambulances to carry the POWs and te wounded rangers.

Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs)

LTC Mucci's took a decision to assault on the camp that held the POWs on 30 January at dusk. The team could have done the same the previous evening. Howvere there were ceratin constraints in LTC Mucci taking a decision about the attack.

Firstly, the guerrilla leaders Nellist, and Pajota informed him that there was a presence of a large number of Japanese troops in the area. During the previous twenty-four hours, a large number of retreating Japanese troops had used the highway just in front of the Japanese camp. Moreover, the guerrilla commanders informed that two to three hundred Japanese soldiers were bivouacked on Cabu Creek, a mile north of the compound. There was also reports of a Japanese division of soldiers were present in Cabanatuan City which was less than four miles to the south of the camp.

Therefore for LTC Mucci, it would have meant that he would be putting his men and the guerrillas at risk if he decided to conduct the attack that same night.

Moreover, the reconnaissance team of Alma Scouts reported the same Japanesw troop movement If LTC Mucci had initiate dthe attack on the evening of 29th January, he would have risked heavy causalties on his side.

But a greater constraint was that he did not have enough information to strategize a foolproof plan of assault. This was greater concern for LTC Mucci.

But the situation had not changed the next day -- 30 January. But still LTC Mucci decided to continue with the assault. At this stage, he had the information about the exact positions of the enemy troops not only within the camp but also in the nearby towns. He could make use of the fire power of the guerrilla fighters to stop the advancing, if any, Japanese troops during or after the assault. LTC Mucci therefore could formulate a complete assault strategy which ensured minimum casualty on their part and maximum chances of success.

Also he did not have enough time at hand as it had been reported that the Japanese had already removed some of the POWs form the cam and there were speculations that the rest could be moved away too to have them killed. Therefore he had to conduct the assault the very next day -- 30 January despite the situation not having changed much.

Commander's Judgment

The major reason for the delaying of actions by LTC Mucci on 29 January was the lack of exact information. The reconnaissance team had not turned up at Platero until after dusk. They had the most vital information about the exact condition of the camp, the number of Japanese soldiers posted there, the movements of the guards and their daily routine.

Until he got this information, LTC Mucci could not finalize the final plan for assault and delegate specific roles and responsibilities. Therefore this was one of the primary reasons for LTC Mucci not conducting the raid on the camp on January 29.

However he was also pressed by time. While he would have liked and wanted to wait for the Japanese troops in the two nearby towns to have left the area, he could not wait as there were fearsthat the Japanese could move the POWs away from the camp and even kill them therefore while lack of exact information forced LTC Mucci to delay the attack for one day, the constraints of time and the pressure to get the mission over as soon as possible for the safety of the POWs forced LTC Mucci to conduct the raid he very next evening on 30 January.

COA Analysis, Comparison & Recommendation

In case the Rangers decided to continue to move toward Guimba, recognizing that movement will be slow the wargaming would be:

Analysis of relative combat power

The total strength together with the guerrilla rebels and the Rangers would be around 1000.

The forces returning back with the POW would number around 375.Wiht the POWs together the total strength is expected to be around 650 with just half the men armed.

The friendly forces that are present include the two guerrilla units -- one holding a roadblock on the main highway and 800 yards southwest of the camp to be attacked and the other setting up another roadblock on the highway bridge over Cabu Creek about 300 yards northeast of the camp. These two guerrilla units can stop any Japanese units trying to confront the Rangers. The Rangers have a bazooka team to combat tanks.

There was heavy presence of enemy of at least a division in a nearby town and an undisclosed number in another town. Added to this any survivor of the enemy form the camp could be a potential threat. Enemy Tanks are available with the enemy troops in the nearby towns.

Options available

1) The two guerrilla mange to hold off the Japanese and allow Rangers time to cross over to the friendly territory.

2) Despite enemy fire and following,, the guerrilla units and the 375 strong Rangers manage to retaliate and move back safely

3) The guerrillas do not manage to hold off the enemy and the enemy casus casualties on the Rangers and the POWs

4) The enemy never realizes the raid happened as they do not get information about the same.

Array initial forces:

The forces that would be required to stop the enemy would be substantial as the enemy forces can outnumber the friendly forces. The mission is get the POWs back to safety. This is the intent of the commander and the mission intent as well. Therefore the 1000 friendly soldiers that would be available would have to counter fight and retreat at the same time to reach behind friendly line. Though air support would be available, it may not be possible to contact the base for air support due to lack of radio signal.

Therefore to accomplish the intent of the commander, it is necessary to have well equipped fighters to reach the POWs to safety.

Develop the scheme of maneuver

The maneuver scheme would consist of moving to friendly territory as fast as possible. However with the relatively weak and possibly wounded POWs it might not be possible to maneuver fast.

The retreat should be led by a group of guerrillas and local guides followed by the POWs and then the rest of the column. This will shield the POWs from enemy fire and the retreating forces would be able to delay enemy advance as much as possible.

Assign headquarters

The commander should lead the retreat team at the beginning. The POWs also need to be flanked on both sides and this can be done by the Guerrilla fighters. The fittest and the most capable of the Rangers and the Guerrilla fighters should be present at the end of column to face and ward off enemy fire. Additional forces should be kept in between the last soldiers and the POWs to take each other's place allowing time to reload and regroup.