Military Intervention, Humanitarian Aid, ICC

Military intervention, humanitarian aid, ICC & Africa

Military intervention or peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, and the International Criminal Court (ICC) are all noble, useful, and imperfect institutions designed to cope with crisis situations. They are humankind's flawed attempts to rescue itself from bad circumstances, some of which are humankind's own doing. The benefits of these actions are sometimes not adequate to meet the needs of the beneficiaries; other times, the viewpoints of the benefactors and the beneficiaries are not identical. Just because they are flawed, however, does not mean that such activities and institutions should be abandoned. Like all complex human endeavors, they can be evaluated, analyzed, and improved.

Military intervention is perhaps the most difficult activity to reform. Deploying armed troops into a chaotic situation, often between opposing forces mixed in with desperate and terrified civilians is risky and extremely complicated. Firstly, there is the issue of impartiality, which can negatively affect militarily strategic goals. Taking sides can more quickly stop the violence but create enemies for the intervening forces, whereas true impartiality can make the troops ineffective on the battlefield, bringing little positive change to the crisis (Betts 21). Additionally, unanticipated things will happen when a large force of foreign soldiers enter into an already disturbed situation. Long-term peacekeeping operations sometimes result in sexual exploitation of local women, disruptions of the normal economic and governing order, and changes in gender roles (Aoi, de Coning, and Thakur).

Aoi, de Coning, and Thakur suggest planning for these unintended consequences by taking a complex systems approach to military interventions. They say there should be real-time monitoring of forces on the ground and an acceptance that unintended events and interactions are inevitable. Coupled with unambiguous rules of engagement and clear force mandates, the negative affects of such operations may be lessened.

Humanitarian aid operations can be negatively affected by corruption. Paul Harvey notes that in the past few years there have been news reports of corrupt activities in aid operations in Somalia, Liberia, and Iraq. In the case of Uganda, Bailey's "most striking observation" was the lack of concrete evidence of corruption; a lot of the problems may have been due to inefficiency or incompetence (9). Still, her research uncovered widespread perception that corruption was taking place, including adding false names or fake households on to recipient lists, paying fees to get on aid registration lists, selective exclusion from lists, registration of ineligible recipients, the sale of ration cards, and camp leaders taking and/or selling food. Also sometimes workers not paid by aid agencies, and aid distributors sometimes requested sex for preferential treatment (Bailey 9-13).

Hard evidence was hard to find, but in cases where corruption was proven, people were punished, often through loss of job or leadership position (Bailey 15-16). Both Harvey and Bailey recommend more transparency in the processes of registration for and distribution of aid and responsive mechanisms to receive, investigate, and address recipient complaints.

The International Criminal Court seems to be able to hold itself above the corrupting influences that can affect on-the-ground operations like peacekeeping and aid distribution. In the case of Uganda, in March 2005, a delegation of leaders from the north of the country visited the ICC headquarters to stop the court from issuing arrest warrants of top LRA leaders, including Joseph Kony (Rubongoya 220). They were worried that such action would threaten the peace process. Nonetheless, in October of that year, the court issued the warrants (Rubongoya 224). This example illustrates a strong commitment to the mission and principles of the court.