Military Reforms of 1861-74 IT\'s

Military Reforms of 1861-74

It's generally agreed today that state of army truly reflects the standards of living in the country and the attitude of the citizens towards their country. It truly refers to the case with Russian army: today and in the past. Historian records and modern reports from Russia show that despite the patriotism of its citizens, "patriotism and love to the motherland" is understood as something abstract, which has no real life meaning for people. Ineffective army was a big problem for Russian Empire in the 19th century, which experienced stagnation as serfdom was not abolished yet.

The degradation of Russian army was defined by social and economical crisis of Russian empire in the second half the nineteenth century. Oppressive reaction used by Russian emperor Nicholas I against the revolt of Russian Decembrists in 1821 (nobles who wanted to abolish serfdom and reform Russian absolutism into constitution monarchy) defined deepening crisis of empire for the next 40 years. Russian absolutism, which promoted xenophobia and volunteer isolation from Western powers experienced deep crisis by 1860's:

war would end before Tsar Nicolas I came to see that the real causes of Russia's difficulties were its poverty and diplomatic isolation

The failure in Crimean war has shown that Russian army, fleet, system of communications and state administration were outdated and ineffective, in addition serfdom prevented agriculture and industry from natural development and only served as feudal survival which prohibited country from development. The situation in army reflected the whole situation in the country, which lived by semifeudal laws in the century of modern age. Institute of serfdom was effective either as labor force or as basis of regular army due to low motivation:

The core of Russia's problem was that even the population of serfs-or of freed peasants after emancipation-was not large enough to support an army of the size required by Russia's strategic situation

By the end of 1850's it was clear for everyone that army had to be reorganized.

Early attempts to reorganize permanent army

There were no considerable changes made up until Dmitriy Miliutin was appointed as the head of Ministry of War in 1861. He was one, who made a titanic work of army reorganization, turning it into a mobile, professional and well-equipped:

Reduced to its essential elements, Miliutin's universal service reform addressed several critical tasks. First, by greatly increasing the number of annual conscripts while reducing the term of active service, it maintained the size of the active army while expanding the pool of trained manpower. This formula limited peacetime costs, yet made possible the creation of a large reserve pool on which the army could draw in time of war

Among all military reforms which took place in 1861-1875, one of the most significant was the reform of 1874, which substituted 25 years military service of recruited levies to 6-7 years of universal military training service.

Up until the Universal Military Training Act of 1874 recruited soldiers formed a special estate, which was a social phenomenon of the 19th century imperial Russia. In most cases soldiers were recruited from male serfs of the age of 18 or older:

The usual age for service was between 18 and 35 years, but masters could send off serfs at any age. Finally, the courts used military as a dumping ground for petty offenders

After the military service term of 20-25 years they were dismissed and were granted personal freedom. But the conditions of military service and life in barracks were more than unbearable, so that recruitment was perceived not like a possibility of future liberation or social promotion but like a penalty:

as bad as peasant life could be, no one wanted to become a soldier

Besides participation in military campaigns, soldiers were often assigned to military garrisons of the most remote territories of Russian empire: deserts of Central Asia, Siberia or Russian Far East. In such remote territories soldiers were in the full control of their officers and in most cases were deprived of elementary rights. Physical punishments with fatal outcome were common practice as Russian army never experienced lack of recruits.

By the middle of the 19th century the number of retired soldiers was considerably growing, which created a big social problem. Retired soldiers, in most cases had difficulties in adaptation to civil life, they were not used to peasant labor and appeared to be unwanted out of barracks. Some of them settled in urban areas and got low paid jobs of watchmen, custodians, and other servicemen. Some soldiers received jobs of village clerks or literacy teachers in village schools, as in most cases soldiers received elementary education in the army and up until the middle of the 19th century, army was nearly the only state institution which guaranteed basic literacy education for representatives of low estates. As Martin McCauley writes:

In some regiments, according to the newspapers, a type of club has been organized for the lower ranks, where for a small charge they can get tea and bread, can pass the time playing draughts and chess and where, eventually, newspapers were available. Nobody can doubt the immense moral benefit of such institutions.

Historians note that retired soldiers experienced serious difficulties in social adaptation, a considerable part of them voluntarily returned back to army. Disabled soldiers in most cases received elementary social care from a number of private and state charity organizations, the most seriously ill soldiers were placed in hospitals called "houses for invalids." By the year of 1861 the number of disabled soldiers in Russian army was about 13,000 in 1890's it reached the level of 30,000.

One of the most effective military reforms in 1830's was establishment of unlimited furlough for soldiers after a definite military service term. In 1850's Russian Ministry of war made first attempts to create a permanent reserve, as Russian commander stuff which often boasted to have the biggest army in the world couldn't use it's great potential due to outdated ammunition, absence of roads and poor treatment:

When, at the moment we need to bring our troops into military preparedness, the 369-000 recurits must be drawn from the population, that is thirteen to fifteen young men from each thousand of population. Such extraordinary levies have a very poor effect on the physical strength of the population and on the economy. On the other hand, such an enormous number of new recruits cannot be prepared rapidly and properly for their task. To eliminate both these deficiencies I consider the best solution is to make the number of permanent and temporary reserve troops equal to the figure which will represent, in the new organization of the army, the difference between the peacetime and the wartime strengths of the army. This can be achieved easily and gradually, without aggravating the population; it requires only to set the normal number of annual recruits at a level which exceeds the annual decrease in strength of the army. Insofar as the number of recruits exceeds this annual reduction, so long-serving soldiers can be released into the reserve....

Such reform had very progressive meaning for soldiers as it provided them with wider opportunities for social adaptation and allowed the Ministry of War to start the creation of permanent army reserve. After 1834 soldiers with "reserve" status received a privilege of free choice of place for living and had equal rights for employment. Soldiers from reserve also could be freely readmitted to military service. But nevertheless, in case of law breaking, begging or alcoholism such they were returned to military service and were deprived of the retirement right forever.

Military and social reforms of 1860's were the first attempt to make a logical and integral reorganization of Russian army. In 1860's retired soldiers were guaranteed certain privileges of receiving allotment from state land reserve, or they could receive material compensation. Such approach was explained but the lack of lands in predominantly poor peasant communities, which in most cases even did not return inherited allotments of soldier's relatives, if they died before his demobilization. Czarist government was interested in populating frontier and remote territories by soldiers, which could be quickly mobilized in war time and established certain privileges for those soldiers who wanted to settle there. As for example:

Cossack settlements in the Caucasus after 1850 were supplemented by groups of retired married soldiers with 15 years' service in the Caucasus Corps

Deviant behavior of soldiers in Russian Army.

A special place in life of retired soldiers was taken by deviant behavior, which was often expressed in such demonstrations as aggressive alcoholism, begging, and idle way of life. The problem of begging of disabled retired soldiers was not solved, which vividly demonstrated undeveloped institutes of civil society in Russian empire, indifference of state and private organizations to the problems of charity need and simply concluded unbreakable gap between elite and low classes.

One of the most serious reasons which destabilized situation of dismissed soldiers was decision of 1841 to establish regular assemblies. They created addition burden for low rank soldiers and made the procedure of employment even more problematic, which created extra reasons for deviant behavior. Retired or dismissed soldiers were not subdued to physical punishments such as whipping, so police could do nearly nothing even in the case of open public aggression or hooliganism. Absence of alternative to heavy drinking in the army created such attitudes, according to..:

Unfortunately in the Guards, as far as I know, there was nothing like educational recreation facilities and the soldiers were deprived of any sort of recreation for their whole period of service. This isolation had a bad effect on the health and the morals of the lower ranks. They lived for six years far from their families and homes, repeating, with machine-like regularity, the same drills, which would bore even the most patient. And so in order to relax somehow flagons and bottles of vodka were brought into the barracks at any opportune moment. Neither repressive measures nor strict supervision helped in the struggle with soldiers' drinking and it can be said with certainty that as long as the lawful demands of human nature - which include a need for relaxation - are not met in any other way, vodka will, as before, serve as the only amusement for each soldier..."

For the retired soldiers civil way of life was oppositely different from life in barracks which created psychological vacuum in civil life. Even though that historians mark that deviant behavior was not a permanent attribute of retired soldiers, in general scope such cases were common because of the lack of elementary social guarantees from the side of official government.

Reform of 1874

The Miliutin military reforms like most of innovations in Russian empire of the 19th century were borrowed from Prussia. Generally speaking Russian government wanted to follow the model adopted by Prussian Counselor Otto Von Bismarck at least in military reorganization. According to Josh Sanborn, military reform of 1874 was held in order to prevent further degradation of Russian army and raise the feeling of patriotism among both upper and low classes:

On the first day of 1874, Tsar Alexander II issued the decree that introduced the last of the Great Reforms. In it, he announced that in his "constant solicitude for the well-being of Our Empire, " he was changing the basis for military service throughout the realm. The burden of military service, he recognized, "lies presently only on the lower urban and peasant estates, and a significant portion of Russian subjects are freed from the responsibility that should be sacred for everyone in an equal measure

Even though that the need of reformation was obvious in 1850's after the failure in Crimean war, in decree emperor referred only to foreign positive experience:

Recent events have proven, " he went on, referring to the Prussian victory over France, "that the strength of a state is not in the number of its troops alone, but is primarily in the moral and intellectual qualities of those troops. Those qualities only reach the highest stage of development when the business of defending the fatherland becomes the general affair of the people (narod), when all, without distinction of title or status, unite for that holy cause.

Such radical in some cases changes were met differently in society. For low urban classes it was a progressive law as it did not break the way of their life and guaranteed a limited term of military service (6 years of training in army and 7 years in fleet), but nobility reacted with outrage as it was bewastating their social status of freedom from any state service, granted in 1762 by empresses Catherine II. In a more general scope such reforms were attempts to break semifeudal way of life insured by 150 years of Russian absolutism and was perceived by progressive figures of Russian history as primary premises for the construction of civil society in Russia. Josh Sanborn explains reaction of nobility as follows:

Despite Alexander's bold spin in the decree itself, where he stated that "our heroic aristocracy and other estates not subject to recruitment have expressed... their happy desire to share the burden of obligatory military service with the rest of the people, " nobles instead tended to share the feelings of conservative publisher Prince Vladimir Petrovich Meshcherskii, who wailed that "one of the main rights of the Russian nobility was destroyed