Australia\'s Domestic and Foreign Policy

Australia's Domestic and Foreign Policy Approach to Confronting Terrorism Terrorism has emerged as one of the most pressing concerns in foreign policy and international relations. With the inception of guerilla strike tactics, multicellular militia organizations and rising tension between the developing and the developed sphere over the course of the second half of the 20th century, terrorism has become a method of choice for political orientation by armed groups airing grievances over territory and governmental determination. As a result, nations of the developed and developing spheres alike have had to coordinate efforts to find ways to respond to an enemy which is difficult to pin down and a nature of warfare that is unfamiliar to traditional military stratagem. Therefore, devising foreign policy approaches and national security legislation in response to and anticipation of terrorism stands as one of the most distinct challenges before us in this new century. At present, there remains no consensus on how best to respond to terrorism and indeed, many of the methods employed have been seen as controversial at best and ineffective or criminally unconstitutional at worst. This unsettled discourse serves as prelude to our discussion of Australian legislation and policy stance concerning terrorism, both with respect to national security and foreign policy. As a staunch ally to the United States, both through its historical ties to the Western industrial giant and through the intimacy of the conservative government of former Prime Minister John Howard's relationship to embattled American chief executive, President George W. Bush, Australia has committed itself to an aggressive foreign and domestic policy stance on confronting global and regional terrorism. Its policies have been met with a mix of rancor and consent, with many from within the region objecting strongly to its unwavering support for the hardline and bellicose global war on terror even as many others have recognized the importance of Australia's role in helping to maintain security in the South Pacific. As the largest military entity in this part of the world, Australia is uniquely situated as a Western nation on the doorstep of the Asian continent. This is a reality that factors heavily both into its vulnerability to global extremism and into its sense of urgency in meeting head on the challenges thereby produced. Today, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd affiliates with the more left-leaning Labour Party and has to some extent reduced the nation's military presence in such endeavors as the War On Iraq. Nonetheless, he remains supportive of many of the policies put into place during the last generation of leadership, with Howard's lingering Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill (2002) and the Australian Anti-Terrorism Act (2005) continuing to steward a hard line Australian stance of prevention and enforcement and with Australia's active support both of the United State in Iraq and Afghanistan collectively bearing a determinant effect on Australian policies at home and abroad. By and large, this discussion will make the case that the military and policy approaches of the moment verge in many regards on being unconstitutional and ineffective. Certainly, the moment of inception for the current foreign policy situation in Australia could be traced to 1996, when John Howard was elected as prime minister. Elected for five consecutive terms, Howard has come to embody the conservative and nationalist modern Australia, stewarding it toward a foreign policy approach marked by a distinct focus on extending Australian interests. Historically speaking, this would be a significant shift for the nation. Indeed, "the most significant post-war changes in the focus of Australian foreign policy came with the election in 1972 of the Whitlam Government, which introduced a more independent and internationalist foreign policy with a clearer focus on Asia, and the 1996 election of the Howard Government, which abandoned the post-Whitlam bipartisan consensus to focus foreign policy more openly on the national interest and link it more directly to the domestic political agenda." (Wesley et al, 58) This helps us to recognize a degree of continuity which has been sustained since the time of Howard's initial election and through our entrance into the age of terrorism. Where western policy response to terrorist threats has been to engage a proactive mode of unilaterally protecting interests at home and abroad, the Howard government has been philosophically poised as a key global figure in this conflict. This is a policy approach that would be in place from the early onset of the Howard government, beginning with the Bougainville crisis. Here, concern over militia activity in the jungles of its closest neighbor, Papua New Guinea, alerted the Howard government as to the relevance of instability amongst neighbors to the well-being of Australia. This would be a crucial new umbrella ideology in Australian foreign policy when a militant uprising seized the island of Bougainville on the southern tip of Papua New Guinea. (May, 12) The uprising was consistent with a history of resentment by the native Melanese, who believe they have been subjected to negative environmental and political consequences by the predominance of mining companies on their land. And indeed, since the 1980s, Bougainville's wealth of copper and gold "has accounted for around 40 per cent of Papua New Guinea's exports and between 17 and 20 per cent of government revenue. Ever since mining exploration began on Bougainville in the 1960s, however, the presence of the mining company has been a source of resentment amongst the local people in the Panguna area." (May, 13) This is to indicate that both extensive corporate and economic interests were at stake for this very close neighbor of Australia's, prompting the Howard government to demonstrate its willingness to act in an aggressive military fashion in extra-border conflicts. By no sheer coincidence, the government of John Howard would view itself as being in the policy position to endorse the PNG government in its bid to resume jurisdiction over this valuable island when, "in February 1997 Australian intelligence agencies picked up the first clear indications that the Papua New Guinea (PNG) Government was recruiting mercenary fighters to help it recapture the island of Bougainville." (Wesley et al, 1) The Australian government would oblige this interest by providing the PNG with access to its own mercenary corporate pool, demonstrating a model of war-making that has reared itself with yet greater predominance and influence in the highly privatized Iraq war. Australia's counterterrorism premise would begin to achieve its orientation at this juncture, with Prime Minister Howard taking the helm of a foreign policy situation that would be an early template for future interactions with prospective terror groups and rebel uprising. Adopting the hardline stance that the rebels in Papua New Guinea represented a threat to the security of Australia and its interests, the Howard government determined that "the introduction of mercenaries into PNG would set a dangerous precedent in the South Pacific, a region where several other states were facing internal fractures." (Wesley et al, 2) To this policy point, Howard provided arms and the support of Australian based mercenary firms in order to help the Papua New Guinea government defend aims of hegemonic and corporate relevance. This serves as an appropriate foundational principle in our understanding of the Howard government's terrorism policy, which would be informed according to these same interests and which would be addressed through many of the same tactics. The appeal to military force as a demonstration of Australia's willingness to serve as the western bastion in its region would place it in line with nations such as the United States and the United Kingdom, and would place it out of step which much of the rest of the world as the age of terror would begin. The next events of importance in activating the policy would be the attacks on New York City and Washington, DC in the United States on September 11th, 2001 and the bombing of the Bali nightclub on October 12, 2002. The latter of these attacks killed 88 Australians and, according to a report by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, a transcript of the confessions culled from bombing suspects indicated that "Australia was punished for its close relationship with the U.S., and for its involvement in East Timor's transition to independence from Indonesia in 1999." (BBC News, 1) September 11th, naturally, fueled the initiation of America's global war on terror, and as a result, mobilized many of America's closest allies to support it in wars that would be waged against Afghanistan and Iraq. As per its position as a prime supporter of the United States, Australia would come out in vocal terms and committed language to the aid of the its ally. Where many nations such as the traditional array of American allies in Western Europe objected strenuously or caved to a position of advocacy where prospective foreign invasions were concerned due to political pressure, Australia pledged its first and unwavering support of the United States, and tied its interests in terms of alliance and individual security to those of the United States. The result would be an entanglement with American terror approach that would be immediately well-suited to the shared conservatism of Howard and U.S. President George W. Bush. Thus, when the blast in Bali, at the southern point of Indonesia, directed the fury of 9/11 at a popular attraction to Australian holiday-makers, Australia became a nation motivated in foreign policy by the apparent threat of global terrorism. This would be demonstrated by its unwavering willingness to follow the United States even into its poorly-informed and ill-advised invasion of Iraq, providing combat troops and civilian military aid. During the lead- up to this war, in fact, John Howard would perhaps have been noted as only second to Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair in the ranking of Iraq War cheerleaders, appearing frequently in the media in order to endorse the alleged provocations made by the U.S. and later proved false. Howard echoed well the terms which Bush used to prompt war, remarking in a February 2002 appearance that the Australian government was firm in "backing strong action against Iraq if it continues to ignore demands for it to give up its weapons of mass destruction." (AAP, 1) This helps to capture the policy ideals underscoring the Australian position, with the ramifications of its regional proximity to such terror-implicated states as Indonesia and the Philippines becoming part of a difficult balancing act. Indeed, this is a significant concern given the centrality of Australia's relationship with its Asian Pacific trade and diplomacy partners. Its membership in APEC has long been a defining aspect of Australia's immediate orientation toward its foreign relations within its region. Any break from this pattern on Australia's part can be perceived as a transition away from a policy in place since 1989 when, acknowledging the changing tide of the world economy, the various countries which make up what is today characterized as the Pacific Rim, or Asia-Pacific, gathered at a summit in Canberra, Australia to discuss the implications of a joint regional agreement designed to reduce trade barriers amongst the countries aligned toward shared goals on the borders of the Pacific Ocean. (Faiola, 1) This would include many of the countries of Southeast Asia, Asia, the Australasia region and North America. These nations, of a wide range of differing cultural, political and economic dispositions, would establish through the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation an agreement that would alter global politics; establishing a grounds for excluding so-called rogue nations from the benefits of economic interaction, for cultivating the increasing interdependency of diplomatic nations by reducing trade barriers, and for honing establishing a tool helping to bring industrializing progress to developing nations. An alliance of this nature would serve as a powerful political tool, helping to create a consensus against which rogue nations would be held to either suitable standards of diplomatic and civil behavior or to a destructive economic isolation. The eventual inclusion of Japan, the United States, China, Russia and South Korea in APEC would serve to establish a strong unification against actions such as North Korea's nuclear tests this past October. The APEC has now come to serve as the primary channel through which said nations volley the notion of levying international economic sanctions against the totalitarian communist nation. (Faiola, 1) In the case of the War On Terror however, Australia has somewhat departed from this approach as we have noted, appealing to a unilateral response specific to each of its diplomatic and military partners. This has engendered resentment from some and relative policy equanimity with others, drawing a complex web of regional relationships. This would be further underscored by Australia's treatment of many immigrant groups on its own soil, many of whom would object to what they viewed as ethnic persecution. To this end, one of the immediate responses to the initiation and acceleration of the war against terrorism would be Australia's toughening of its own laws for the domestic treatment of those suspected of funding or participating in the planning or implementation of terrorism. Just as the United States rushed its notoriously draconian Patriot Act through its Congressional bodies as a means to enhancing the tools of law enforcement and intelligence agencies in investigating or fighting terrorism, so too would Australia produce an array of policy initiatives for domestic enforcement of security initiatives. To this end, "the potential for the criminalisation of politics is demonstrated here through an examination of the ASIO Act Amendment Bill 2002 and the Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002," wherein which it would increasingly become the power, entitlement and initiative of the federal government to use the power now designated to it as a way to undermine, disrupt or penalize political groups, ideals and figures of contrary ideologies to its own. Legislated in the wake of September 11th, such legislation would mean that "it is now a criminal offence for Australians to belong to, train with, fund or recruit members for a proscribed terror group." (BBC News1, 1) Countless groups would be added to this classification in an attempt to ratchet up Australian intelligence and enforcement concerning potentially disreputable groups or organizations. Naturally, there is a degree of subjective philosophy which influences this disposition, highlighted most recently by a highly contentious case where "opposition to a proposed Islamic school in Camden has reached the highest office in the country with Labor leader Kevin Rudd becoming Prime Minister." (Kinsella, 1) Rudd entered his support for groups trying to prevent the construction of the Islamic school, but balked at venturing a security objection, instead describing the decisions as a planning and zoning issue. This would cynically undercut the issue as it is largely seen by Australians who, regardless of disposition on the matter, recognize its implications in the broader War on Terror. Anecdotal evidence such as this contributes to a broader policy orientation which would have a direct impact on its relationship with the various parties making up the South Pacific region. With Indonesia serving as home to the largest global population of Muslim citizens and the region in general placing itself on the anti-western side of an intensifying dividing line carving up the globe, Australia would have to find ways to work with its neighbors in order to mitigate threats coming from their borders. Thus, the Howard government had firmly pursued individualized relations with each of his neighbors over the specific subject of terrorism as an emerging threat still coming into sharper definitional focus. To this end, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) would point out that "we have concluded thirteen bilateral memorandums of understanding (MOUs) on counter-terrorism with Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Fiji, Cambodia, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, India, East Timor, Brunei, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkey. This extensive network of bilateral MOUs support practical, operational-level cooperation." (DFAT, 1) This would be the primary channel through which the Australian government would seek to share intelligence on the subject of terrorists cells and organizations as a way to identifying problematic groups, freezing lines of finance allowing such groups to operate and working to be a part of the global network aligned against the prevention of future attacks. Even to date under Rudd, Australia continues to attempt to implement its foreign policy on counter-terrorism through the diplomatic process, engaging new enforcement actions tailored specifically to each of these fronts. As a prime example reported in 2006, "Malaysia and Australia sealed two treaties Tuesday aimed at facilitating cross-border evidence collection and the extradition process in an effort to boost fight against transnational crimes and terrorism." (KNI, 1) This is an indication of the way in which the Australian government has worked within the parameters of globalization to pursue to the deconstruction of legal barriers traditionally obstructing to legal cross-border collaboration. Naturally, these elements of implementation tend to vary based on the relationship which Australia possesses with each of these nations. One could devote a considerable wealth of scholarly energy to the investigation of Australia's counter-terrorism aims just in its relationship with Indonesia or Pakistan. However, a foreign policy orientation impacting the Australian international and regional standing more than any of these individual relationships is its relationship with the United States. The global resentment which is directed at the United States for its exploitive and bellicose policy approach to global partnerships has been magnified by its unilateral commission of war against Iraq, against the position of the United Nations and without evidence of a provocation. The Howard government's unwavering support of this war had been the central controversy of its policy implementation, with its commitment of troop support to the war meeting intense scrutiny. For Rudd, the decision to begin withdrawing troops from Iraq does represent a transition, but is not explicitly loaded with a sentiment of reversal on the war itself. Instead, it is seen as a new phase in the approach taken by Australia to its support role in the War on Terror. Ultimately, and directed by its friendship with the United States, the Australian government has experienced a decline in favorability in the region. Particularly with its staunch interest in pursuing hardline regional enforcement by pressuring neighbors in the wake of the Bali blast, Australia would draw the ire of many who had come to be close allies of Australia during its prior two decades of political openness. Due to a rising focus on a foreign policy veritably defined by the concerns of terrorism and security, the question of retaining stability and pursuing progress in Australia-Asia relations severely declined. To this end, "Australia's 2001 Election was often regarded as the lowest point of Australia-Asia relations. Neither of Australia's political establishments included 'Asia engagement' as part of their main policies or official statements. The main discourse circled around issues on counter-terrorism measures." (CSIS, 1) This angered many in the Asian Pacific who viewed this as a closing of Australia to non-western partnerships of real meaning. Additionally, those who viewed America's policy as a threat to sovereignty in the developing sphere-which characterized most of Australia's non-Anglo neighbors-would recognize the paternalistic Australia as directly reflect of this ideology. Still, for nations in Asia who recognized terrorism and Islamic extremism to be a threat to sovereignty as well, Australia would be a necessary partner in dismantling cross-border networks of information, finance and weaponry. Thus, "on October 21, 2001 the APEC Leaders issued their Statement on Counter-Terrorism that condemned terrorist attacks and deemed it imperative to strengthen cooperation at all levels in combating terrorism in a comprehensive manner. " (APEC News, 1) And this, more than Australia's negatively connoted relationship with the United States, has come to define the impression which serves it in the Asian Pacific region. More than efforts between the United States and former allies, Australia has actually had a degree of success in making these bilateral relationships, as well as the multilateral organizational memberships, function to serve the needs of all parties involved. Indeed, this is distinction from the United States. Still, its coalition membership in Iraq and its vocal endorsement of America's Bush administration have been rather damning facts. Within Australia itself, "while attempts to define national values and align foreign policy with them seem to resonate positively with the electorate in a post-9/11 world, there are some who are uncomfortable with what they see as an increasingly self-righteous jingoism in Australian foreign policy." (Wesley et al, 278) And with an election between Howard and Rudd, this was the policy aspect upon which Howard was most judged as the public voted him out. Failure and success of counter-terrorism policies are difficult to gauge, especially in the short run. However, it would be fair to mark Australia's policy of bilateral engagement with regional partners to be a successful deconstruction of the U.S. approach of unilateralism. Nonetheless, the support which Howard placed behind Bush for a war policy in Iraq that is most certainly a failed one has tainted the whole of the Howard administration's foreign policy legacy, leaving Australia deeply implicated in a qualified quagmire with no apparent or declared end yet in sight. And on the domestic level, most academic considerations of the approach taken to this juncture at the legislative level have been deeply unfavorable. This is well captured in an analysis offered in 2005 by the Australian National University in Canberra: "Never before in history has Australia witnessed a comparable overhaul of national security legislation and the introduction of laws that significantly curtail civil liberties and fundamental freedoms. . . . It is argued that the actual risk of a terrorism attack occurring on Australian soil is rather low. As a consequence, the Howard government's antiterrorism laws constitute a disproportionate response that has worrisome long-term implications for Australia's legal system and its society more generally." (Michaelsen, 331)