Modernity the Discourse of Modernity

Modernity

The discourse of modernity is unfortunate in that it tends to entail a certain hostility to non-Western cultures. This type of discourse and its inherent hostility operates to exclude non-Western cultures from meaningful participation in the modern world. Simultaneously, it articulates a desire to indeed include them under the condition of "civilization." Modernity seeks to both whitewash and civilize non-Western cultures to resemble the West.

"Instrumental in the ideology of colonialism, this configuration continues to wield a powerful influence in contemporary theories of the Orient and of modernity. The assumption of modernity privileges Western cultural and moral dispositions, defining modernity in terms of Western cultures and historical experiences" (Mirsepassi, 9). The trope of modernity is concerned with the concept of the "West" as representative of progress. Non-Western cultures and traditions, on the other hand, are considered at best as lagging behind, and at worst as a hostile and incompatible paradigm in terms of modernity.

During the nineteenth century, developments in Iran, as in many other parts of the global south, led to a division "into two parts: an elite class, drawn into the cultural orbit of the West through political and economic ties, and the mass of people. The former designated themselves as "modernized" and "Westernized" while the latter were seen as "traditional" and "backward," with this binary corresponding invariably to the divisions between rich and poor, ruler and ruled" (Milani, 25). This division led to a blatant elitism within the Iranian state under the Pahlavi dynasty, which was itself influenced by imperial modernized ideals.

There is an inherent irony in this discursive turn: the revolution in Iran was fought emphatically for modernity and all of its promises as a social ideal; it was however also focused against the distorted version of modernity first imposed under Nasir al-Din Shah, and later by the Pahlavis. This betrayed every humanistic principle that modernity supposedly represented. Yet modernity under the three Shahs "was no mere deviation or corrupted moment in an otherwise morally pure design; the discrepancy between ideal and reality under the Shahs and the dictators like them is a revelation of the interlocked "other" face of modernity" (Mirsepassi, 17).

The association of modernity with the West was countered by nationalism in the form of a struggle against the absolute monarchy. This represented a quest for a new state of liberalism and progressive ideas without the constraints of colonial domination. From the beginning of his political career, Muhammad Mussaddiq was aware of Iran's domination by Britain, even though it was not formally a colony, Iran was dominated by Britain. This domination was accomplished by institutions such as the British embassy, an effective institutional component of the Iranian polity, and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which acted as the main pillar of British domination. "As an act of his office between 1951 and 1953, Mussaddiq gained great popularity for nationalizing Iran's oil industry, wresting from the British invaders one of the final vestiges of its colonial hold" (Abrahamian, 279). Mussaddiq believed that colonialism in any form -- regardless of whether it manifested formally or informally -- brought about social decay and resulted of economic and political backwardness. It must also be noted however that neither Mussaddiq or others like him were frightened of modern ideas and techniques -- in contrast to the religious establishment - or mesmerized and captivated by them. They followed a rational and realistic route towards understanding Iranian and European societies, along with a belief that consistent progress was only possible through comprehensive and synthetic change. This belief entailed a firm belief in freedom, law, and democracy, to an even greater extent than their faith in technical progress. According to this belief, technical and socio-economic progress had to involve the people's consent, conviction, and co-operation. After his death, Mussaddiq's memory remained for Iran as a symbol of independence. This symbolic connotation had a certain power as opposition to the Shah and the West. It resurfaced during the 1970s until it was revolutionized by new ideas and images after the 1979 revolution.

In present-day Iran, Iranian 'nationalists' are considered as direct descendents of the Democratic and constitutional era by the Islamic Republic, precisely as they were in the Mussaddiq era. This is however a grudging acceptance. The supporters of the Islamic Republic consider the divine plan for the creation of the good society, implicit in the Koran, as central to their culture. Their reaction to nationalism is therefore somewhat skeptical, as towards a secular phenomenon rejecting all that is sacred to Islam.

Further fuelling this skepticism is the fact that nationalism and liberalism alike are manifestations of the Euro-American culture. Those supporting Khomeini therefore regarded it as deserving of nothing more than total rejection. Modernity and many of its distinct associations became anathema. As such, these aspects were identified most closely with western impropriety and cultural genocide against Islam. The increasing importance of the Islamic force, strengthened by a defensiveness its leaders had come to regard as necessary, resulted in the establishment of present-day Iran, its importance and its identity. Possibly the best representation of this is an act that both secured Iran's independence, but also embroiled the country in an endless struggle for autonomy.

The culmination of this is the Islamic revolutionary movement of the sixties and seventies, which can be regarded as an attempt to seriously challenge the discourse of modernity. Ironically, the Islamic revolutionary movement was affected by the very discourse it aimed to challenge. Islamic discourse is therefore inevitably an internal dialogue with modernity. In this, Islamic discourse has not completely abandoned the principles of modernity, leading to an impeding and contradictory internal discourse. This contradiction can be viewed as a driving force in the dynamic search for modernity since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979.

The main thesis of my study suggests that Iran's experience with modernity should be understood in terms of a process involving aspects of modernity conducive to emancipation and those conducive to domination. In this dialectical process, different elements of modernity often vied with each other, leading to different phases in the development of the new civilization in Iran. Furthermore, at different times, different aspects of modernity were developed and elaborated by different social groups. In this way, the early reformist intellectuals of the late nineteenth century, at least in their theoretical approaches, placed more or less equal emphasis on the democratic and positive aspects of modernity. From the Pahlavi era, there was a shift in emphasis to the instrumental side of modern civilizations. Similarly, Islamic theocrats developed their approach to place great emphasis on expanding and deepening the potential for the liberation and empowerment of Iranians in the twentieth century.

Historical Background

The long rule of Nasir al-Din Shah brought about the encounter of Iran with Western modernity. This shook the existing Iranian sense of cultural identity and community to the core. Imperial cultural hegemony was on the rise. Iranian despots tended to be in awe of the West, basing their sense of political security on the pulse of the Western powers rather than the needs and desires of their own people. This sense of awe and need for security often resulted in great costs as a result of an attempt by these leaders to cultivate a modern image of themselves in the eyes of the west. This ambivalence over identity created core problems in the Iranian relationship with the Western powers. Whereas "xenophobia nationalists and religious fundamentalism harbor narcissistic illusions of ethnic or religious grandeur, some advocates of modernity foster a cult of self-denigration and illusory notions about the perfect West… On the other hand, all social issues modernity hurls into the public domain were ensnared with colonial politics" (Milani, 25).

England continued its invasion in 1872, with a British company buying a concession from the Qatar ruler for the exclusive right to run Iranian industries, exploit its farm lands and mineral resources, develop its urban transportation systems, and establish its national bank and printed currency. "The British statesman Lord Curzon would call this the most complete and extraordinary surrender of the entire industry resources of a kingdom into foreign hands that has ever been dreamed of, much less accomplished in history" (Kinzer,62). Nasir al-Din Shah sold the majority of Iranian industry to British Imperial for only 15,000 pounds. British power was further secured by terms requiring Iranian tobacco farmers to sell their crops at prices set by the British Imperial Company. Furthermore, smokers were obliged to buy tobacco only from shops that were part of the British retail network. The end of the century saw increasing public discontent erupted on a mass scale, ensuing in the tobacco crisis of 1891-1892. The conflict of the traditional religious discourse with modernity became increasingly clear, as a general strike was encouraged by a religious fatwa against the use of tobacco. This expanded into a state-wide boycott.

When Nasir al-Din Shah "contracted with a Belgian company to construct a rail road from Tehran to the shire of Abdul Azim, cart drivers fearing cheap competition, mullahs opposing foreign influence, and pilgrims shaken by the death of a fellow pilgrim under the steam engine joined hands to tear up the railway" (Abrahamian, 72). The already shaky relationship between the Qatar state and Iranian society was further undermined by the Western exploitation of Iranian resources during the second half of the nineteenth century.

From 1918 until 1921 "British subsidies kept the government afloat, and British military and administrative advisers attempted to reorganize Iran's army and to manipulate the various political factions within the country to British advantage" (Cleveland, 185)*. When Britain added insult to injury by offering Iran a loan in exchange for exclusive advisory privileges, anti-imperial demonstrations broke out in several cities. Widespread discontent grew further. The Qatar government was regarded as ineffective and pro-British. A determined military commander finally took action and put a stop to the chaos.

Reza Khan used the political climate to advance from the position of commander and chief of the army in 1921 to that of the shah of Iran in 1925. His election overthrew the Qatar dynasty. Under his newly-founded Pahlavi Dynasty, Reza Shah pursued a program of reform towards the creation of a strong central government. "To lessen possible opposition, Reza Shah imposed severe restrictions on the clergy and the craft guilds who were by tradition accustomed to considerable autonomy" (Arasteh, 104)*. In a bold move in 1934, the Shah issued a decree to secularize property and deprive the clergy of its wealth and power. Civil law came to take precedence over Islamic law. The Shah also outlawed and discredited Islamic nationalist movements and Shiite popular religious practices. This simply replaced one type of repression with another. The distance of the government from the society it was supposed to serve was extended by such measures. In addition to the above, public religious expression was forbidden, and especially those that entailed pilgrimages to Najaf and Karbala in Iraq. Citizens were also forbidden from attending the religious dramas and processions associated with the month of Muharram. The guild's activities were restricted by only allowing them to meet under police supervision.

In addition to such restrictive and often violent tactics, the Shah also attempted to force modernization upon his country by introducing Western clothing styles for men and women. European clothing was important in large quantities, and sold cheaply to citizens to encourage and enforce the new styles. The changes that this forced modernity entailed, including the unveiling of Iranian women, resulted in subsequent gendered and racialized notions.

"The authoritarian state imposed through the construction of a coercive public patriarchy based on obedience and loyalty to it as father and king. However, the nation became a site of contestation since it included only those willing to join the project of Westernization and modernization and marginalization those of deviating from it" (Kaiwar, 205). Although an agent of change, the new state was iconic of enforced Western modernity. The change was neither natural nor in accordance with the wishes and desires of leadership entities such as the ulama, the traditional guilds, or the tribal khans. As such, the society was European in appearance but remained traditional at heart.

An understanding of the Iranian revolution can be gained by recognizing that the country's recent history is also affected by the modernist imperialist narrative. While the United States enjoyed a normalized relationship wit Iran during the Pahlavi rule, the Shah's unpopular and undemocratic modernization projects recontextualized the very meanings of modernity in Iran. The negative connotations of these concepts were exacerbated by the cultural elitism of the "Westernized Aryan" minority and the authoritarian state apparatus.

"This scheme inherently linked "tradition" with failure and pointed out a single road to prosperity and power" (Mirsepassi, 11). In this way, the local culture was explicitly delegitimized by an outside party, namely Western modernity. Rather than enforcing the changes envisioned by the Shah, this led to a civil reaction of the Iranian people toward the singular universality of their own culture and practices. This is particularly relevant for our purpose in this study, as such a division led to the complete loss of the Shah's state power and the legitimacy of the ruling class in pre-revolutionary Iran.

The systematic suppression of secular opponents created a political vacuum for the emerging Islamic movement, and a platform for its attempts to articulate an alternative to the oppressive Western models of modernization introduced by the Shah. The Shah's goal was to rebuild Iran in the image of the West or, at any rate, in the image he had of the West. He refused to democratize the Iranian polity, and would offer the same response to any opposition view: "Democracy is the invention of the "blue-eyed world" and does not fit the Persian political landscape." (Milani, 18)

Eventually, the Muslim clerics were the first instigators of revolution, fueled by the perception of the Shah's inequitable rule. The clerics swelled both intellectual and public resentment of the Shah and his practices into a full-fledged revolution. The religious forces in the country, in their zeal to oppose the rise of secular humanism, systematically equated modernity with unsavory colonial and western influences. "It was precisely this beguiling rhetoric that convinced many secular democrats in Iran that Ayatollah Khomeini was a progressive critic of modernity and colonialism" (Milani, 10).

In this context, new competing and conflicting cultural strategies of selfhood began to emerge. "Religious forces, suspicious of change, advocated social and spiritual isolation. Only a culture enveloped in divine wisdom, they argued, could survive the satanic verses of modernity. On the opposite extreme were the advocates of cultural transubstantiation who encouraged a total submersion of Iranian culture into the paradise of European civilizations" (Milani, 52). Confounding this individual battle was the peculiar problem of the new stage of modernity in Iran.

The Occident and the Orient: Looking through the Orientalist Lens

Modernity in the West is frequently seen as evidence of its cultural superiority and creativity, thereby its ascendancy over other parts of the world since the era of European colonialism and to the 19th century. This is a paradigm playing an especially prominent role with regard to the relationship between Western and Eastern culture. "Orientalism" as an academic discipline and a way of thinking emerged as an overarching vision. This vision homogenized non-Western culture and societies into a single rather than diverse concept. Regardless of any specificity separating the differing people of Asia, East Asia, and North Africa, their commonality, according to Orientalist thought, can be found in the fact that they were fundamentally different -- and inferior to - the West.

This study aims to investigate the representations of Persia in a number of canonical and non-canonical texts. The theoretical framework is based upon Edward Said's analysis of orientalism. It is argued that the case of Persia instances the heterogeneous and striated character of orientalism ('representations' rather than 'representation' in the title). It is shown that, while a number of relatively similar set of motifs and topoi, mainly derived from classical tradition and contemporary travel writing, circulate in the works of the three authors included (Sheen, Morier, Nasr al Din Shah), they are differently inflected and serve different thematic and ideological purposes.

In what follows I will discuss issues in Morier's Hajji Baba novels as the culmination of 'oriental tales' in both thematic and stylistic terms. What makes the Hajji Baba novels masterpieces of orientalist work, is above all Morier's ability to 'pass off' 'partial accounts' of Persia, which he presumes to have noted during his stay there as 'the whole story' (dysfunctional government, social injustice, being out of pace with 'modernity', etc.). Thus, in England, Hajji Baba, and to some extent the other Persian members of the embassy, are provided with an 'opportunity' to be educated away from their 'oriental' mode of life and thought: the journey from 'ignorance' to 'enlightenment', from Persia to England, is both physical and intellectual.