Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 129

Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 173 L. Ed. 2D 955

Jesse Montejo and Jerry Moore were interrupted during a burglary by the owner of the residence, Lewis Ferrari (U.S. Supreme Court, 2009). Montejo was picked up for questioning the next day and after waiving his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436, 1966), admitted to shooting and killing Lewis Ferrari during the burglary. When Montejo was arraigned two days later in court, he stood mute as the court appointed counsel.

A few hours after the arraignment, police detectives visited Montejo at the jail (U.S. Supreme Court, 2009). During the end of the ensuing discussion, Montejo waved his Miranda rights and agreed to take them to the murder weapon. During the trip to locate the murder weapon, Montejo wrote a letter of apology to the victim's widow.

The defense attempted to suppress the letter of apology during the jury trial, to no avail (U.S. Supreme Court, 2009). The conviction was for murder in the first degree and the sentence was death. Montejo appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court, using the argument that Jackson v. Michigan (475 U.S., at 626, 1986) should apply. According to Montejo's attorneys, being advised of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel should have invoked a prophylactic protection against subsequent interrogations without counsel being present, regardless of whether the defendant waived his rights. The Louisiana Supreme Court disagreed, citing Montoya v. Collins (955 F. 2d 279, 1992), which they interpreted as holding that a defendant must request counsel before the Jackson rule can be invoked.

Issues Brought Before the U.S. Supreme Court

The overall issue brought before the U.S. Supreme Court was the parameters governing application of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel at all critical stages of criminal proceedings. Based on the majority opinion (U.S. Supreme Court, 2009), what was not before the Court was whether:

a defendant had a right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment

this right can be waived by the defendant if voluntary, knowing, and intelligent the defendant can waive this right without counsel a Miranda warning is sufficient for notification of the right to counsel

Majority Opinion

At issue, according to the majority opinion, was how to apply a uniform rule across all states for deciding under what circumstances a waiver can be judged invalid (U.S. Supreme Court, 2009). Some states have equated notification with invocation, thus preventing police and prosecutors from 'badgering' the accused after arraignment. The Court viewed Edwards v. Arizona (451 U.S. 477, 1981) as sufficient for providing a prophylaxis rule against later waivers; however, Edwards was not interpreted as a complete bar against the defendant seeking out the police voluntarily. In other states, a Miranda warning is considered sufficient notification, but not equivalent to invocation. In other words, a defendant in some states has to request representation unequivocally for Edwards to be invoked.

The majority opinion also discussed at length the problems that the ruling in Jackson v. Michigan creates for the latter states (U.S. Supreme Court, 2009). The Court in Jackson held that being informed of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel is legally equivalent to invoking this right, and therefore the police must not initiate contact with the defendant after arraignment. The majority opinion held in Montejo v. Louisiana that the Jackson rule is unnecessary because Edwards provides a prophylactic rule against badgering by the police that can be applied to all states. The Court therefore overturned Jackson. The Miranda-Edwards-Minnick rulings, with Minnick v. Mississippi (498 U.S. 146, 151, 1990) finding that a defendant cannot be interrogated without counsel being present after invoking the right to counsel, are, according to the Court majority, sufficient safeguards against badgering. This ruling leaves it up to the states to decide whether being advised of a Sixth Amendment right to counsel is sufficient to trigger Edwards.

However, the Court is aware that the Montejo majority opinion significantly changes the legal rules regarding the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and therefore views Montejo as having acted as though the Jackson rule was in effect at the time of his arraignment (U.S. Supreme Court, 2009). For this reason, the Court remanded Montejo to allow the defendant to pursue claims that the waiver was involuntary and unknowing.

Dissenting Opinion

The dissenting opinion interpreted Jackson as providing prophylactic protection against police-initiated contact for the purposes of interrogation once representation has been requested or assigned by the court, whether or not the defendant knowingly invoked his or her Sixth Amendment right (U.S. Supreme Court, 2009). The dissenters wrote that the authors of the majority opinion failed to uphold stare decisis for seemingly arbitrary and unsupportable reasons. In essence, the dissenters found that overturning Jackson violates the intent of the Sixth Amendment to provide a barrier between the defendant and the state.

Discussion

The majority decision in Montejo to overturn Jackson represents a major shift in the procedural rules governing the Sixth Amendment right to representation. Prior to this decision, once a criminal defendant was formally charged the police could not interact with him or her without first notifying defense counsel of their intentions (Bretz, 2010-2011). Any post-arraignment waivers would therefore be held invalid under the Sixth Amendment and represent a violation of substantive law. Under Montejo, whether a Jackson-like procedural rule applies will depend on how states decide to manage this area of jurisprudence.