Rule-breakers received swift punishment. Deviation from the norm was not tolerated by law or by social convention. Just because a moral standard helps create a stable society does not mean that moral standard is just, good, or right. Finally, the use of coercion itself denotes an unnatural moral standard. It takes relatively little coercion to ensure that most people don't murder or steal. Most children internalize the types of moral standards that Rachels generally accepts as universal. By extension, some moral standards may be universal throughout time. Rachels indirectly distinguishes between moral relativism and cultural relativism. Moral relativism assumes the total lack of universal ethical truths, the lack of any benchmark to measure right and wrong. Cultural relativism may refer to behaviors, customs and traditions that do not carry any moral stigma. Preferring potatoes over corn, or goat meat over chicken, is one way of describing cultural relativism that is not necessarily moral unless one culture believes it wholly immoral not to eat a certain type of meat. However, the ban on eating cloven-hooved animals in the Old Testament has little rational morality attached to it. As Rachels points out in Chapter 4, "Does Morality Depend on Religion?" The will of God expressed in religious text is not necessarily a sound base for logical moral arguments.

One of Rachels' main criticisms of moral relativism is its unsound logic. Just because a culture believes something to be true does not make it so. It is one thing to respect cultural differences and yet another to assume that the differences preclude value judgments. Moral progress evolves when a society changes its norms from within, to create social values that are rooted more in reason and common sense than in outmoded tradition. As Rachels points out, some societies may cling to the belief that the Earth is flat. Their belief is not morally wrong but it is nevertheless incorrect. To hold cultural relativism as the ultimate standard is to become unintelligent. Morality, like science, can point to proven truths....

Science evolves: what was believed true even a decade ago can be disproved today. Similarly, morality evolves. What was acceptable behavior last year may not be acceptable a decade from now.
Rachels does not entertain the possibility of moral devolution because although it is possible for a society to revert back to outmoded moral codes, it rarely happens. Although some feminists claim that back in the day societies were matriarchal and peaceful, evidence suggests the contrary. Most societies and cultures have rewritten their moral codes to reflect more enlightened values. It would be almost inconceivable to reinstate slavery in the United States or to wrest suffrage from women. One of the ways moral codes progress is through political protest and grassroots organization. Rachels mentions Martin Luther King as an example of how moral codes can progress as a result of social struggle. Another way moral codes can progress is from increased contact between cultures. The exchange of ideas can lead to moral progress. Without needing to force moral values on other cultures, a society can lead through example.

Thus, moral relativism and cultural relativism have their place. They prevent people from assuming absolute rational standards, and they encourage open-mindedness and tolerance (Rachels). Cultural relativism prohibits social Darwinianism, ethnocentrism, and arrogance. On the other hand, cultural relativism can be dangerous. Relativism can lead to apathy and passivity. If a person believes that morals are relative, based only on closed cultural codes, then killing, maiming, and beating can become condoned behaviors. Relativism leads us to look away when wives are being beaten by their husbands, or when businesses are cheated of their investments. Moral codes can and do evolve. They evolve out of necessity and out of the universal truth that some actions are inherently wrong because they cause pain and suffering for no apparent reason.

Works Cited

Rachels, James. The Elements of Moral Philosophy. 2nd edition. NY: McGraw Hill, 1995.