Oklahoma City bombing: preventative lessons and law enforcement response

Oklahoma City Bombing as a Blueprint for Lessons Learned

On April 19, 1995, 168 federal workers were killed by a terrorist bomb in the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. This tragedy caused law enforcement authorities to focus more than ever before on designing preventative measures toward terrorism. There was nothing authorities could do to undo the events of the day. However, they could at least learn from it and hope to prevent these types of horrific incidents from occurring in the future. So what did they learn?

Suspicious Activities Preceding the Event

It could be argued that McVeigh's clean record made it impossible to predict what was about to take place on April 19, 1995. After all, he had served his country, he had never been arrested and most people considered him to be a likeable guy. The ingredients he purchased to make the bomb were not especially alarming either. But this does not mean that certain clues were not available that could have led law enforcement authorities in his direction. For example, he had been seen driving around with a truck full of propane tanks. Most notably, the day before and the day of the bombing, witness had seen McVeigh suspiciously lurking around the Murrah building. According to the Homeland Security Newswire (2010) "The day before the bombing, McVeigh parked a car at the federal building and walked several blocks to an alleyway where another car was parked with a note saying the vehicle had broken down and was awaiting parts. He did that four times in a day" (p. 1). Apparently, McVeigh was mapping out his getaway route. This seems like something that should have been a clue that some type of suspicious activity was taking place. However authorities have learned from their mistakes. Now, many parking garage attendants and security officers undergo what is known as First Observer training. According to the Homeland Security Newswire (2010) First Observer Training follows the motto "if you see something, say something." The activities witnessed do not have to be illegal, just suspicious. McVeigh parking his car and walking back and forth four times in a day was not against the law, but if it had been reported as a suspicious activity, one of the biggest tragedies in history might have been prevented.

Terrorist Preparation

A terrorist attack as large scale as the Oklahoma City bombing requires careful planning, including the procurement and assembly of the explosive device. In this case, the terrorists used ammonium nitrate fertilizer -- around two and a half tons of it. McVeigh's military background had already taught him all that he needed to know about weapons and explosives. He merely needed to obtain the proper materials and build a bomb. Some of the materials were bought and others were stolen. Then it was time to assemble the bomb. As CNN (2004) reports, co-conspirator "Fortier told the court that McVeigh had written to him in the fall of 1994, 'telling me him and Terry had decided to take some type of positive action, and he wanted to know if I wanted to help them.' Prosecutors contend Nichols and McVeigh began buying the fertilizer that was used in the Oklahoma City bomb during that period" (p. 1).

Many people saw McVeigh assembling the bomb at a nearby lake, but no one reported any suspicious activity. As the Homeland Security Newsletter explains, "McVeigh had pulled his Ryder moving van loaded with 55-gallon drums up to a local lake. No one bothered to report the incident though it probably appeared he was prepared to dump toxins into the lake. As it turns out, he was assembling the explosives." Obviously the people who saw McVeigh at the lake were not really sure what exactly they had witnessed, so they probably did not see any need to report McVeigh's actions to the authorities. However, as the First Observer training model emphasizes, the actions observed do not have to be illegal to be reported, they merely have to be suspicious. Therefore, "if you see something, say something."

Making the Grade

Ultimately, the authorities cannot be blamed for their lack of knowledge prior to the event. Firstly, no one reported any of the suspicious activity that was occurring. Secondly, McVeigh had no previous record or any indication that would target him as a possible terrorist. Thirdly, considering that McVeigh chose the wrong building, even if the authorities had taken notice of the Waco two-year anniversary, the Murrah building probably would not have been included in any extra security measures because it was not involved. Therefore, it is difficult to give the authorities any type of "grade" because although they failed to prevent the attack, there were so many factors beyond their control that it is difficult to blame them. That does not mean, however, that important lessons were not learned.

Summary Report and Conclusion

Although there was little that authorities could have done to prevent the 1995 terrorist attack on the Murrah building, knowledge regarding preventative measures needed for future occurrences have emerged from this tragedy. Firstly, authorities have learned that security personnel, as well as the general public, need to be trained to spot "suspicious activity" and promptly report it. Secondly, the authorities now know that extra security during anniversaries of events such as Waco or the 9-11 terrorist attacks is of paramount importance. Lastly, they learned that you cannot judge a book by its cover. A terrorist is not necessarily of Middle Eastern decent. He can be a white, clean cut man who has dutifully served his country and has a clean record. These lessons are being applied to terrorist prevention activities today, which is ultimately the only positive thing to have come out of the horrific Oklahoma City bombing.