Napoleon\'s Influence on Lee Robert

Napoleon's Influence On Lee

Robert E. Lee, in his attempt to use Napoleonic war strategy, made many of the mistakes that Napoleon made and came to defeat and victory in much the same manner as did Napoleon.

The purpose of this study is to identify the Napoleonic tactics utilized by Robert E. Lee in the Civil War and to show that use of these tactics resulted in Lee experiencing some of the same victories and defeats as did Napoleon in the use of the same tactics due to the changing nature of warfare in both cases.

Defensive-Offensive Maneuvers: Attack from a strong defensive position after the enemy who has attacked is weakened in strength. (the Molossian Naval Academy, nd)

Turning Maneuvers: Indirect approaches that attempt to swing wide around an enemy's flank to so threaten the enemy's supply and communication lines that the enemy is forced to abandon a strong position or be cut off and encircled.

Envelopment: This maneuver is one in which "a secondary attack attempts to hold the enemy's center while one (single envelopment) or both flanks (double envelopment) of the enemy are attacked or overlapped in a push to the enemy's rear in order to threaten the enemy's communications and line of retreat. This forces the enemy to fight in several directions and possibly be destroyed in position." (the Molossian Naval Academy, nd)

BACKGROUND of the STUDY

The work of Rothenberg states that warfare in the 19th century was quite different from the transformations that took place during the time of the wars of Napoleon. Prior to other weapons being introduced, specifically stated is that the: "...limitations of the musket determined battle tactics. To compensate for the extremely low accuracy of the individual shot, mass fire was required and to achieve this, the battalions were formed in elongated lines, three deep, firing volleys on command." (1978) This required precision timing and soldiers had to keep alignments of the formation "straight" and correctly spaced distances with commands timed precisely." (Rothenberg, 1978; p. 15)

To understand the context the duties in war of soldier this research looks to the work of Grimsley who informs this study that: "Infantrymen fought on foot, each with his own weapon. Cavalrymen were trained to fight on horseback or dismounted, also with their own weapons. Artillerists fought with cannon." (1997) Rothenberg writes that artillery had become "militarized and shed the last remnants of its ancient guild status. Generally, armies were well supplied with field pieces, firing 6-, 8-, or 12-pound projectiles, though they still lacked organic transport. Guns and ammunition supplies were dragged to the battlefield by hired civilian drivers." (1978)

It was not until sometime between 1756 and 1763, during the Seven Years' War that pieces were not very heavy or flexible in terms of mobility. Therefore, guns must be situated before the beginning of a battle therefore location, location, location...as the saying goes. (Rothenberg, 1978; p.15; paraphrased) Artillery underwent lighting quick evolution beginning the middle of the eighteen century and onward with artillery becoming "lighter and more maneuverable, and equipped with better aiming devices." (Rothenberg, 1978; p.15) the French Army, when taken over by Napoleon was characterized by a strategic aim resulting in "fast marches." (Slavkov U. Brna -Austerlitz, nd) the French army was stated to have been capable of cutting march time of a distance in half as compared to other armies. Furthermore, these armies were able to use a compact formation "of columns up to sixteen rows deep, which could consist of an infantry battalion, or a square foot of soldiers known as a 'carre'. These tactics put the enemy at loss, surprised by its violence and made it possible to defeat the enemy to a man." (Slavkov U. Brna - Austerlitz, nd)

I. OVERVIEW of NAPOLEON BONAPARTE

The work entitled: "Introduction to Napoleon and Europe" states that one must understand that Napoleon did not "lose his wars by himself or with the help of the weather alone; his adversaries won them. The allies developed new methods of organizing and using their armies large in response to Napoleon's exploits. His continental foes aped what they saw as key aspects of Napoleon's military system in order to defeat him...Perhaps the allies defeated Napoleon by becoming Napoleon." (Rothenberg, 1978; p.15) the work entitled: "The Battle of Three Emperors" states that the feature that was most outstanding in Napoleon's system of warfare was "its flexibility and limitless variations." (2008) Napoleon's strategic maneuvers had "one specific purpose in mind, a decisive battle." (the Battle of Three Emperors, 2008) According to Ross (1985) Napoleon "always understood the necessity for combined arms operations and noted that 'infantry, cavalry and artillery cannot do without one another." (Ross, 1985) Ross further states that Napoleon "always relief upon surprise and speed." (1985) Also characteristic of Napoleon in terms of combat style was "boldness and flexibility." (Ross, 1985) the 'Old Regime' style battles were "marked by rigid tactics." (Ross, 1985) Formation of troops was in a linear fashion in which "close range volleys...[were]...traded...with enemies until one side broke." (Ross, 1985) Ross relates that this method resulted in casualties "as high as forty percent of the forces engaged." (1985; p.3) Napoleon learned some bitter lessons of war in the Battle of Waterloo.

II. OVERVIEW of ROBERT E. LEE

The work of John Lord entitled: "American Leaders: Robert Edward Lee" states that Lee exhibited: "...the triumph of profound intelligence, of calculation, and of well-employed force over numbers and disunited counsels." Lee's campaigns and battles "exhibit the triumph of profound intelligence, of calculation, and of well-employed force over numbers and disunited counsels." (1990) Stated additionally is: "Lee's campaigns and battles "...exhibit the triumph of profound intelligence, of calculation, and of well-employed force over numbers and disunited counsels." (Lord, 1990) Lee followed the Napoleonic tactics of war and Napoleon's war maxims ultimately to the defeat of his army in the Civil War.

III. VICTORIES of NAPOLEON and LEE COMPARED

Battle of Pyramids

Napoleon marched his troops across many miles of desert in the country of Egypt in a battle against the Marmelukes in May 1798. The Maramlukes had been trained as soldiers since they were small children. This was a battle in which steady fire upon the Marmaluke horsemen quickly won the battle of the Pyramids for the French and left Napoleon's army entering the city of Cairo in victory.

Battle of Austerlitz

The Battle of Austerlitz was fought "on December 2, 1805" and "was the decisive victory that Napoleon sought.' (Ross, 1985) Napoleon's army caused the allied forces to fall on the right through weakening the center of the allied forces with the assistance of reserve corps that had arrived the previous night for this purpose. Napoleon's troops covered eighty miles in only 50 hours moving up from Vienna entering the battle on the right of Napoleon "right directly off the march." (Ross, 1985; p. 7) Ross (1985) states:

When he felt that the allies were fully committed against his right, Napoleon unleashed his strategic reserve against the Austro-Russian center. After bitter fighting, the French broke the allied center and pivoted south against the allied left wing. When the allies finally retreated, they left behind 27,000 casualties -- a third of their original strength. The Austrians soon sought an armistice while the Russians marched back to Poland." (p. 7)

The communications of the other army was weakened through Napoleon's striking his enemies "with deep, rapid, slashing maneuvers that threatened their communications and threw them off balance strategically and psychologically." (Ross, 1985; p. 7) the rapid and continuous blows on the enemy is accredited by Ross (1985) to be due to the ability of Napoleon's army to "...move rapidly with a minimum of logistic support and their tactical proficiency on the battlefield." (p. 7) the Defensive-Offensive maneuver was used in the battle of Austerlitz by Napoleon. (the Molossian Naval Academy, nd)

Lee's Second Battle of Bull Run

The second Battle of Bull Run was fought in 1962 between Union army General John Pope and Lee's army. Jackson's unit attacked Pope's advance units at Cedar Mountain situated near Culpeper Virginia. Jackson's unit comprised by 23,000 men "swing in a wide circle around Pope's army. On August 26 he swooped down on the federal base at Manassas Junction, captured or destroyed supplies, and then made a stand at Manassas, the site of the First Battle of Bullrun." (American Civil War, MSN Encarta, nd) the tactic used by Lee for winning in this battle is known as turning maneuvers. (the Molossian Naval Academy, nd)

Wagram Campaign

Napoleon's Wagram Campaign is stated in the work of Epstein (1994) to have been fought in two phases. The first phase involved building bridges from a "small series of islands in the middle of the Danube." (Epstein,; p. 148) the second phase was a night assault ordered by Napoleon. Epstein states: "The battle of Wagram was a battle of attrition determined by the number of troops and the volume of firepower." (p.163) Epstein writes that the battle of Wagram illustrates the fact that "the nature of the ground and location are determinative in the tactical deployment." (p. 164) the army of Charles was defeated in this battle however, it was not destroyed. The total loss of life in this campaign for each side of the battle was astronomical.

Chancellorsville

The work of Lieutenant Colonel Herman L. Gilster entitled: "Robert E. Lee and Modern Decision Theory" published in the Air University Review (1972) states in the Battle of Chancellorsville, in Virginia in May 1863 involved a battle between the Union Army of the Potomac, headed by Major General Joseph L. Hooker and the Army of Northern Virginia, led by General Robert E. Lee. Specifically stated is:

During the campaign, Lee, with a force approximately half the size of Hooker's, repulsed the North's advance into Virginia and achieved a strategic victory that has been studied by students of military art throughout the world. However, today's critics of the quantitative-oriented decision tools being used by our military services say that this battle would never have transpired if these same tools had been used then. They feel that under the present decision-making process Lee would not have met Hooker's advance but instead would have retreated to southern Virginia or even into North Carolina. Contrary to that course, Lee decided to give battle, and he won a brilliant victory." (Gilster, 1972)

Gilster writes that in this battle "Lee had interpreted Hooker's strategy. Leaving Major General Jubal Early, C.S.A., with 10,000 men to face Sedgwick, Lee moved his units towards Chancellorsville. The first clash occurred on the afternoon of the first, and Hooker, apparently having lost his courage, gave up the initiative and recalled his much larger force to Chancellorsville into a defensive position. That night Lee and Lieutenant General "Stonewall" Jackson, aware of Hooker's hesitancy, conceived a daring plan. Lee would maintain his position with approximately 17,000 men and demonstrate against Hooker's front, while Jackson would take the remaining force, using Major General Jeb Stuart's cavalry as a screen, and turn the enemy flank." (1974) it took most of the next day for this movement by Lee's army however, just prior to sunset "Jackson struck Hooker's exposed flank. The battle raged during the night until the Federal Army gave way before Jackson's thrusts." (Gilster, 1974)

Tillburg (1990) states: "Lee had suffered an irreparable loss at Chancellorsville when "Stonewall" Jackson was mortally wounded. Now reorganized into three infantry corps under Longstreet, a.P. Hill, and R.S. Ewell, and a cavalry division under J.E.B. Stuart, a changed Army of Northern Virginia faced the great test that lay ahead. "Stonewall" Jackson, the right hand of Lee, and in the words of the latter the finest executive officer the sun ever shone on," was no longer present to lead his corps in battle'." (1990) the maneuver utilized by Lee in Chancellorsville was that of the 'envelopment'. (the Molossian Naval Academy, nd)

IV. DEFEATS of NAPOLEON and LEE COMPARED

Te battle of Asper-Essling was one of defeat for Napoleon. One reason believed that Napoleon's army suffered defeat in this battle is because Napoleon "...failed to take into account the murderous violence of artillery fire of the Austrians."(Epstein, 1994) Epstein notes the "...high proportion of Austrian guns" to the men in the army of Napoleon. (p.101) in a letter to Eugene, Napoleon wrote that he believed his army has faced more than 400 guns in the battle of Asper-Essling. Because of this, Napoleon is said to have secured 683 guns prior to entering the Wagram Campaign. Smothers (2007) writes that mistakes made by Lee in the Civil War Battle of Antienam included that Lee, "...against the advice of his subordinate generals chose to fight in an area with the Potomac at his army's back and insufficient room to maneuver and totally outnumbered." However, while the confederate plans were known to McClellan leading the Union army he was nevertheless suffering "what Lincoln called the 'slows'." (Smothers, 2007) Antienam ended up being called a 'draw' with neither side winning this battle. Smothers writes that Lee made mistakes in two other battles: (1) the Battle of Fredericksburg: Lee defeated Burnside but chose the wrong battlefield. Burnside moved back North with no decisive victor in this battle; (2) During the Battle of Gettysburg "when he ordered a ruinous charge against entrenched Union forces up Missionary ridge." (Smothers, 2007)

V. The BATTLE of WATERLOO and the BATTLE of GETTYSBURG

The battle of Waterloo was the last battle of Napoleon's career and was a defensive battle following wet weather. Robert M. Epstein, in the work entitled: "Napoleon's Last Victory and the Emergence of Modern War" writes that in his use of 'Napoleonic' war tactics, Robert E. Lee made a decision that Gettysburg should be a decisive war - and indeed it was because it was this battle that determined the winner of the Civil War. Epstein additionally states in Chapter 12 "The Emergence of Modern War" that the decisive victories of Napoleon "were only possible against the obsolete armies of the 'ancien regime'." Epstein writes that a war is considered modern "when it was marked by the fullest mobilization of the resources of the state, and when operational campaigns were used to achieve strategic objectives in the various theaters of operation." (1994) Additionally "those operational campaigns were characterized by the use of opposing symmetrical armies raised by conscription, organized into army corps, maneuvered in a distributed fashion so that tactical engagements are sequenced and often simultaneous, with decentralized command and control, and a common doctrine." (Epstein, 1994)

Rory Muir, in the work entitled: "Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon" relates that the smoke was so thick at Waterloo that is was described as "we breathed a new atmosphere - the air was suffocating hot, resembling that issuing from an oven. We were envelope din thick smoke' or 'we every instant expecting through the smoke to see the Enemy appearing under our noses, for the smoke was literally so thick that we could not see ten yards off." (1998; p. 21) Muir describes Waterloo as being a battlefield that was "unusually small" and one that had that day "a high density of soldiers and particularly intense fighting on positions which scarcely changed throughout the day. Evidently there was little or no wind, and both Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte caught fire, adding to the murk." (1998; p.24)

Tillburg (1990) states of the battle of Gettysburg:

The gently rolling farm lands surrounding the little town of Gettysburg, Pa., was fought one of the great decisive battles of American history. For 3 days, from July 1 to 3, 1863, a gigantic struggle between 75,000 Confederates and 97,000 Union troops raged about the town and left 51,000 casualties in its wake. Heroic deeds were numerous on both sides, climaxed by the famed Confederate assault on July 3, which has become known throughout the world as Pickett's Charge. The Union victory gained on these fields ended the last Confederate invasion of the North and marked the beginning of a gradual decline in Southern military power." (Tillberg, 1990)

Even the greatest among military commanders make mistakes. Some of these are exampled in Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo and Lee's defeat at Gettysburg. Robert E. Lee, Confederate field commander is known to have made a great mistake on July 3, 1863 in a wheat field in Pennsylvania. Nearly 13,000 Americans were ordered forward in what was suicide mission. There were three reasons that Lee ordered Pickett to charge:

1) Lee believed that it was the weakest point in the Union Defense Line (directly at the center); (2) Lee thought that Colonel Anderson's artillery would soften the Union Defenses enough to enable his infantry to carry the ride;

Lee was convinced that the Army of North Virginia was unable to be beaten on the field of battle. The Confederate Army of Northern Virginia numbered over 74,000 men and had defeated the Union army in the two previous battles. (Tillberg, 1990)

Furthermore, Lee had received reports from Confederate scouts that reinforcements were moving toward the Union army, which were damaged by the Confederate attacks. When Lee heard this he believed that the army must be weakest at its' center. The second point of consideration was that Lee's army was low on cannon shell therefore the prospect was of either division of artillery and attack of the Union at its flank again or concentration of artillery in what was to be one last assault upon the weakest part of the Union army. Lee had instilled a great amount of faith in Napoleonic tactics. Finally, Lee was sure that the Northern Virginia Army was an unbeatable force. Factors that Lee failed to consider the first of which was that while the Union Army did receive reinforcements on both flank sides the center of the Army was stronger than Lee had anticipated as there were approximately 20,000 as compared to the belief of Lee that there were only 5,000 at the center. Additionally, instead of as at Fredericksburg, when Lee's artillery were firing downhill at the forces attacking them in Gettysburg the cannon was firing at an uphill angle and the Union army was protected by a stone wall and slope that was angled and since the Union army was positioned where Lee's artillery could not see it they had no method of determining how much damage, if any that they were inflicting. Another major difference was the absence of Stonewall Jackson who would likely have attacked fully on south Gettysburg on the high ridges.

McPherson (1988) in the work entitled: "Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era" states that the reason for the battle tactics in the Civil War being poor in nature is due to the Napoleonic training of officers. Napoleon's battle tactics are stated of McPherson to have "...emphasized close-order formations of soldiers trained to maneuver in concert and fire by volleys." (1988) Tactical offensive moves of Napoleon included using "his artillery in conjunction with infantry assaults, moving the field guns forward with the foot soldiers to blast holes in enemy ranks and soften them up for the final charge." (McPherson, 1988) in the work of Marino the battle tactics of Napoleon are summarized in the statement of:

Napoleon did not fight battles simply to win possession of a field, or to claim a victory that could then be exploited through diplomatic channels or peace treaties. Instead, Napoleon fought his battles with the singular purpose of utterly destroying the enemy and forcing his will upon a vanquished foe. He did not always succeed in this purpose, but he fought every battle with the same intent. Naturally aggressive and possessed of an iron will and great determination, Napoleon simply sought to overwhelm his enemies." (1998)

Another problem for Lee when using Napoleon's tactics is that by the time the Civil War had begun the weapons used in battle had changed because rifles had been developed and manufactured in the decade prior to the Civil War. The work of McPherson (1988) notes that there were two impacts due to weapon transition "it multiplied casualties, and it strengthened the tactical defensive." Stonewall Jackson's war tactics were quite different from Lee's in that Jackson wanted to make the North feel the cost of the war through "unrelenting war" in the homeland of the people of the North that would make them face "what it will cost them to hold the South in the union at the bayonet's point." (Bevin, 2007)

It is stated that the war was won by Sherman for the North "by employing precisely the strategy that Stone wall Jackson had tried but failed to get the South to follow..." (Bevin, 2007) Lee's strategy was one focused "on conducting an offensive war against the armies of the North. Lee was a brilliant commander and much superior to the commanders of the Union army. Despite Lee's skill as a commander "...his insistence on frontal assaults - led to inevitable defeat. No matter how skilled a battle leader Lee was, he could never win the war by pitting the far-weaker resources of the South against the tremendous economic and military power of the North." (Bevin, 2007) There is great brevity in the foregoing statement in that weaponry advances and the resources to have that weaponry was possessed by only the Northern army.

Bell (2006) writes of the Battle of Gettysburg that the:

climatic Civil War battle around the hamlet of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania spanned over the first three days of July 1863. The green, pastoral fields that today mark the site belie the ferocious struggle that raged over the now hallowed ground of Little Round Top, the Peach Orchard, and Cemetery Ridge. By 5 July, Lee slipped his battered Army south, and a befuddled Union General George C. Meade found himself in control of the field with his Army of the Potomac largely intact. Such an outcome was hardly expected. Lee had out-generaled Union forces since his assumption of command in 1862 but the untested Meade defeated Lee. The South failed to achieve the decisive victory for which Lee yearned and the South desperately needed. " (2006)