The US government has been working all round the clock enhancing its military strategies amid the growing terrorist attacks on its interests. This study critiques two articles whose main ideas revolves around the strategies. It is evident that although the strategies are critical to the citizenry, it is important for the government to keep a lean budget.
¶ … Tea Leaves on Obama's New Military Strategy" and "America's Path: Grand Strategy for the Next Generation," focus on President Obama's new strategy of promoting growth and jobs while ensuring national security. However, these articles could be misleading in a way. In light of the president's action towards national security and the climate, it is unclear whether the government may afford to act on national security and climate change at a time when the global economy is under recovery. These articles could be misleading in some way because they imply that actions towards protection could be more costly than it saves. Stabilizing security by empowering the military saves the economy than it would cost to mitigate the effects of insecurity (Art, 2012).
The articles contain a new defense strategy created to yield approximately $450 billion in budget savings achievable in the next decade. However, the articles have failed to detail programs that must be trimmed or cut in terms of budget. Instead, the articles outline a generalized vision guiding the defense budget decisions of the administration. These articles maintain that the strategy will ensure an effective and safe nuclear deterrent; however, they do not explain the number of nuclear weapons required for deterrence and the costs involved modernizing and maintaining the U.S. military force (Art, 2012). Nevertheless, the strategy articles, "Reading the Tea Leaves on Obama's New Military Strategy" and "America's Path: Grand Strategy for the Next Generation," clearly articulate that it is possible to achieve diverse goals with a small nuclear force. This will minimize the volume of nuclear weapons in the U.S. inventory including their role in the national strategy of U.S..
This plan has attracted remarkable argument across the government. From the two ambitious articles, it is difficult to understand that they are referring to the policy community. It would have been better had the authors thought harder before arguing in the articles. Writers such as Pollack have confessed to having been wrong about nations such as Iraq. In his article, he provides little evidence of his arguments. While most of the administrations get some wrist-slapping light, Pollack argues that the Bush policy is breathtakingly ignorant, arrogant and reckless (Art, 2012).
Most of the judgments in the articles are as sound as the criticism on Bush administration. Because of the stability, prosperity and democratization after the Post-Cold war, it is fundamentally correct argue that the U.S. must commit itself to help the messy countries such as Middle East to come to par. The article proposes a grand strategy similar to America's engagement in the World War II with Europe. Although it is irrational, it is challenging given the global increasing dependency on Middle East oil (Art, 2012).
Basing on the two articles, the challenge is that the U.S. needs to recapitalize every one of the three legs of the atomic triad, and they do not have the money to do it. The articles outline nothing about the part of U.S. atomic weapons in defense policy, but the Obama organization's 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. The gigantic nuclear armor inherited from the Cold War period is defectively suited to address the tests postured by suicidal terrorists and hostile regimes in the 21st century. Keeping up over the top atomic power does nothing to help persuade countries such as Iran or North Korea, or terrorist movements to forsake their pursuit for harmful weapons. It does nothing to motivate nuclear restriction by China and Russia (Art, 2012).
However, the authors are right when they show that tyranny and violence are not hard-chained into Islam besides concluding that the U.S. has overblown the Islamist terror. They are also right to say that internal turmoil in Middle East countries is a strategic threat. This is expected to continue until they develop more opportunities, schools, and accountable institutions. U.S. And Russian atomic armories still surpass what is vital to deter atomic attacks. Currently, the United States deploys 1800 strategic warheads while Russia sends 1550 strategic warheads. Both countries have many warheads in reserve. No other atomic equipped nation deploys more than three hundred strategic warheads. China has close to forty to fifty warheads on intercontinental-range rockets (Art, 2012). Both nations have focused in their financial and security interests in trying to reduce their nuclear powers. Washington and Moscow may seek reciprocal reductions in their entire strategic nuclear armory to a thousand warheads or even fewer. This will make them still hold all the required capacity to prevent atomic assault by any present or future enemies.
The U.S. has to settle on perceptive choices that abstain from wasting the already rare resources to deploy and modernize numbers of atomic weapons. The United States can trim atomic weapons excess, recover at least $45 billion through the next decade, and still keep up a considerable nuclear force. By downsizing the atomic equipped submarine constraints from 12 to eight vessels, the U.S. could safeguard $27 billion throughout the next 10 years and $120 billion over the life of the project (Art, 2012). Eight operational pontoons might permit the Pentagon to convey the same number of heavy bombers as arranged under a new strategy. By causing delays on the new strategic bomber, the U.S. might recover $18 billion through the following decade, as per the Pentagon. There is no hurry to field another strategic bomber given that the Pentagon's plan to convey sixty substantial heavy bombers under a new strategy. Further savings in the budget could be realized by eliminating long-range bombers from the atomic mission.
A percentage of savings from climate protection are indirect. One of the greatest might originate from the U.S. cutting its energy needs by less than fifteen percent, which might end their dependence on Mideast oil. Under that situation, the U.S. could extraordinarily reduce an estimated $200 billion in military costs caused every year to keep oil from the Middle East streaming in their direction. Additionally, once the U.S. no longer needs to prop up Mideast nations to favor their energy policies, they will considerably less subject to terrorist threats radiating from those nations. At that point, the U.S. can scale back some of their gigantic spending on homeland security (Art, 2012). Protection of the climate must be treated as a monetary issue, not simply a natural issue.
You’re 82% through this paper. Sign up to read the full paper.
Sign Up Now — Instant Access Already a member? Log inAlways verify citation format against your institution’s current style guide requirements.