Naturalist claims about the universe

Philosophy

Traditional Naturalist Claims: The Problems Therein

Naturalism is the philosophical position most often advocated by humanists, scientists, and -- obviously -- naturalists. They would have us believe, in the spirit of the 7th century Greek philosopher Thales, that the "natural world [is] a realm of insensate matter and impersonal forces that operate independently of human or supernatural volition" (Prado par. 3-4). The naturalist worldview posits that all phenomena in the universe exist only materially and their functioning can always be explained in mechanistic terms. All philosophers and individuals that put stock in an immaterial world, whether that world is spiritual or otherwise, champion an opposing position. An examination of the traditional claims of naturalism will reveal that the naturalist position is lacking, chiefly because naturalism is a philosophical position not an empirical one. Thus, it is no more deserving of individual faith than a person's belief in the supernatural.

Naturalism believes that the world is constructed and ordered in purely material terms, but there is little evidence to suggest that this is the whole story. For the naturalist, nature is the source of everything in the universe and all rational explanations for phenomena can only be constructed in natural, or material, terms (Dubray par. 1). This position has its value, certainly, because it allows us to analyze phenomena and make reasoned conclusions about the way in which parts of the universe are ordered together. From a material perspective, then, the naturalist position is aptly suited to produce reasonable explanations. However, the staunch naturalist does not simply want to provide material explanations for material phenomena, but instead to insist that there can only be material explanations and material phenomena. Karl Popper, a scientist and critic of this kind of inductive reasoning, explains:

naturalistic methodology (sometimes called an "inductive theory of science") has its value, no doubt. [...] I reject the naturalistic view: It is uncritical. Its upholders fail to notice that whenever they believe to have discovered a fact, they have only proposed a convention. Hence the convention is liable to turn into a dogma. This criticism of the naturalistic view applies not only to its criterion of meaning, but also to its idea of science, and consequently to its idea of scientific method. (Popper 31)

In other words, and importantly, naturalism fails because it presupposes that the explanations is provides are applicable in all situations, before even understanding individual situations. As Popper points out, this is an "uncritical" stance.

In the same vein, naturalists imagine that all situations and circumstances in the universe have a mechanical explanation; i.e., it is possible to provide a natural explanation of every phenomenon (Dubray par. 3). Worse, this obviously ideological position is not supported by anything but the naturalist's wishful thinking. For example, though evolution is the source of heated debate, no self-respecting scientist would argue that contradictory evidence or poor understanding is a challenge to the eventual discovery of the mechanisms of evolution (Johnson par. 8). There is never a doubt in the head of the naturalist that evolution, or any other complex and poorly understood subject, has a natural explanation that can be reasoned out through an examination of possible natural mechanisms. but, of course, this position is not a function of empirical fact, and it would be a stretch to definitely state that macroevolution is well documented at the empirical level. Rather, the faith in evolution as a mechanism of species change is based on the philosophical presupposition of naturalism, not evidence that such a mechanism actually exists (Johnson par. 3).

The naturalist position is further "bolstered" by a fundamental faith in the veracity of sensory inputs and human cognitive processes, a faith that is woefully misplaced. In fact, the naturalist belief in random evolution undermines any belief in the ability of human senses to derive truth about the workings of the universe (Plantinga 2). Those who believe in a supernatural deity often believe that said deity imbued human beings with the ability to acquire and understand knowledge. If this is the case, it is possible for human beings to use their minds to discern the nature of reality. But if instead humans are simply the product of randomly accrued changes through natural selection, then there can be no such guarantee. Our physical senses and cognitive processes wouldn't have developed with reliability in mind, but rather with survivability. The mind or the senses are only important, in the naturalist context, to the degree that they better allow an individual to survive to pass on his/her genes to the next generation (Plantinga par. 3). From this, we can argue that naturalism undermines its own claims about the ability of human reason to generate useful and reliable information about the workings of the universe.

Despite these obvious problems with naturalism, its proponents continue to take up the charge that nothing exists beyond the material world and that all explanations for phenomena can be reduced to mechanistic ones. That naturalist believes that the uniqueness of human beings -- or any object -- can be recognized "while retaining a view of ourselves as entirely natural creatures whose behavior is in principle explainable using standard scientific methods" (Prado par. 1). The argument from naturalism begins with this supposition and supports itself roughly by laying claim to natural explanations of natural phenomena as proof that there can be no other explanations for no other kind of phenomena.