Negotiations: principles, strategies, and outcomes

¶ … board member is "given the clear PURE priorities in this case what negotiation strategy do you propose (before or during the negotiation) to ensure that such priorities are very well addressed and secured? (This is a strategy question around how to maximise your influence in this multiparty negotiation, please do not provide a 7-party 7- element analysis)

One of the tricks to successful negotiation is knowing that negotiations begin long before the parties sit down to discuss solutions. How a person sees the issue can impact how a person views concessions and whether or not they are able to reach their desired deal. I understand that my own personal reference for the negotiation is going to frame it and shape how I function during the negotiation. Therefore, rather than choosing to view this negotiation as a dispute with the towns and the national government, I am entering the negotiation with the mindset that I am completing a deal with the other parties (Raiffa, 2002). This point-of-view is enhanced by the fact that the President of SAN called the meeting, and he has become the spokesperson for community concerns about the project. By constantly reminding myself that I am trying to find a solution that meets the needs of all of the involved parties, I am more likely to find a solution that meets PURE's needs. If I can frame the negotiation in a way that emphasizes referents that "lead the opposition to a positive frame and couch the negotiation in terms of what the other side has to gain," I am more likely to gain concessions from the other parties (Neale and Bazerman, 1992). I intend to do this by emphasizing the positives that PURE has already brought to the towns, and, while I will listen and acknowledge the changes that the towns have felt because of PURE, taking every opportunity to show how perceived negatives can be positives. I want to make sure that, at every point in the negotiation, the parties are aware of what they could lose if PURE walked away from the table, without ever once seeming to threaten them with walking away from the negotiation.

Interestingly enough, because of the large number of parties involved in the negotiation, I feel as if going into the negotiation with a negotiation strategy set-in-stone would actually be counterproductive to a successful negotiation. I will not have the same level of control that I would in a two-party negotiation, and, if I tried to assert that type of control, I would be seen as dominating the negotiation, so that any negotiated deal would be viewed with hostility and suspicion. Moreover, "once three or more conflicting parties are involved, coalitions of disputants may form and act in concert against the others" (Raiffa, 2002). If the parties form coalitions against PURE, then I lose the bargaining advantage that I have by being the person able to offer a positive benefit to the other parties. Therefore, I intend to approach the negotiation as a joint decision-making process. Moreover, because it is clear that there are some major points of contention between the towns, I am going to make my best efforts to act as a mediator in their disputes. If I can make PURE appear to be an entity that has not only enhanced the quality of life in each town, but has also helped soothe some animosity that exists between the towns, then I am going to be in a good position to get concessions from each of the involved parties.

In addition to seeking concessions, one critical part of my negotiation strategy is going to be to make concessions. In this negotiation, PURE is going to be viewed as having more power than any other single party, except the national government, which will probably be taking a hands-off approach during the negotiations if possible. In fact, PURE could probably go into the negotiations without making any concessions. The result would almost certainly be a 1.5% tax, but PURE could refuse to make any voluntary payments, and the towns could be left to deal with any issues about how to distribute the taxes. However, taking that type of approach would be very damaging to the future relationship between the towns and PURE. Therefore, I want to make sure that PURE appears to make concessions to the towns, and that the towns are very aware of the concessions that I will make on behalf of PURE. For example, during the negotiations I may offer the towns the right to free field trips for their school-children, a fringe benefit I have been authorized to offer, and which would actually probably result in an increase in PURE's profit because of the associated costs of concessions and souvenirs. However, I would label this offer as a concession, rather than assuming that the offer would be considered a concession (Malhotra, 2006). Moreover, I would emphasize the benefits the town would receive from that concession by putting a dollar value on the cost of the concession. Furthermore, after giving a concession, I would demand and define reciprocity (Malhotra, 2006). For example, if PURE can provide a real value of a certain dollar amount to each town, it would be reasonable for me to request that they reflect that increase in value by decreasing their tax requests.

Furthermore, I do have some concerns that at least one of the parties is going to try to engage in some form of hard-bargaining tactics, including threats or ultimatums. I need this negotiation to end successfully, or at least for the majority of the parties to come to an amicable solution, therefore, I need to make sure that I retain control of the turns in the negotiation. For example, if one of the parties offers me an ultimatum, rather than respond to the ultimatum, I am going to let it sit there for a few moments without a response, and then suggest alternatives to what they could have meant by the ultimatum. I am the only party that will be seen as a bully if I ruin negotiations, and the only party that not feasibly return to the bargaining table if I left the negotiations as the result of an ultimatum. Therefore, I will not allow another party to push me out of the bargaining process.

2. Another board member has asked how you will reconcile personal and company interests in this difficult high stakes negotiation. The tension between principal and agent is a common body of theory within negotiation literature. Please provide a short analysis of how you will work through this tension in the forthcoming negotiation.

The first thing that I have done to work through the inherent conflict in the principle/agent relationship between me and PURE was to sit down and consider any sources of tension in my relationship with PURE. If I am unaware of potential conflicts in our relationship, it is impossible for me to deal with those conflicts. Instead, I might assume that I am acting to further PURE's interests, when I am really acting to further my own interests. I examined what PURE's objectives are in this negotiation, as well as its overall corporate strategy, and asked myself whether I could work towards furthering those objectives. I knew that I could work to further objectives that did not always perfectly align with my own, but that I needed to ensure that working to accomplish PURE's goals would not be morally questionable or objectionable to me. However, I am aware that this type of questioning analysis is an ongoing process. If I discover something during the negotiation that means I cannot honestly and in good faith negotiate in PURE's best interests, then I have to be able to contact the board and inform you of a potential issue. If that issue cannot be resolved in a way where I can continue to act in PURE's best interests, then I must be willing to walk away from the negotiation, knowing that will mean walking away from my job and any future opportunities with PURE. To do otherwise or to do so in an irresponsible manner, would mean that I had failed in my duties as PURE's agent. I had to determine whether or not I would be willing to walk away from my job in that situation, even though I do not anticipate that situation occurring, before determining that I could be an effective agent for PURE.

Fortunately for me, my interests and PURE's interests in this negotiation are very closely aligned. I sincerely believe that PURE's presence in this region of France is bringing opportunity to the towns and that it is in the towns' best interests, as well as PURE's best interests to come to an amicable agreement that will remove any obstacles to the park's construction. I have personal motivation for wanting to reach a successful agreement; doing so will allow me to prove myself capable of international negotiations, and pave my way to even larger challenges within the company. PURE wants me to reach a successful agreement so that there are not any delays or stumbling blocks to the opening of the amusement park. However, while our interests are closely aligned, it would be erroneous to assume that our interests are identical. PURE is highly interested in receiving a tax rate below 1.5% and in minimizing the amounts of its voluntary payments to the towns. However, PURE has authorized me to enter into an agreement with a 1.5% tax rate and to make certain voluntary payments based upon the taxing amount. This means that I might be pressure to give the towns more than they are actually going to demand in order to reach an agreement for the company. I would still be seen as a successful negotiator, as long as I was able to help negotiate an agreement that might block development of the park, but PURE might face substantial financial losses.

The reality is that, as an agent for PURE, my duty is to ensure that I am always looking out for PURE's best interests. However, as a negotiator working with human beings with valid concerns, I have to keep in mind that the financial bottom line is not always the best bottom line and that focusing solely on finances could be detrimental to PURE's long-term interests in the area. I also need to keep in mind that it is possible that my principal needs additional information before committing to a decision. While this answer may be unpopular with the board, it is important to realize that negotiations can and should be places where the parties come together and develop creative solutions to problems. I cannot possibly anticipate all of the possible solutions that the towns might propose, and neither can the board members of PURE. Internal negotiations can stifle external negotiations. Therefore, I feel like I must remind the board that "no matter how creative and flexible the internal process may be, it is likely to result in instructions that unduly tie the hands of a negotiator acting on behalf of an institution" (Fisher, 1990).

In order to ensure that I represent PURE's interests, I am going to focus on things other than getting a commitment from the towns. That does not mean that I will agree to something outside of my authority. However, it does mean that I am going to look at the interests of all the parties, the legitimacy of any proposed agreement, the relationship between the parties, the BATNAs for each party, the options for each party, the commitment for each party, and the communications between the parties (Fisher, 1990). If I do not focus on things other than getting the commitment, it is possible that I might actually agree to something detrimental to PURE's interests. Therefore, if one of the towns has a proposal that seems as if it will be beneficial to PURE, but is contingent upon something outside of my authorization, then I am not going to reject that solution out-of-hand. If the creative proposal really seems that it might be in PURE's best interests, then I will be honest with the other parties, tell them that element is outside of what I am authorized to negotiate, but that I think it would be of interest to PURE and would like the opportunity to bring it to the company. I understand that this might greatly compromise my future with PURE, but, as an agent, my duty is to PURE, not to my own future. Furthermore, if I am able to spot an opportunity and provide a greater benefit to the company, that is only going to add value to my reputation as a negotiator.

3. A long serving board member is a little concerned about your style of influence and she wants to know how you will manage this in a potentially difficult negotiation. Most people have an inherent style of negotiating. Please go back to the Kilmann profile you developed in class and provide how you can use this profile to your advantage in this negotiation. (Please avoid general description of each negotiation style as that is not the question)

There are strengths and weaknesses to each negotiation style, depending on the goal of the negotiation. Many people think that a competing negotiation style is necessary, because the assumed goal of the negotiation is that the negotiator wants to win the negotiation at all costs. I may be incorrect, but I think that is probably the board member's concern, since I do not score highly in competing. In fact, with a competing score of 2, that is my lowest negotiation area. Moreover, I am relatively high in both avoiding and accommodating, with 5s in both areas, so I can see some concern that I would acquiesce on important issues in order to reach a consensus with the towns. However, my highest scoring areas are collaborating, where I score a 10, and compromise, where I score an 8. Fortunately, those are the two areas that will be needed the most for this negotiation.

While many business people think that negotiation is about entering a room and coming out the victor, the reality is that such a scenario does not reflect negotiation, but bullying. Negotiation does not have to be a form of dispute resolution, but can be a form of deal making, instead. In fact, my high scores in compromise and collaborating are a great reflection of how I view the negotiation process. To me, negotiation is not supposed to be an adversarial process, especially when the parties to the negotiation are expecting to continue in a long-term business relationship. To approach the mayors as if they were my adversaries would create long-term problems for PURE and would be detrimental to the likelihood that the parties would reach some type of agreement. Because I have selected a joint-decision making model, I will need to approach the negotiation from a collaborative perspective, and try to find a win-win solution for all of the parties involved. This will be especially complicated given the number of participants in the negotiation. Furthermore, because some of the participants are coming into the negotiation at a disadvantage when compared to other participants, it may be difficult to keep my empathy for them from swaying my professional position.

However, it is possible to combine empathy and assertiveness in negotiations. Empathy refers to an "understanding of the other side's needs, interests, and perspectives, without necessarily agreeing" while assertiveness is "advocacy of one's own needs, interests, and perspectives" (Mnookin, Peppet, & Tulumello, 2000). Empathy, which is a tremendous part of the collaborative process, does not mean that I am going to somehow begin advocating for the other parties. My role and my goals can still be clearly defined, even at the same time as I am exercising empathy for the other parties involved in the negotiation. "Empathy requires neither sympathy nor agreement…nor is empathy about being nice" (Mnookin, Peppet, & Tulumello, 2000). Instead, it is a way of exploring someone else's perspective without making any commitment to it. Because I want to encourage the towns to explore non-monetary solutions to their concerns, I need to understand their perspectives, even if I do not agree with them.

That I do not have a competing negotiation style makes me less likely to engage in the type of belligerent behavior that some people incorrectly associate with being assertive. "An assertive negotiator begins with the assumption that his interests are valid and that having them satisfied is legitimate" (Mnookin, Peppet, & Tulumello, 2000). Moreover, an assertive negotiator is able to identify interests, explain them clearly, make arguments if necessary, and ask difficult questions (Mnookin, Peppet, & Tulumello, 2000). This is the type of behavior expected by the French during negotiations, so, even though my scores in accommodating and avoiding are relatively high, I should be able to be assertive without fearing the social consequences for doing so.

In fact, my collaborating/compromising negotiation style reflects the fact that I am able to combine empathy with assertiveness. Successful negotiators need to possess that ability, and the fact that I can do so means that I will have an advantage in the negotiations, even if the other parties enter the negotiations with different styles. Of course, it is true that a collaborative approach by all the parties would be the most helpful, since "problem-solving negotiations go better for everyone when each side has well-honed empathy and assertiveness skills" (Mnookin, Peppet, & Tulumello, 2000). However, my success is not dependent upon the other parties' abilities. "Problem-solving negotiations go better for an individual negotiator if she both empathizes and asserts, even if the other side does not follow her lead" (Mnookin, Peppet, & Tulumello, 2000). Moreover, empathy and assertiveness help in two areas of negotiation: value-creation and value distribution. Moreover, "the assertive negotiator confronts interpersonal difficulties as they occur, rather than permitting them to fester, and thus makes long-term cooperation possible" (Mnookin, Peppet, & Tulumello, 2000).

The primary concern that my negotiating style creates is that I prefer to avoid certain disputes. I already have a strong feeling that I want to avoid being involved in the towns' decisions of how they are going to distribute funds. However, the reality is that we may not be able to reach an agreement if those specific issues are not addressed at the negotiations. I do have a strong gut feeling that how they distribute those funds is not my problem. However, avoidance would be counterproductive. This is not a dispute that, if avoided, will go away. Furthermore, even if I think that we have reached an agreement, if that agreement is contingent upon the towns reaching a later agreement that is only a tenuous, temporary solution. If I avoid being involved in that scenario, I may miss the only opportunity PURE may ever have to reach consensus and use this conflict for problem-solving.

My secondary concern is that I am an accommodator. However, because I know that I am an instinctual accommodator, I am careful to make sure that any accommodations I offer to make are the result of a conscious choice. I have considered whether this negotiation will trigger my accommodating tendencies, and I feel like some aspects of it will. For example, I think the reason that I want to avoid discussing how the towns distribute their money is because I think that Magny has been unfairly impacted and deserves a share of that money, but am worried that I do not have the power to change how the taxes are distributed. Knowing that my accommodating and avoiding sides might work to prevent an agreement, I can take steps to make sure that I am dealing with issues as they arise, and that I am only making accommodations as the result of conscious choice.

4. Another Board member's mother was born in this area of France is particularly concerned about how you will manage cultural differences in this negotiation. The theory and practice of intercultural negotiation has come a long way over the last 20 years. Please provide your best advice on how you will manage this difference in this specific negotiation. (Please avoid general description of how a range of different cultures negotiate, this is not essential to the question)

It will be difficult to handle the cultural differences because so many things that are rolled into the genre of manners and are seen to signal respect vary across cultures. My response to things that are not intended as insults may be very emotional, and even if I am able to control the outside characteristics of that emotional response, those emotions will change how I respond to the negotiating process. Moreover, I may inadvertently do things that would come across as being rude or dismissive, when that is not what I intend by the behavior. I would really like the opportunity to talk to this board member, or the mother if possible, to learn about the culture of that specific area of France. While I can learn a lot about the cultural of France through books, articles, and websites, talking to an actual resident who grew up in France, and who, presumably, also lived outside of France, would give me great insight into the cultural differences that I can expect. Furthermore, the President of SAN may be a good resource to ask about any local customs, and I could approach him for that information without making him look as if he is playing favorites. While the national government has to appear neutral, the President of SAN has already stated that he thinks PURE is going to be a benefit to the communities, so his providing me with small amounts of assistance would not be inconsistent with his public persona.

One of the things that I have already done to help manage these cultural differences is to spend time in the local area. I went as a tourist to each of the four towns. My primary reason for doing so was to see if I could find out any information that would help me in the negotiation. However, a secondary reason for doing so was to see if there were any cultural idiosyncrasies present in these towns that differed from what I had previously learned about French cultural norms. Though my observation period was not lengthy, I did not immediately notice any differences from the rest of France.

What I do know is that the French take a different approach to many things than those from countries descended from Great Britain. The cultural similarities between the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States might lead one to believe that negotiating with France, a traditional ally of those countries, would be a similar experience. This assumption is wrong. The French approach negotiation differently than those from English-based cultures. Furthermore, while much of the business world is adopting or has adopted U.S. cultural norms because of U.S. financial dominance, it would be foolish to expect mayors from four relatively small French towns to have adopted the same negotiation style as executives in French-based offices of international businesses.

The first thing that I need to understand is that the French approach time differently. While punctuality is not seen as a weakness, being late is not seen as a sign of disrespect. Therefore, some of the parties might be slightly late to the negotiation without assuming that they are trying to broker power by choosing to come late. This is critical to someone with a more monchronic approach to time, which might put emotionally-weighted interpretations into-time-based decisions. In fact, France, with its polychromic culture, has several cultural features that are related to time. For example, the French are willing to take breaks in negotiations when that seems appropriate (LeBaron, 2003). Doing so could be taken as a sign of weakness in other cultures. This is an important detail for me to keep in mind, because I can use that aspect of French culture to my advantage if a scenario develops in which I need some time away from the negotiations.

In addition, French culture may inhibit the type of communication that I am seeking in this negotiation. French culture fosters an atmosphere where people think that others are capable of reading their thoughts and minds (LeBaron, 2003). This may help create a scenario where people are failing to directly communicate their desires and fears because of a belief that the other party inherently understands them. I will be alert for scenarios where that seems to be occurring, and I will ask a large number of questions aimed at helping me gain insight into the players. Furthermore, I will remind myself to ask these questions while a person is explaining, rather than waiting until the end of an explanation, because the French see interruptions as a sign of interest (Gorrill, 2007). I also need to be aware that the French pay great attention to rules and hierarchy, especially in the public sector (Gorrill, 2007). Because I will be dealing with mayors, I need to ensure that anything I am able to completely support anything I propose that is outside of a formal rule. However, the fact that the French like to adhere to rules should work to my advantage, because the French "have a low tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity" (Gorill, 2007). The mayors, and their constituents, may not have the same financial imperative to reach an agreement as I do, but their cultural norms are going to favor an agreement of some sort. However, I need to be prepared for the possibility that at least one of the towns will suggest having an additional meeting after the first six-hour negotiation; because, in France, "initial meetings are often dedicated to information sharing and discussion, rather than reaching final decisions" (Gorill, 2007). That possibility is actually not a problem, since I want the towns and the national government to be the ones to determine how funds are distributed among those players. As long as we can reach an agreement about the taxing amount and the voluntary payments, and issue a press release about that, I do not have to be concerned about further negotiations between the parties regarding distribution of their benefits.

Of course, during the negotiation, I will try to keep my nonverbal and verbal behaviors modified to reflect what I know of French culture. I will try to maintain an air of formality during the negotiation, make direct but moderate eye contact, speak French when possible, avoid discussing personal topics, allow for rigorous debate, and try not to rush the negotiations (Gorrill, 2007). However, I realize that it is inevitable that there will be some type of culture clash or miscommunication stemming from cultural differences. Therefore, at the beginning of the negotiation, I will be very honest with the mayors and the national government representative, and apologize if I make any etiquette gaffes, explaining beforehand that they will be attributable to cultural differences, not a sign of disrespect. I will also bring a translator if possible. Even if I feel confident that my French or their English will be sufficient for us to conduct negotiations without the need of a translator, it would be a foolish error to allow negotiations to be derailed because of a language barrier.

5. One Board member is concerned about how you will manage the towns if they become united and form a blocking coalition? In this question you will need to clearly understand coalition theory and how you can use it to your advantage. It is expected that your answer will include a relationship map for this negotiation to clearly identify the likely coalitions, your potential coalitions and what you think PURE should do to manage this.

The concern that the towns, or at least some of the towns, will form a blocking coalition is a valid one. Three of the towns have strongly expressed concerns that the PURE project has been detrimental to their towns and will continue to be detrimental to their areas. On the surface, their concerns may seem unimportant because the PURE project has the backing of the national government, but news that some of the towns have formed a lobby to represent their interests in the project certainly signals a willingness to work together to gain some control over the project, even if they will not be able to block it. However, it is important to keep in mind that if the towns form a coalition, that does not necessarily signal something detrimental to PURE. On the contrary, "coalitions can bring advantages to the party across the table as well….a collation is likely to lead to a more efficient negotiation process that could benefit everyone involved" (Harvard Law School, 2009). In fact, there is already a good foundation for a working coalition- SAN. The President of SAN has a positive image in the community and would be a good person to front a coalition, if the towns felt it necessary to form a coalition.

In order to manage the towns, I need to understand the relationships between each party involved in the scenario. This process will involve making a relationship map. The first step in making a relationship map is to clarify and prioritize PURE's interests. The second step in making a relationship map is to identify all relevant players. The third step in making a relationship map is to identify all relevant players' key interests. The fourth step in making a relationship map is to identify and characterize the relationships among the players. The fifth and final step in making a relationship map is to plan and implement a sequence of one-on-one negotiations to leverage and/or reshape the relationship map to serve PURE's short- and long-term interests (See generally, Falcao, p.2).

PURE's interest is to keep the taxe professionelle at or below 1%, although the company acknowledges that the government might impose a tax up to 1.5%, and that 1.5% actually appears to be the going rate for such a tax. Furthermore, PURE wants to keep its total output minimized, but has authorized some monetary relief to the towns. The amount of the authorized voluntary monetary relief is based on the tax rate. PURE is also concerned about the strength of the long-term relationship with the mayors and the towns. PURE wants a friendly relationship, but will not give up any of management or control of the amusement park to the towns. All of these objections must be met in order for me to enter into any type of agreement.

The relevant players in this negotiation include PURE, the mayor of Bailly, the mayor Cheesy, the mayor of Coupvray, the mayor of Magny, and the national government. PURE's objectives are stated above. The mayor of Bailly is concerned that her town has been unfairly treated because it is bearing the burdens of the project, but will not receive any significant tax benefits. She will be seeking a voluntary payment from PURE. The mayor of Cheesy is very anti-PURE, but his town will benefit from any taxes imposed. There may be personal animosity between the mayors of Cheesy and Bailly. The mayor of Coupvray wants the 1.5% business tax, may be willing to give some percentage of her tax revenue to other towns, and is seeking a voluntary payment from PURE. The mayor of Magny might be focused on negotiating with the national government and getting tax revenue from the other towns. The national government wants to open up France to more international investment, and wants to avoid alienating people in the towns. The government is also going to want to avoid giving out its own money.

It would make sense for all four towns to band together to form a coalition, especially since the towns of Magny and Bailly have already joined together to form a lobbying group. However, the animosity between the towns makes it unlikely that all of the towns will join together. Cheesy seems unlikely to join with any of the towns, but, because it has no allegiance to any of the towns, could easily join with Magny and Bailly if doing so would further his purposes and make it appear to his electorate that he was opposing PURE. The mayor of Coupvray has mentioned a willingness to share tax revenue with the other towns, which might make it difficult for Coupvray and Cheesy to be allies. None of the towns are likely significant support from the national government, but the fact that they are bringing publicity to the issue also means that PURE is unlikely to get the strong support from the national government that has been expected and extended up till this point.

While the first impulse might be to quiet the mayor of Cheesy, his public position means that he cannot be the first mayor to capitulate to PURE. I have to be able to give him the opportunity to agree without losing face. Therefore, I need to concentrate on the other mayors. The first mayor I would speak with is the mayor of Magny. I would tell him that I agree his town has born an unfair share of the burden, and see about making concessions. I would tell him that I can authorize a voluntary payment, but that my payment amounts are capped based on the percentage of the tax that is imposed. While I do not want to be involved in how the taxes and voluntary payments are distributed, the reality is that is the stumbling block for the negotiations. Everyone understands that the project is going to continue; the negotiations are about the cost of finishing the project. To claim neutrality after disparately impacting the four towns is disingenuous. Money is going to be part of the negotiations, so I would discuss possible figures based on equal and unequal sharing of tax revenue at different percentage points. Next, I would speak to the mayor of Coupvray. I would discuss the fact that she seems to recognize that two of the towns have had an unfair burden from the project and thank her for her willingness to share tax revenue. However, I would explain my concerns that Cheesy would not do the same and mention that the amount of any voluntary payment I can authorize is limited by tax percentages. I would ask her to agree to a tax rate of 1%, but forego annual payments if she did not share with the other towns. Finally, I would approach the mayor of Bailly. I would use the same negotiation strategy as with the mayor of Magny. I have intentionally put Magny and Bailly at the ends of the negotiation, so that any pre-existing alliance may seem tenuous. While it may serve my interests to align them, I also want to preserve the ability to seem as if I am able to place their interests at odds with one another. Likewise, I would not speak to the mayor of Cheesy first, because I do not want to further empower his squeaky-wheel philosophies. Ideally, I would like to be able to present a negotiated agreement to the national government without asking for its intervention. Barring that possibility, I want to be able to approach the national government from a position of having tried to bargain with the towns and get them what they need, rather than be seen as trying to stonewall the towns.

6. One critical issue for PURE on the agenda is a joint MOU for going forward. Given that different parties have different "positions" and that this issue is so important to PURE the Board Member wants to know how you will achieve consensus to a collaborative approach between all the different parties in moving forward.

While the different parties have different positions, those positions are not necessarily indicative that they are not interested in coming to an agreement. After all, the mayors and the national government are all willing to sit down at the negotiating table, which is somewhat at odds with some of the public statements that have been made, suggesting that they are unwilling to compromise. PURE also remains the only party able to offer significant positive benefits. While the other parties can refrain from engaging in negative behavior aimed at hurting the PURE park's chance of success, PURE can engage in behavior aimed at helping the towns. That means that I will have the ability to provide incentives for any individual who is not willing to work in a collaborative approach. However, I need to be careful not to feel too confident in the negotiations. Before entering the negotiation, I must "reflect on the possibility that [my] expectations are incorrect- and actively seek out information that might prove [me] wrong" (Harvard Law School, 2008). If the other parties are actually going to have the same bargaining strength that I have, I may not be able to the first thing that I intend to do is tell the other parties that I want us to take a collaborative approach to the negotiating process. I would tell them that we have a lot of different parties with different interests, which may make it seem impossible for everyone to walk away from the negotiations feeling satisfied, but that I think that is a possibility. Rather than each of the parties trying to guess what the others might want to achieve from the negotiations, I am going to suggest that we agree to listen to each other's positions in order to gain understanding about those positions. I am also going to suggest that we start prioritizing our individual wants and needs. I will even given them an example of the things I would like to accomplish in the negotiation. For example, I will tell them that I want to minimize the tax rate, so that I can maximize the amount of discretionary money I have to give the towns in the voluntary payments. This is true and also demonstrates an immediate willingness to make a concession towards some of their demands- making the voluntary payments- without making any type of commitment to those payments, and making it clear that voluntary payments are going to be contingent upon the tax rate. By opening up the negotiations with an indication that I am going to be willing to be part of a collaborative process, I hope to foster an environment of cooperation.

I am entering the negotiation knowing that many of the parties have strong emotional connections to the outcome of the negotiation, and have already developed strong emotional reactions to PURE's presence in the area. I know that those negative emotions can inhibit a collaborative approach to negotiation, because negative emotions do not lead people to explore value-creating options, and even if a dispute is solved, it can lead lingering resentment, which might cause future conflict (Shapiro, 2006). Therefore, what I am going to do is try to use positive emotions to help motivate collaboration. The good thing is that the parties involved do not have to enter into the negotiation with positive thoughts in order to have positive thoughts. "Negotiators may experience positive emotions toward one another due to joint participation in the negotiation process, joint brainstorming on the agreement, or a positive emotional connection with one another" (Shapiro, 2006). Therefore, if I can try to actively engage each of the parties in the negotiation process, and show some movement towards their positions so that they feel as if their participation is meaningful, I can help create positive emotions about the process itself, thereby increasing the likelihood of collaboration.

The biggest threat to the collaborative approach is that one party will enter the negotiations from a competitive point-of-view. The most important thing for me to keep in mind is that I cannot allow another person's competitive approach to sway my approach to the negotiations. I must remain firm and assertive, without ever being belligerent or seem as if I am lacking empathy. My biggest concern is that the mayor of Cheesy may be very competitive in his negotiation style, because so much of his public image is based on his active resistance of the PURE park in his area. If he behaves in an ultra-competitive and hardball manner, I plan on rephrasing his statements, to show empathy, but also to remove the emotions that he attaches to the statements. For example, if he demands voluntary payments from PURE because he says the project has caused physical damage to the town, I will not ignore that statement. However, I can rephrase it by saying something like, "Do I correctly understand what you are saying to mean that you feel as if the project has caused financial damage to your town and that you deserve some monetary compensation for that damage?" Instead of arguing with his position, that question acknowledges his position without admitting guilt or without committing PURE to any remedies. Hopefully, using reflective speech to get agreement from him on some matters will help foster a positive environment. I will also use other types of turns to help keep the process running in a collaborative manner. I will make sure that I remain a credible advocate, and not allow any party to cause me to act defensively (Kolb, 2004). Moreover, I will actively seek participation from each of the parties, which will position us as partners in the process (Kolb, 2004).

Oddly enough, one of the most important things I can do to keep the negotiation running as a collaborative process is to be willing to stick with my no. I have been given a clear set of objectives by PURE's board, and I do not have the authority to enter into an agreement that does not meet those objectives. Therefore, I cannot let the towns think that they ever have a chance at getting more than $14 million each year in voluntary payments, because that is not possible. There are several steps I must observe to ensure that I am sticking to my no. The first thing I need to do is be very clear and direct if something is outside of my authority, and not to obscure that fact with softening details. I need to make sure that my "no" is not weak; if there is a reason I must say "no," I need to offer the real reason rather than offering excuses. I need to be empathetic, but I need to make sure that my empathy seems honest, rather than forced or fake. I need to make sure that my no is legitimate and that I do not get pulled into a battle of wills with any of the parties. Finally, I need to make sure that I do not give any of the parties false hope. For example, if I go through the entire negotiations acting as if I can authorize larger voluntary payments than I can, I might actually derail the entire negotiation process and lose my credibility (See generally, Weeks, 2004).

7. The question of boundaries between ethical and unethical practice in any negotiation is critical. Several issues in this case appear to cross that ethical boundary. One board member is keen to hear your view on negotiation ethics particularly as large sums of money are being discussed and the opportunity exists by any party to take advantage of the situation.

I do not think that the ethical concerns in this scenario are quite as troubling as some of the board members may believe them to be, because the results of the negotiation will be open and subject to scrutiny by the national government. Obviously, I will not be going into the negotiation offering full disclosure to the other parties in the negotiation. For example, though I have discovered that a 1.5% tax rate is basically standard, I will be arguing against the imposition of such a tax rate. I also will not be disclosing the amounts I am authorized to spend for discretionary payments to the towns, because I hope to keep the amount of those payments under my authorized limits. Furthermore, I believe that the other parties are already engaging in these types of little lies and omissions, even prior to the beginning of negotiations. The rumored amount of the voluntary payments they expect to receive is a form of pre-negotiation pressure. However, it is expected that parties to negotiations will engage in a certain amount of puffing, or suggesting that things are slightly different than they are. This is simply part of the negotiation process, and is something that I will expect and anticipate. I will not accept any offered fact without proof of that fact. For example, if a town states that an increase in property prices has caused an exodus of young people from the town, then I am going to want to see supporting statistics showing that exodus before making that fact an issue in my decision-making process.

While I do expect some amount of puffing, I agree with Charles Craver's position that there are three types of misleading conduct or statements that should be avoided in a negotiation: affirmative misrepresentations, partially true statements, and impermissible omissions (Craver, 2005). First, I think that I have a duty to avoid making any affirmative misrepresentations to the other party. For example, while I am going to argue against the 1.5% tax rate and use examples of towns that do not impose that tax rate, I am not going to state that a .5% tax rate is the standard rate. While I may omit the information that a 1.5% tax rate is standard, it is not permissible for me to lie about a fact which I know to not be true. In fact, it is within the context of this tax, a major fiscal liability for PURE, that I expect to have to be the most careful with my own personal ethical behavior.