Negotiations Strategies and Outcomes: Camp David Negotiations

Negotiations Strategies and Outcomes: Camp David Negotiations of 1978

Today, one of the most successful frameworks for Middle East peace can be found in the example of the Camp David Negotiations of 1978 between Israel and Egypt. True, relations between the two nations have cooled somewhat, given the current inflamed status of the Middle East in regards to Palestinian nationhood (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005) But because of the peace treaty facilitated by President Jimmy Carter, Israel still remains in a state of relative peace with Egypt, alone of virtually all other Arab states. However, this treaty did not become an international agreement without much fraught negotiations between the parties at hand.

According to the Jewish Virtual Library, the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations were concluded by the signing at the White House of two agreements, after twelve days of secret negotiations at Camp David. (JVL, 2005) The first of these agreements dealt with the future of the Sinai Peninsula. This peninsula had been acquired by Israel during the Six-Day War from the invading Egyptian powers. (Israeli Defense Forces, 2005) The first treaty that resulted from the Camp David Negotiations also made peace between Israel and Egypt, to be concluded within three months of the signing, as transpired subsequently. (JVL, 2005) The final outcome of this Israel-Egypt agreement clearly and specifically, in concrete terms defined the future relations between the two countries, all aspects of withdrawal from the Sinai, military arrangements in the peninsula such as demilitarization and limitations, as well as the supervision mechanism. (JVL, 2005)

President Carter witnessed the accords that were signed by Egyptian President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin. The alternatives to such a negotiated agreement were, from the United States' perspective a continuation of the shuttle diplomacy, or incremental, bilateral peace talks as had characterized the previous administration of Henry Kissenger, to broach the differences of the two parties. Instead, Carter opted for a more active and comprehensive multilateral approach. (Issacston, 1992) From the point-of-view of Egypt and Israel, refusing to negotiate meant that Egypt would continue in its state of economic and political isolation from the West, and Israel would remain a hostile occupier of hthe Sinai.

The parties involved, namely that of Egypt and Israel may have been said to have been aware of such unattractive alternatives in the sense they were aware of one another's competing interests in the region and mutual interests in attaining peace. They were also aware of the United States' desire for less acrimony between their two nations, although perhaps uncertain of the degree to which the U.S. wished to reform its strategy. Also, they were not immediately aware of the new United States approach that called for the reconvening of the 1973 Geneva Converference with an interest in creating a permament peace between the two nations.

In terms of their competing desires upon entering the negotiations, Israel wished to retain its security in a hostile region of the Middle East with a buffer zone and the- newly elected Likud Party Prime Minister Menachem Begin wished to retain control and dominance over this land and party. The President of Egypt Anwar Sadat wished for regional peace in the interst of his nation's security, although he also sought to balance in the interests of the militants in his land and within his party. Thus both political representatives of both Middle Eastern nations could claim value, to some extent, in an international political context by seeming moderate compared to the extremists within their own parties and territories.

Even assuming a fixed pie perspective, that neither party could keep as much territory in the disputed Sinai as he wished for his nation both individuals could have been said to have been tactically sucessful in achieving their objectives. Sadat, in November 1977 became the first Arab leader to visit Israel, thereby implicitly recognizing the land and thus encouraged the United States to help improve the troubled Egyptian economy. Sadat's visit strove to make Egypt seem like a more moderate nation than it had been during the Six-Day War that had resulted in the acquisition of the contested terriotires. (Hammel, 2002) Prime Minister Begin, by refusing to squander goodwill, thus showed a willingness to engage with Sadat, as Begin did not wish to seem intransient in comparision to the Arab leader.

Also, less obvious to either Sadat or Carter at the time, Israel was really more comfortable dealing with a purely Eguptian delegation than an Arab faction interested in advancing both Palestinian as well as Egyptian intersts. Thus Begin had an interest in a so-called summit diplomacy strategy of isolating Egypt from other Arab lands and weakening the Arab position, a framing strategy Sadat may have been unaware of at the time to the degree that Begin practiced it. Still, particularly difficult situation arose on day ten of the talks. The issues of Israeli settlement withdrawal from the Sinai and the status of the West Bank seemed to create an impasse, and the mediating Carter had to concede the issue of the West Bank to Begin, while contiuinging to advocate Sadat's less controversial position on the removal of all settlements from the Sinai Peninsula.