Non-commissioned officers in the American Army, 1925–1945

Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) in the American Army 1925-1945

Research initially presented a challenge as a dearth of information addressing specific supporting segments seemed to exist. Nevertheless, as this writer continued to seek information in the library and online Army related websites, the bank of words grew and materialized into this paper.

Facets of the U.S. Army from 1925-1945

The army is always the same. The sun and the moon change. The army knows no seasons." Nathan Brittles, played by John Wayne, made this comment when referring to the army's permanence in the 1949 movie, "She Wore a Yellow Ribbon" (Nugent, Stallings, and Ford). In a sense, the army's permanency may or may not change in time. Regarding changes in the U.S. Army's discipline, training, duties, and weapons however, changes have and will most likely continue, just as during the time from 1925-1945. According to the Army Study Guide, "America's NCO corps and designated discipline details just didn't happen, but evolved over the years, tapping ideas and innovations from many different sources" (Army). Influence of Baron Von Steuben, America's first inspector general, powerfully shaped the structure of NCO corps and ensuing discipline strategies and techniques, not only in the Continental Army, but ultimately within the U.S. Army. Von Steuben introduced and officially established "the Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States, commonly called the 'Blue Book.'"

The "Blue Book" identified "duties and responsibilities for corporals, sergeants, first sergeants, quartermaster sergeants, and sergeants major, while it encompasses the NCO ranks of that day." The book also established qualities a soldier must have to serve in demanding positions. Although the Blue Book ceased to serve as the U.S. Army's regulatory bible after 30 years, it provided the frame for Army guides and manuals used during 1925-1945.

TABLE 1. Life Span of Army Doctrine Manuals

Publication Year

Longevity in Years

Odom 6)

During the period from 1925-1945, and including World War II, similar to war in the eighteenth century, combat consisted of close range fighting, with "massed-fire melee, where rapidity of firing was of primary importance. Accuracy was little more than firing faster than the opposing line." Training for use of weapons, drawn from the manual of arms and firing drills stressed firing speed. Speed of firing, it was determined, was best gained by soldiers repeatedly being drilled handling their firearms. Practices of the firing motions were repeated over and over until the loading and firing actions became automatic. Mechanical firing motions during the time from 1925-1945, for practice and combat, were derived from the following identified eight counts; fifteen motions utilized in the 18th century:

Fire! One Motion.

Half-Cock -- Firelock! One Motion.

Handle -- Cartridge! One Motion.

Prime! One Motion.

Shut -- Pan! One Motion.

Charge with Cartridge! Two motions.

Draw -- Rammer! Two motions.

Ram down -- Cartridge! One Motion.

Return -- Rammer! Two motions." ("Baron...")

While training soldiers in weapons' use, deficits in budgets plagued the Army's "failure to develop adequate doctrine during the interwar years. Without money, the army could not afford the personnel and material required to conduct meaningful training," including adequate training for weapons. In turn, the Army did not follow through with responsibilities noted under NDA 1920 (Odom 200). Economic turbulence and instability hounded the U.S. army until 1925. "As late as 1927, senior leaders reported that stability was the army's single most vital need as it struggled to build a viable force" (Odom, 85). During the thirties, the U.S. army fell to seventeenth among the world's armies. Afterwards, however, the U.S. Army recovered and in time became recognized a prominent powerful military force. Isolationism, alongside the Great Depression, had decreased the Army's concern for readiness, initiating disintegration of military concern. Recovery of the U.S. economy, accompanied by international aggression, eventually again sparked support for military spending. The Army, however, reportedly did not achieve large-scale modernization until France fell in 1940 (Odom 98). A 1935 Gallup poll reporting that Americans would support larger appropriations for military readiness was the first indication of shifting attitudes. Nevertheless, appropriations would not reflect slowly growing popular concern until 1938. (Odom 200)

TABLE 2. Congressional Appropriations for Military Activity, 1925-1940 (dates adapted)

Fiscal Year Ending

June 30

Appropriation ($)

Source: Data from U.S. Treasury Department, Digest of Appropriations (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1921-41).

Odom 82)

During the time frame from 1925-1945, a soldier's duties could change in a moment. The closer a soldier came to combat, the greater his "physical hardihood" needed to be, General McNair contended. "Proximity to combat depended, not on type of job, but on type of unit. A cook or clerk, if in an infantry unit, was likely to have to fight and would certainly experience irregular conditions of living. (Palmer, Wiley, and Keast 41)

Advances in technology advances, as well as soldiers' individuals roles changing during 1925-1945 contributed to changes throughout the Army. "The idea that 'man is least vulnerable when merely clothed against the weather and armored by his own agilities and a steel helmet,' was no longer valid. The modern soldier's challenge was mastery of new weapons and equipment and, most important, their combination. FSR 1939 revealed that the army was unprepared to meet that challenge." (Odom 134)