Nuclear Disarmament Using the Tools

Nuclear Disarmament

Using the tools of social analysis to look at this immense social problem gleans information that demonstrates both the nature of the problem and the immense level of resources and negotiations that would have to take place in order to even begin to reach levels of total disarmament, a goal that many seek, while others thwart it, that is seemingly insurmountable in its complexities. (Nuclear Weapons Proliferation website MSNEncarta) Many cultural issues need to be addressed as well as strategic policies and demands that are as diverse as the types of weapons that exist and the personalities of the nations and individuals involved. The nature of the problem has it seeds in the complicated manner in which nuclear weapons have become so prolific (a fact that you will see in the following passages.)

Realistically, we are now speaking of a low probability of a relatively small event. Large-scale nuclear exchanges seem very much less likely now than they did in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. There simply are not the scenarios in which such an event could occur. On the other hand, the possibility of isolated nuclear weapon use by what is sometimes called a 'rogue state' cannot be excluded. Indeed, some think it likely 'somewhere, some time in this decade, someone is going to set off a nuclear weapon in deadly earnest.'(9)

Smith 9)

According to the National Resources Defense Council, Nuclear Weapons Databook Project there are currently in the 10,600 with 7,982 of those deployed, or ready for utilization within minutes and 2,700 hedged in a contingency stockpile (2002 stats) in the United States. Russia is estimated to have as many or more, in association with the unrest, and therefore limited ability to reduce the stockpile with disarmament, as it is very costly to do so, (70,000 per warhead). (50 Facts About U.S. Nuclear Weapons website) There are at least six other nations that have ready nuclear warheads and several others are suspected of either having nuclear weapons and/or the materials and equipment needed to develop them. (Nuclear Weapons Proliferation website MSNEncarta) it is safe to say that the actual number of nuclear weapons, both deployable and in stockpile is unknown to everyone but the nations and individuals who possess them, but it is estimated to be somewhere in the area of 30,000, of all different sizes and types.

There are also concerns about the "missing" bombs, or those that have been lost in accidents and never recovered, of which the U.S. reports 11, but worldwide it is unknown. Those countries that are still in development of nuclear weapons and nuclear processes for "peaceful" means are highly regulated, by UN sponsored regulatory organizations but concerns about the significant level of secrecy abound as well as the constant fear that terrorist organizations seeking such technology will obtain it and potentially begin a nuclear war, which would likely end in the partial or eventual total destruction of the world as the amount of known nuclear weapons that exist today is enough to destroy the planet several times over. (Nuclear Weapons Proliferation website MSNEncarta)

Consider, for example, the possibility of nuclear winter on both human and nonhuman life on Earth. The nuclear winter theory holds that smoke and dust produced by a large nuclear war would result in a prolonged period of cold on the earth. Early versions of this theory were put forth in the early 1980s by Richard P. Turco, Owen B. Toon, Thomas P. Ackerman, James B. Pollack, and Carl Sagan. They believed that low temperatures and prolonged periods of darkness would characterize a post-holocaust event and obliterate plant life. This, in turn, would threaten human existence.

Mayer 558)

Nuclear weapons were developed by the United States during World War II roughly between the years (1939-1945). Since then, though the stockpile has diminished, in part due to the end of the cold war, which at its height was the peak of nuclear capabilities for Russia the U.S. And other nuclear nations. (50 Facts About U.S. Nuclear Weapons website) the science, technology and resources needed to develop them were significant and continue to be a large portion of the defense budget of the United States as well as other nations. This commitment in and of itself is a significant obstacle in the realization of full disarmament. "There is no immediate prospect of nuclear weapons being abolished/eliminated, notwithstanding the opinions of the World Court and the Canberra Commission." (Smith 9) the estimated 1998 spending on all U.S. nuclear weapons and weapons-related programs: $35,100,000,000 according to the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project. (Brookings Institute website) Despite UN intervention, the development of regulatory agencies, laws to reduce the numbers and many heated discussion between nations with regard to demonstrative changes in armament, real progress is limited by investment, and commitment as well as by many defense and logistics fears and theories, even though most military strategists believe nuclear weapons to be of very little use in modern warfare. "A major factor in the debate about nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence is the assumption that the possession of nuclear weapons is indefensible because of what they may do, and thus that nuclear deterrence itself is morally indefensible."

Smith 9) comprehensive test ban treaty was approved by the UN General Assembly and signed in 1996; over 170 nations have now signed. The treaty prohibits all nuclear testing, establishes a worldwide network of monitoring stations, and allows for inspections of suspicious sites. Conservative opposition to the treaty in the United States led the Senate to reject ratification in 1999; it was ratified by Russia in 2000. ("Disarmament, Nuclear")

One expert also sights that the global need for energy will likely further complicate matters as more and more nations demand the right to utilize nuclear technology in "peaceable" forms to improve energy resources. Additionally, such use of nuclear technology can seriously impede the ability of regulatory commissions and review boards to investigate, as nations have been deceptive in the past with regard to development.

All-round disarmament and concentration on the peaceable uses of nuclear power was, of course, the ideal exorcism of these prospects, but the way to that was tortuous and tangled. Pending its satisfactory navigation, there was no way to deter attack other than to promise instant and massive counter-attack -- a promise only madmen could refuse -- ...A curious paradox has emerged. Let me put it simply. After a certain point has been passed it may be said, 'The worse things get, the better'... It may well be that we shall by a process of sublime irony have reached a stage in this story where safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation.

Best 37)

Anotehr issue that is cleary at stake is the fact that the U.S. And other nuclear powers are so invested in their nuclear weapons that asking other independent nations to relinquish this power hold seems relatively ironic and potentially damaging to the cause.

or, in simple terms, where is the moral high ground when the United States with tens of thousands of nuclear warheads -- or even the UN Security Council with the nuclear-weapons states as the five permanent members -- demands of North Korea that it must not produce a single nuclear bomb?... International agreement will be much easier to achieve on a zero than on a low-limit nuclear weapons regime. An agreement which freezes the right of the existing nuclear-weapons states to retain their nuclear-weapons capability indefinitely is simply not politically sustainable. Verification of zero nuclear weapons will also be easier than of low limits on their numbers.

Thakur 2, 15)

In 1995, the French began a series of test on nuclear weapons that broke with tradition, outraged the world and proved that even though nations may be in agreement with the UN strategies, be signing members of the treaties that regulate them and be accepted members of the global world, they might still challenge the system to better their understanding and hold on nuclear technology.

The worldwide outrage and disbelief provoked by the French decision to resume nuclear testing in 1995 confirmed both the public revulsion against nuclear weapons and their associated infrastructure and the general belief that they are problems left over from the history of the Cold War. I argue that, on balance, the regional and global security risks posed by the acquisition or retention of nuclear stockpiles exceed any security gains that can reasonably be anticipated from such postures. I acknowledge, therefore, that nuclear weapons can confer security benefits, but demonstrate that these benefits are outweighed by the political and security costs.

Thakur 2)

According to Thakur the issue is simple, "We should seek security from, not in, nuclear weapons."

Thakur 15) Thakur goes on to diplomatically outline the problems associated with problems with regard to disarmament.

The nuclear security dilemma is this. The nuclear-weapons states will not give up their nuclear capability without first being convinced that their strategic dominance will not be challenged. But the threshold nuclear-weapons states will not give up their nuclear option without seeing proof of a timetabled move towards a nuclear-free world. The road towards the nuclear-free destination includes still deeper reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the five nuclear-weapons states; further constraints on the deployment of their nuclear weapons on the territories of other states, for example by means of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones; the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; the negotiation of a ban on missile test flights and on the production of fissile materials; and so on.

Thakur 15)

One point that Thakur also makes if that this development of strategic and cultural demands is not achievable unless the demand is global, and includes a zero tolerance policy, which will allow the situation to be more easily investigated and confiremed.

International agreement will be much easier to achieve on a zero than on a low-limit nuclear weapons regime. An agreement which freezes the right of the existing nuclear-weapons states to retain their nuclear-weapons capability indefinitely is simply not politically sustainable. Verification of zero nuclear weapons will also be easier than of low limits on their numbers. The only guarantee against the threat of nuclear war is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. They are the common enemy of mankind.... nuclear weapons... cannot be disinvented. (Chemical weapons are probably easier to reinvent, given how commonly used their ingredients are around the house.) but like them, nuclear weapons too can be outlawed under an international regime that ensures strict compliance through effective and credible inspection, verification and control regimes. In most contexts, a step-by-step approach is the best policy. But such caution can be fatal if the need is to cross a chasm. In the case of nuclear weapons, the chasm that needs to be leaped across is the mental conditioning of national and world security resting on weapons of maximum insecurity.

Thakur 15)

The proposed problems often include such sweeping non-conditional statements that are unlikey to really be passed or implemented given the extremely complicated nature of the situation and the number of players and potential players in it, all with different degrees of investment and agendas.

One possibility is an international treaty signed by all states providing for the destruction of all national nuclear stockpiles; the establishment of an international inspection procedure to see that no nuclear weapons are produced secretly; and the establishment of an international force equipped with, say, fifty nuclear weapons to be used only by order of the U.N. Security Council against any country found to be violating the treaty by building nuclear weapons. This U.N. nuclear force would be used only as a last resort, after diplomatic and political efforts had failed, and then only if circumstances were such that a conventional force would not be able to accomplish the task of disarming the rogue country. As a practical matter, the U.N. force would probably serve solely as a deterrent and an earnest of U.N. intentions.

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The ethical and moral issues associated with disarmament are as diverse as those associated with the strategic and power centered models, many groups for and against the utilization of nuclear technology are outspoken and all have various messages. One of the most morally inept arguments in favor of keeping nuclear weapons is that the deterrence of war is worth the concern, yet no body really believes that a major power would even really use such weapons, as they are far more aware of the whole of their damaging effects than ever before and know that million if not billions innocent lives would be destroyed and the world would be put in serious environmental crisis. The deterrent argument also does not effect those rouge states or terrorist organizations that would be seeking weapons, as they do not necessarily have the same motive for abstention of their use. In the case of the terrorist question, their goals are not based upon material earthly goals or on the defense of their own lives and therefore deterrence is a mute point. Just like deterrence doesn't really work in the case of the death penalty, as the people who commit acts that warrant it do not either care about their subsequent death or do not think they will ever really be put to death. If they have the forethought to believe they will be put to death for their crimes than they would have the forethought not to commit them in the first place.