Paul Wolfowitz Considered by Many

Paul Wolfowitz

Considered by many "one of the most hawkish members of the Bush administration," Paul Wolfowitz is seen as the main artisan of war against terror and is known for his advocacy of military action as the potential and most sustainable and efficient solution for any outside provocation. Working for 24 years under six different presidents, Paul Wolfowitz's career in Washington is circumscribed to his activity within the Department of Defense, as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, during George H.W. Bush's mandate at the White House, and as Deputy Secretary of Defense, but also to his diplomatic activity. Indeed, Paul Wolfowitz has worked in the Department of State as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and has served as the U.S. ambassador in Indonesia for three years.

It is interesting to note, as such, that while on one hand he is renowned for his policies in Iraq and especially for his radical work on the concepts of pre-emption and unilateral military actions as the main strategy for the U.S., on the other hand, he has worked to improve relations with China or to consolidate the strategic alliances with the Republic of Korea and Japan. His work in Indonesia, as the most populated country in the Muslim work is also to be taken into consideration, with both its positive and negative aspects. Was Wolfowitz the lance in a policy that supported regimes and dictatorships such as Sukharto's in Indonesia?

This report will aim to analyze two different periods in Paul Wolfowitz's activity in Washington. The first period revolves around his first Pentagon stay, between 1977 and 1980, when he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional Programs. It was during this time that he released a report with Geoffrey Kemp, and Dennis Ross, titled "Capabilities for Limited Contingencies in the Persian Gulf." The document was to become "the first major assessment of U.S. strategic interests and challenges in the Persian Gulf," relevant for the prophetic prognosis on Iraq and its subsequent role in the Persian Gulf area. He was also the key person in developing the Maritime Pre-positioning Program, which served 12 years later as the strategic background for the U.S. intervention during the first Persian Gulf War.

The second part of the essay will aim at showing how Wolfowitz became one of the theoreticians on neo-conservative thought in Washington and how parts of his papers became the fundamental principles of the Project for a New American Century.

Paul Wolfowitz activity in the Department of State as ambassador in Indonesia and main figure of the East Asia policies are seen by some as characteristic for the Reagan period conservatory actions. While some apologetics have included Wolfowitz on the list of thoughtful Americans aiming to promote democracy in third world countries, his role in East Asia is not considered by all to have had the peaceful and optimistic characteristics many have wanted to give it. Considered Reagan's "point man on Asia," he is shown to have promoted an U.S. policy in East Asia that relied on undemocratically established regimes that violated human rights and were categorized, by any standards, as police states. Examples in this sense include the Indonesian dictator (that the United States helped gained power in the 60s), but also military dictatorships in Korea and the Philippines.

Of course, this is quite relevant for the U.S. approach towards Iraq in the 80s and little reflects Wolfowitz's own work on Iraqi danger. The context was similar and is related to the way the Cold War began to be fought during the 70s and 80s. The two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, had given up on any prospects of direct confrontation and relied on using developing states to fight the war between the two doctrines. This is why the Soviet Union supported Communist movements in Angola, in Nicaragua or Ethiopia and this is why the United States tolerated and even treated as allies undemocratic regimes in Indonesia or Iraq. By the end of the 70s and throughout the 80s, Iraq was already an undemocratic regime. The Baath Party and Saddam Hussein had already successfully implemented a dictatorship, but this was no obstacle in providing them with weapons, including biological weapons, in the war against Iran that lasted for part of the 80s.

As such, in my opinion, we need to point out that Paul Wolfowitz, during his days as a diplomat, acted in line with the U.S. foreign policy of the time, despite his work on the danger that Iraq represented at that time. It seems reasonable to point out that, while writing a paper that showed the "worrisome development" of Iraqi army, he also supported the exact same policy in East Asia. Further more, as many critics show, only a few years ago Paul Wolfowitz helped pass out the legislative act that permitted U.S. training for the Indonesian military, the same military that cruelly intervened in East Timor only some years earlier.

Going back to his 1979 study, "Capabilities for Limited Contingencies in the Persian Gulf," Wolfowitz's position in this book seems to have been one of the two position stands that were mentioned throughout his career in Washington. The second one referred to his 1982 evaluation on China's evolution and his belief that China would soon rival the United States as a world power.

Wolfowitz's study on Iraq has two main ideas. The first one refers to Iraq's preeminence in the Persian Gulf, "a worrisome development." The second idea refers to the response that the United States should use in this case, namely, the use of U.S. "capabilities and commitments to balance Iraq's power," probably in the containment strategy.

Amazingly enough, after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, an army officer briefing Secretary of State James Baker on the situation in the region used the updated report that Paul Wolfowitz had created 11 years earlier.

If we logically analyze the situation in the Middle East during the time that Paul Wolfowitz wrote the respective study, his conclusions may have seemed less strange, but it is always the case that state officials fail to learn from the examples history is keen to present. Short-sighted, senior figures took notice of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, a violent Muslim outburst which also led to taking several American hostages. On the other hand, a revolution itself, while carrying the energy that could lead to trouble, does not have the strong, established institutions to ensure a continuous success. Saddam Hussein had already been in power since 1963. He was the undisputed ruler of the country. With the death of Nasser in 1970, Saddam Hussein was already becoming the pan-Arabic figure that could trigger the necessary anti-American feelings in the area. In my opinion, this was even more dangerous than upright aggression.

Paul Wolfowitz was not the only one who shared similar opinions regarding Iraqi role in the Persian Gulf area. Zalmay Khalilzad, presently White House envoy for the Iraqi opposition, sustained after the Iraq-Iran war that "American backing for Saddam should be reassessed."

Together with Donald Rumsfeld and 16 others, Paul Wolfowitz and Zalmay Khalilzad would send a letter to Bill Clinton in 1998 stating that "failing to move towards the "removal of Saddam Hussein's regime from power" would "have a seriously destabilising effect on the entire Middle East." It is obvious that, at this time, Wolfowitz's opinions are no longer solitary. Further more, they are shared by people whom we can certainly classify as neoconservative, as nine of these hold senior positions in the Bush administration.

The open letter that Bill Clinton received in 1998 is extremely important because of several reasons. First of all, it was signed by people who are now part of the neoconservative Bush administration. Second of all, and having even more relevancy, is the fact that the idea of a regime change in Iraq was already active during the 90s and can in no way be linked to the tragedy of September 11, as the main cause that led to Saddam's downfall. The actual statements of the paper cannot be denied: the U.S. government needs to take the appropriate action that will "eliminate the possibility that Iraq will be able to use or threaten to use weapons of mass destruction. In the near-term, this means a willingness to undertake military action as diplomacy is clearly failing. In the long-term, it means removing Saddam Hussein and his regime from power. That now needs to become the aim of American foreign policy."

On the other hand, the end of the first Gulf War saw Paul Wolfowitz write a draft document that would become the initial founding document for the Project for a New American Century, which was established in 1997 by two of the leading neo-conservatist figures, William Kristol and Robert Kagan.

Wolfowitz's document (it was written together with I. Lewis Libby) argued for several ideas that created the basis for the preemptive action ideology the Bush administration has exercised ever since its first mandate. First of all, the U.S. should "actively deter nations from "aspiring to a larger regional or global role." Second of all, preemptive force should be used to prevent countries from developing weapons of mass destruction and, third of all, the United States should "act alone if necessary." Clearly, all of these correlated ideas have been implementing in Iraq. Further more, all of ideas would be laid out in the founding statement of principles for the Project of the New American Century.

Evaluating what exactly the neoconservatives that have are now in the highest positions of the U.S. administration is a difficult and dangers job. Consternating the need for an objective evaluation, it is best to present all points-of-view. The least radical of these seems to be the one referring to its goal to promote the United States towards global leadership.