Philosopher\'s Knowledge Epistemology: A Review

Philosopher's Knowledge

Epistemology: A Review and Application to My Current Interests and Studies

Epistemology, or the philosophy and study of knowledge, seeks to explain a great deal of components of human knowledge. For instance, epistemic philosophers want to know what knowledge is and what its essential components, in addition to how knowledge has come to be and where it originates. Further, philosophers want to know if humans really can have knowledge, and what kind of knowledge we can if, if we can, indeed, have some type (Moser and vander Nat 2003, pg. 1). The first thing that Moser and vander Nat propose as an area in which epistemic philosophers are interested is the different types of knowledge that exist (pg. 1). Some of these types of knowledge include empirical, or a posteriori, and nonempirical, or a priori. Although many different types of knowledge exist, these two seem to get the most attention from epistemic philosophers. Empirical knowledge is based on evidence, while nonempirical knowledge is not, and is based on "sensory experience" (Moser and vander Nat 2003, pg. 1). Some philosophers do not even believe that a priori knowledge can exist because they believe that evidence is always needed. Two other important types of knowledge that are discussed are the knowledge of truths and the knowledge of things. According to Moser and vander Nat (2003), knowledge by description is always a knowledge of truths because it requires someone to believe that something is true, as opposed to knowledge acquaintance, which imply relies on "direct nonpropositional awareness of something" (2).

Philosophers of epistemology who focus on propositional knowledge, or "knowing something is the case" (Moser and vander Nat 2003, pg. 2) tend to look at four conditions that are required for such knowledge. The first is the belief condition, a one-way relationship between belief and knowledge, which acknowledges that knowledge requires belief, but that belief does not require knowledge. In this vein, then, epistemological philosophers are also interested in belief and what kinds of beliefs that people hold (Mosner and vander Nat 2003). The second condition necessary for propositional knowledge is labeled the truth condition. This condition holds that truth is necessary for propositional knowledge;. That is, something cannot be known unless it is true (Mosner and vander Nat 2003, pg. 6). Thus, epistemic philosophers are also interested in "what constitutes truth" (Mosner and vander Nat 2003, pg. 6). The third condition necessary for propositional knowledge relates to the first two, and suggests that while something must be believed and true for it to be knowledge, it must also not be baseless. In other words, " a groundless "conjecture...might be true and be believed by a person but still not be knowledge" (Mosner and vander Nat 2003, pg. 11). Instead, propositional knowledge requires that "the satisfaction of the belief condition be 'appropriately related' to the satisfaction of the truth condition" (Mosner and vander Nat 2003, pg. 11).

The fourth and final necessary component of knowledge, then, is called the fourth condition, or the "Gettier Problem." While most epistemic philosophers are in agreement that justified, true belief is required for knowledge, they are no longer in agreement that these requirements are sufficient for knowledge because of Gettier's proposition that one might have justified, true belief, but lacks knowledge (Mosner and vander Nat 2003, pg. 16). Thus, epistemic philosophers are concerned with knowledge, and questions such as what constitutes knowledge and how a person can have knowledge, as well as the components -- belief, truth, justification, and the Gettier problem -- that are required for knowledge.

Having examined the types of areas of concern that epistemic philosophers traditionally address, I am aware that they are applicable to almost any avenue of research. While the physical sciences may not find them least applicable because of the scientific belief that knowledge is related to evidence, they are certainly of great applicability to both this field and studies of the more intangible, such as religious studies. In fact, religious studies are those that may be, arguably, most affected by these tenants. Is it possible for three people to have three justified, truthful beliefs? Thus, do all three of these people know something? Thus, I am of the opinion that the areas of concern that most epistemic philosophers exist overlap with areas of concern in nearly ever discipline.

This being said, my concerns have to do with race, gender, culture, and social inequality. Across history, many people have espoused different types of knowledge, especially about African-Americans. Children were told, and people believed, that African-Americans were not truly human, were unable to achieve at the same levels as white people, and were not instilled with the same type of thinking abilities, emotional and psychological aspects, and social abilities as whites. In the same vein, stereotypes as women were masqueraded as knowledge for many years. Many people thought that women were not capable of doing the same jobs as men, and were genetically inclined to doing housework, raising children, and performing other "female" duties. Throughout history, other similar stereotypes about Hispanics, Asians, Polish, Jewish, Irish, and nearly every other type of minority have been acknowledged as knowledge. Today, many people claim different types of knowledge about homosexuals, including scientific, religious, social, and political statements. Obviously, these were not exhibits of knowledge because they did not meet the truth component, but I believe that the formation of knowledge and the studies of epistemology compare with this area of concern as they shed light on the process of creating knowledge and what actually serves as knowledge, as well as the different types of knowledge. Each of these ideas is relevant to my study of cognition and the formation of these ideas.

Furthermore, as I continue to pursue this study, several areas of epistemic exploration will be useful while others will be applicable. First, the most applicable area of epistemic exploration is the question of, "What is knowledge. Specifically, what are its essential components?" (Mosner and vander Nat, 2003, pg. 1). Second, other applicable areas of epistemic exploration include the questions of the origins of human knowledge and how we have knowledge. Third, the area of epistemic exploration regarding whether or not humans can have knowledge is largely unrelated to my present study.

First, understanding what is knowledge is important to my study of the stereotypes of many different ethnic groups, especially African-Americans, that were marketed as knowledge. The epistemic study of what qualifies as knowledge allows me to view the three components required for knowledge in light of my study. The component of belief is, first, rather important. The maxim that one cannot have knowledge without belief is of extreme importance of this study. Many people who held stereotypical beliefs and acted on them in the form of denying service, perpetrating violence, or crude treatment of certain people groups later argued a lack of belief and simply an ingrained knowledge of these stereotypes. Understanding that knowledge requires belief might help debase this argument or bring these people to an understanding of their true beliefs. In this same vein, in order to understand knowledge, epistemic study questions the nature of beliefs, suggesting different types of beliefs that occur and exploring what beliefs actually are. In this study, epistemic philosophers also suggest that "the actions we are disposed to take, when we have a belief, should be appropriate to the belief" (Mosner and vander Nat 2003, pg. 3). Thus, in understand the belief component of knowledge, I will be better able to understand how beliefs, actions, and perpetration of knowledge are combined.

Like the belief component, which has such great implications for my explorations in the knowledge of stereotypes, the truth component is also incredibly relevant to this study. First, the truth component allows for the argument that stereotypes cannot be considered knowledge if they are not true. Second, the epistemological concern of truth allows philosophers and others to study what actually constitutes truth. When one discusses stereotypes, many people have different truths. Some argue that the stereotypes are the truth while others say that equality is the truth. In learning to understand of what truth consists, my study will be greatly benefited. I may be able to understand better why some people called the stereotypes truth and knowledge and others did not. In addition to both these components, the justifiable component will synthesize the previous two components, but the Gettier problem may frustrate my research as I will not be able to come up with a sufficient definition of knowledge based on the three components discussed.