Philosophical foundations of language, truth, and scientific methodology

The nature of science
A number of scientists have the feeling that philosophical inquiries are well outdated. They purportedly can handle matters in a better way than their social constructivists counterparts. Philosophers and physicists are very different from each other, especially taking into account what some renown physicist recently commented on philosophy. Stephen Hawking for instance is on a campaign to tarnish philosophers. He might not be so convincing in whatever points he puts across, but he is winning the heart of the public by his jokes on philosophers. Jokes have for a long time been known to really move the masses. His most recent book, The Grand Design, co authored by Leonard Mlodinow, starts by scrutinizing the nature of reality, the beginning of all things and the purpose of God. He then claims these to be matters of philosophy, which is in itself dead. Philosophy, according to him, is not at par with the current trends in science. This leaves science as the sole tool for increase of knowledge (Hawkings & Mlodinow, 2010). Such books are well received by the society in general, and thus can create some friction between philosophers and scientists, and in particular degrade philosophy . This is especially true when the book is written in an authoritative style like that of Stephen Hawking (Faye, 2012).
At this juncture, let me try to differentiate physics from metaphysics. In summary, physics presupposes metaphysics. Even the most popular authors of scientific pieces find it difficult to put across the metaphysical foundation of their particular study areas through a scientific approach. Kuhn asserted that a given metaphysical idea is normally dependent on the subject’s inclination. Philosophers cannot explain how scientism is categorized as a scientific doctrine. Naturalism is likewise a difficult topic for the philosopher, despite the fact that modern science and philosophy are built on it. The list goes on and on. No matter how you look at naturalism, your arguments will many times be based on philosophy. Take for instance the need to prove that success is an important virtue to pursue. Scientific inquiries on their own cannot lead to meaningful conclusion.
It is quite difficult for scientists to buy some new idea. In the first place, they don’t know what it is all about, and also do not have a guideline on how to evaluate it. Conflicting paradigms cannot be compared easily. It is a fact that holders of different opinions can argue endlessly without coming to an amicable agreement, mostly because their interpretation of basic terms is very different. A single term can bear up to ten interpretations by different scholars. None of the interpretations can be labeled as wrong. The transformation of scientists is therefore a political as well as a subjective process. Kuhn, in his study of Aristotle, experienced some abrupt, intuitive understanding. Scientists are known to only buy ideas which are supported by many others (Horgan, 2012).
Man has for ages desired to understand ‘how we come to know”. Up till now there has not been any agreement regarding this matter, and we don’t expect any in the near and far future. This has for long been the point of focus for great scholars, each of which has postulated different perspectives. Both philosophers and scientists have tried to look into the development of knowledge in the world. They have spent thousands of hours on theories and experiments that would let us understand how knowledge advances in the world. Positivism promoted the shift from a metaphysical to a scientific era. Positivism also advanced human knowledge by finding answers through scientific approach. The proponents insisted on empirical observations. They held this strong opinion that every idea depends on our outlook of life, which again depends on experience. In other words, having passed through some situation , one is thought to have gained hands-on experience, which he/she may use to give informed opinion on related issues. Logical positivists counted observations arising from experience as scientific. Science was to them the only way to find the truth. By it they could know more about the world and how to manage it. They would know the various forces that control the world and how to manipulate the same for the benefit of mankind. This could only be possible through experimentation. Natural laws were affirmed through such experimentation (Shankar, 2017).
Contrary to Ayer’s verifiability, Sir Karl Popper suggests falsifiability as the best way to tell what statement is scientific and which is not. He bases his argument on induction. He asserts that universalization of any hypothesis cannot be complete by merely observing things. In line with this, he gives the famous example of the white swans. Imagine the hypothesis “all swans are white”. I proceed to observe lots of white swans, but then I happen to spot one black swan. This renders the hypothesis untrue, regardless of how many white swans were spotted. This he coined ‘the criteria of demarcation’. It successfully identified what theories were scientific and which were not. Those hypotheses which could be falsified were taken as scientific. Those hypotheses which could not be falsified were taken as non-scientific. He further depicted his arguments by using hypothesis T with observation O. O happens if T stands true. We can still observe O without it necessarily being as a result of T. However, T only yields O, and not any other observation.
Kuhn’s work resonates the most with me. Kuhn solely changes man’s perception of the world. Prior to Kuhn’s work, science itself was filled with philosophical ideas, especially regarding its advancement. Scientific advancement was taken as addition of new truths to the old ones. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defined scientific advancement as correction of previous errors. Whig had previously interpreted scientific history as a long march involving theorists, researchers and experimenters, towards the truth, and more so better understanding of the cosmos.
Whig and Kuhn’s versions of the advancement of science exhibited numerous differences. Whig held the opinion that science developed in a continuous and steady manner. On the contrary, Kuhn identified numerous discontinuities in the advancement of science. The development was characterized by normal and revolutionary periods, where groups of specialists were thrown into anguish. The prevailing needs at a given time would heighten scientific research around a particular problem area. The scientists would work round the clock to ensure they find a solution to the problem at hand. A good example of the revolutionary period is the change from Newton mechanics to quantum physics. This was a mighty conceptual advancement. Kuhn’s work remains quite remarkable up to now. The year 1962 brought great controversies to Kuhn’s work, owing to the challenges it presented to great philosophical theories on how science should operate.
The fact that Kuhn was a physicist, and not a philosopher, made it even worse for scientific philosophers. Kuhn was born way back in 1922 in Cincinnati. He completed his Physics study at Harvard in the year 1943. The University of Harvard was by then a reputable institution with many renowned scholars attending. He quickly gained interest on the radar as a result of the war. He went back to Harvard after the war to pursue his PhD in Physics. He graduated in 1949. The University’s Elite of Fellows elected him to the board. From then on, he worked on quantum physics until his passing on. He also taught the course “Science for humanities”. It was James Conat, the Harvard president who formed the General Education in Science curriculum.
North Americans are much familiar with Ayer’s approach on Logical positivism (Ayer, 1952). Though he later denounced his own book, Ayer is still believed up to date. His work was so influential that he is still read up to date. On the contrary, not many North Americans know Karl Proper, nor his works. In 1934, Karl Propper published The Logic of Scientific Discovery, but it is only now that Europeans have started to know him. Propper’s hypotheses were not that good, a fact which he himself knew. You can call me biased but I do see something good in Popper’s theories. Propper’s downfall may also be attributed to the fact that Logical Positivism is a hard to tackle question. Many philosophers tried their best to handle the subject, in the midst of numerous disagreements between the key players.
I guess all scientists associate with all I have tried to explain above. The issue is as difficult as that. To me, listening to a renowned scholar presenting important advancements in science is just as thrilling as watching an awesome theatrical performance. The arguments for and against, whether science or philosophy takes the day, are exactly what I like hearing. Not only hearing, but I also spend hours every week reading on a variety of published authors on this subject matter. The current trend in matters science is however wanting. The amateurs, some while ago, had unequaled motivation and curiosity. They would start from scratch and get to experimenting so as to give answers to questions that disturbed their minds. A good example is Isaac Newton, before the laws of motion were even discovered. This has lately changed due to the need for professional approach of such matter, and the prohibitive funding required. Scientific research nowadays costs a big fortune, and therefore knocks out many aspiring researchers. It is a fact that media personnel and lawmakers engage in such activities more than the researchers in the labs, and thus are very likely to paint a cynical image of scientists, as merely another minority group.
The divergent demarcation criteria is a relatively general phenomenon. It is evident that philosophers and other theoreticians do not hold the same views on science. Even so, some level of unanimity has been observed in the group of knowledge disciplines. Take for example the claim that astrology, creationism, Kirlian photography, Holocaust denialism, Climate change denialism, ufology, dowsing and ancient astronaut theory are pseudosciences. The status of Freudian psychoanalysis is likewise surrounded by a myriad of controversies, but scholars seems to agree on this to some extent. It is somehow ironical how scholars have largely agreed on some various issues, while at the same time totally disagreeing on some issues. This points us to the fact that we still need more philosophical work done on the difference between science and pseudoscience (The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2016).
Aside from differentiating science and pseudoscience, philosophical reflection has yielded some other problem areas to be addressed. These include: differentiation between science and religion, how science relates to reliable non-scientific knowledge, the extent of justifiable simplification in scientific programs, the implications of the theory of a supernatural occurrence, and the verification of methodological naturalism (Boudry et.al 2010). All the above listed problem areas, and many others, have not yet been analyzed philosophically (The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2016).

References
Faye, J. (2012). The role of philosophy in a naturalized world. EuJAP, 8(1). Retrieved from https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/81b0/d7fb6f73907a14b9c5519b171d3f59520bbb.pdf
Hawking, S., & Mlodinow, L. (2010). The grand design. New York: Bantam Books.
Horgan, J. (2012). What Thomas Kuhn really thought about scientific "truth". Retrieved from https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/what-thomas-kuhn-really-thought-about-scientific-truth/
Shankar, S. (2017). Verifiability and Falsifiability as Parameters for Scientific Methodology. IRA-International Journal of Education and Multidisciplinary Studies, 7(2), 130-137.
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (2016). Science and pseudo-science. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pseudo-science/