Planning and threat assessment in organizational contexts

Law Enforcement - Threat Assessment

THREAT ASSESSMENT and PLANNING

Personal protection encompasses many different considerations and threat assessments that are completely unrelated to the physical condition, personal reputation and character of the protectee, as well as very specific (possibly unique) threats particular to the individual. Idiosyncratic issues may include the physical condition and ambulatory abilities of the protectee, medical conditions, political affiliation, and public reputation.

Likewise, personal protection plans may also have to take into account the ability or willingness of protectees to follow directions and cooperate with protection agents.

The politically unpopular protectee represents several specific challenges, as does the protectee with ambulatory difficulties or delicate medical conditions, especially those requiring continual monitoring and treatment by medical personnel. The combination of a highly negative political profile and ambulatory difficulties with delicate medical circumstances dramatically expands the breadth of personal protection plans. More importantly, the combination of issues often raises more complex threat considerations in combination than the sum total of all individual threat factors. Nevertheless, by identifying each potential threat systematically, the threat assessment plan can account for all conceivable contingencies.

Controversial Public Figures:

Generally, the higher the public profile of a protectee, the greater the potential exposure to threats. That is equally true of traditional VIPs like political representatives, diplomats, and high profile executives. However, whereas the primary threat to the ordinary VIP is mainly posed by lone individuals who fit the traditional FBI profile for ideological zealots (Kessler 2002), the potential threats to the controversial high profile protectee are more likely to involve multiple individuals acting in concert, possibly within a much larger network of ideological opponents.

Therefore, threat assessment planning for controversial high profile public figures should include advance intelligence-gathering efforts such as monitoring available information on opposition groups and organizations. The starting point for threat assessment-related intelligence gathering efforts should emulate the record keeping procedures of the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) in connection with past threats against protectees. In addition to following up on all threats, the USSS maintains a database of all past threats which it continually consults whenever its protectees are scheduled to appear in regions from which previous threats originated (Freeh 2005).

By utilizing publicly available information and proprietary databases, the protective agent should ascertain the whereabouts of all previously identified threats to the protectee on an ongoing basis that coincides with the protectee's schedule. Apart from their physical whereabouts, various recent successes in the Global War on Terror have repeatedly demonstrated the value of monitoring Internet websites and chat rooms frequented by vocal elements of the political fringe.

Irrespective of whether or not they provide actual information as to specific threats against the protectee, those sources have proven remarkably good indicators of the climate prevailing within the opposition community at any given time. In the case of a white supremacist, advance intelligence gathering consists of monitoring the corresponding activist groups of the targets of white supremacists in their publicly available literature, schedules, and websites.

Ambulatory Difficulties:

Protectees with ambulatory difficulties pose additional problems for the personal protection agent. In addition to requiring specialized vehicles for the safe and efficient transport of a wheelchair-bound protectee, the protection agent must train to effect the transfer of the protectee to and from the vehicle used for transport and to minimize the amount of time necessary to complete the transition. In particular, with respect to ingress and egress with a wheelchair, the greatest potential exposure occurs at the entrance to the vehicle in association with motorized elevators and retractable ramps.

The protective agent must train to understand the capabilities (including the amount of time necessary for deployment and retraction) of all mechanical devices used in conjunction with providing convenient access to the wheelchair-bound protectee.

Needless to say, the less time the protectee spends in close proximity to the transport vehicle but outside its protective environment, the less the protectee's threat exposure.

Toward that end, transportation protocol for the wheelchair-bound protectee should include ensuring that any portion of mechanical cycling capable of completion outside the presence of the protectee is initiated before the protectee emerges from a secure location.

For example, the motorized wheelchair elevator of the transport vehicle may take equally long in both directions but the protectee need not be on scene while the elevator platform descends. By delaying the exit of the protectee from the departure location until the transport vehicle elevator is already in the down position and prepared for immediate ascent, the protection agent can reduce the protectee's exposure my more than half in comparison to positioning the protectee outside the transport vehicle while the wheelchair lift elevator descends into the bottom position. The prospect of protecting a wheelchair- bound protectee necessarily adds at least one agent to the protective protocol because an agent (rather than a non-agent assistant or nurse) must control the wheelchair; but the rear position eliminates that agent from any traditional position as a protective shield.

Medical Considerations:

In general, protectees with delicate medical conditions who require perpetual care necessarily multiply the number of protectees by the inclusion of medical personnel. At the same time, medical personnel may themselves represent a potential threat, particularly when new employees replace old employees. Even without primary staff turnover, the protectee with compromised respiratory function requires 'round the clock availability of back-up personnel to fill in where unanticipated circumstances result in the temporary unavailability of the primary medical care provider.

Thorough background history investigations fall under the umbrella of the personal protective agent's responsibilities because once hired, medical personnel have access to the protectee in compromising situation. Furthermore, the ordinary duties of medical personnel provide the greatest opportunity to execute threats against the protectee's welfare by virtue of their specific responsibilities. Similarly, the protective agent should make sure that procurement of all medical supplies and equipment are conducted on an anonymous basis without divulging the identity of the patient except when necessary or absolutely unavoidable. Entities potentially interested in threatening the welfare of the protectee could otherwise attempt to anticipate the identifiable equipment or supply needs of the wheelchair-bound, respiratory-compromised protectee and infiltrate the supply chain. While it is not their primary responsibility, protective agents should be trained to perform the full range of duties normally performed by the medical personnel. To the extent agents are incapable of doing so, any threat executed against the medical personnel may accomplish the ultimate goal of threatening the protectee, albeit indirectly. For this reason, protection agents must train to perform respirator adjustments, change-over to backup equipment, and basic suctioning techniques for ensuring a clear airway under emergency situations. Ethical Considerations: