Dialectic Method Plato\'s Dialectic Method

Dialectic Method

Plato's Dialectic Method

Plato's Dialectic Method

These heterogeneous senses of being explain the unsatisfying conclusion of the proof. The proof of immortality ends with a statement of the kind of thing the soul is. But the proof cannot establish that a certain soul always exists; individual existence as such remains in the realm of body and thus of chance. To the extent that this is the case, the 'proof' of imperishability can only be an assertion or a hope.

Given its position in the dialogue, and given its manifest inadequacy, the final proof suggests the unavailability of a single cause of all coming into being and passing away, a cause that could make intelligible the perfect harmony of humanity and nature. Moreover, it shows Socrates distancing himself from the core of his orthodoxy the doctrine of separate Ideas in this, the last argument of his life. The final argument then confirms the uncertainty that precipitated Socrates' turn to the speeches of humans. Accordingly, Socrates concludes the final argument of the Phaedo with the recommendation that the "initial hypotheses," the existence of the Ideas themselves, be examined. The conclusion of the final proof of immortality directs us back to that ascent characteristic of Socratic rationalism. In this conclusion we see the rationale for the last proof of immortality. It is, at least potentially, a solvent for any sectarianism that might arise on the basis of Socratic orthodoxy.

Phaedo

The 'Phaedo' has often been construed as a dissertation by Plato on the immortality of the soul. In it Socrates claims that the soul does not die and supports the claim by an argument with himself and his friends. One finds 'proofs' which have been repeated many times since: that living is a kind of dying, the surrender of bodily interests for the interests of the soul; that life is followed by death and death by life, 'that which thou sowest is not quickened except it die'; that soul and body are incomparable; that the soul remains the same soul throughout life while the body is constantly changing and renewed; that the soul is not the function or harmony of the body and so ceases when the body dies, because the soul controls the body while no harmony controls its instruments; that the soul is simple and, unlike the body, uncompounded and only compounded things can lose their identity;

There remains, for those who see mathematics as the spiritual source of middle-dialogue paradigmatism, a significant complication attendant upon treating arithmetical (and geometrical) Forms as paradigm cases. It is maintained that the Forms are simple. How, then can Duality be a pair of units or Equality be two (or more) perfectly equal entities, or, indeed, the Triangle itself have three sides or angles or countless points? A key passage in support of the simplicity of the Forms is Phaedo 78 BC where, in response to Simmias' fear that the soul may, at death, be scattered about, Socrates asserts that such a thing would happen to suntheta whereas asuntheta would not suffer dissolution. Socrates then (78de) goes on to equate these asuntheta with the Forms and the suntheta with the sense particulars. If one takes suntheta to mean 'composite' or 'having parts' and asuntheta to be 'incomposite' or 'having no parts', then one is left with the conclusion that the Forms are simple, i.e. have no parts. Further support is sometimes seen in the Forms being described (at Phaedo 80b, for example) as monoeid? (uniform) in contrast to the particulars as polueid? (multiform), where monoeides, as at Theaetetus 205d, may be taken as implying being without parts.

But one need not read the expressions in question in the way required for the simplicity interpretation. At Phaedo 78c it is stated that a suntheton will be suited by nature for dividing (diairesis) in the same way that it was compounded (taut?(i) h?(i)per suneteth?), i.e. It has at a given time been put together and so is at risk of being pulled apart. Eternal composite objects are not touched by this consideration, a fact borne out by the very next section which says that the unchanging qualify as asuntheta and the changing as suntheta. This shows that it is having been compounded (having undergone a change at a given time) which is relevant. Things eternal and unchanging, be they composite or not, are asuntheta in this sense. Furthermore, another interpretation may be given, in turn, of monoeides. The contrast with polueides may best be seen at Symp. 211ab where the Form of the Beautiful is monoeides, or uniform, because, when viewed as it is in itself, it does not appear in many forms, i.e. As a face, or hands, or a logos or a piece of knowledge. But the particular beautiful things, the multiform or polueid?, have the many 'forms' that the Form may take when copied (or, qua universal, instantiated). There is no implication for the simplicity, or otherwise, of this one Form. There can be a multitude of 'forms' (i.e. many different sorts of particulars) for a uniform, yet composite, Form. when Plato is explaining at Phaedo 101c why nothing can become (genesthai) two other than by participating in Duality, this must be interpreted in the light of 95e where we are told that we are looking for the causes of coming into being and perishing and thus, as regards 'effects', our universe of discourse will be limited to non-Forms. Also at 100c it is agreed that, if anything besides the Form of the Beautiful is beautiful, it is so because it partakes of that Form. Therefore at 101c we are getting an explanation of why things other than the Form of Duality are two. They could be two by resembling the Form as paradigm case. Nevertheless, although we do have self-exemplification at 100c in the case of the Beautiful, there is no compelling reason to extend this feature to Duality, so we have no basis to suppose that this Form is being presented as a paradigm case of Twoness.

There is, moreover, an important sense in which Duality is prior to anything being two, including the paradigm instance. Any instantiation presupposes the Form as a universal and unless we have Duality as a universal we could not have a paradigm instance thereof. But Wedberg cannot appeal to this principle to exclude Duality as such from being two. The reason is that, if we take Duality at Phaedo 101c as de facto limited to its function as a universal, this has no consequences for the additional postulation of Duality as a paradigm case. Such a position may appeal to grounds quite extraneous to the non-exhaustive dichotomy at 101c between the generated duos and Duality as the universal nature in which they participate. What Wedberg's reasoning amounts to is the patent truth that, for all entities including numbers, universals, in themselves, are not paradigm cases. I conclude that the arithmetical Forms were viewed by Plato as collections of units. Hence both arithmetic and geometry may have provided the models for the more general postulation of ideal particulars.

Let me emphasize that this doctrine does not require that mathematical paradigm case Forms should predominate in the middle dialogues. In no such dialogue is Plato undertaking a systematic presentation of his theory of Forms or discussing its genesis. For example, at Phaedo 65d and 74b the Forms are introduced as something with which the interlocutor is already familiar. Also, the primary topics of immortality of the soul (Phaedo) and the relation of justice to happiness (Republic) will determine which Forms are actually involved therein, for example, Life (and Death?) in the Phaedo.

Republic

Of Plato's moral doctrines, the most important are the following: that, independently of other ends, virtue is to be pursued as the true good of the soul, the proper perfection of man's nature, the power by which the soul fitly accomplishes its existence, whereas vice is a disease of the mind arising from delusions or imperfect apprehension of our proper interests; that the real freedom of a rational being consists in an ability to regulate his conduct by reason, and that everyone not guided by his reason, encourages insubordination in the mental faculties, and becomes the slave of caprice or passion; that virtuous conduct, apart from its benefits to society, is advantageous to the individual practicing it, inasmuch as it ensures that regularity of the imagination, that tranquility and internal harmony, which constitutes the mind's proper happiness. He, throughout, and with great power, contends for the earnestness of a virtuous mind in the attainment of truth, and inculcates the propriety of pursuing the ordinary pleasures of life, only so far as they are subservient to, or compatible with, man's higher and nobler duties. In the fourth Book of the Laws there is a pretty complete summary of the salient features in Plato's theory of morals, a condensed view of which will be found in the article "Plato" of the Encyclopedia Metropolitana: the remarks with which it closes on the coincidence of the precepts of morality with the conclusions of prudence and enlightened self-love, are both happily conceived and well expressed.

Plato conceived that there were two great causes of human corruption, viz., bad or ill-directed education, and the corrupt influence of the body on the soul. His ethical discussions, therefore, have for their object, the limiting of the desires, and the cure of the diseases produced by them in the soul; while his political discussions have for their immediate object, the laying down of right principles of education, and enforcing them by the constitution of the laws and the power of the State. His two great works, in fact, the Republic and the Laws, may be considered as theories and plans of civic education, rather than schemes of legislation and details of laws. The former, it is true, inquires more particularly into the principles on which a right government may be formed, and the latter presents a systematic view of the principles of legislation: but, comprising, as both works do, so much matter of a purely intellectual and ethical character, we are compelled to conclude that their primary object is, the improvement of human nature by social institutions expressly formed for that purpose. We are not to suppose, moreover, that Plato, in his Republic, had in view the actual foundation of a State, but that he presents rather an example of the most perfect life -public as well as private free from those impediments which all existing governments and laws throw across the path of the virtuous. Thus, in the Laws (lib. vii.), he says "Our whole government consists in the imitation of a most excellent and virtuous life"; and again, "these excellent things are rather as wishes stated in a fable than actual facts, though it would be best of all if they could exist in all States." He thought, in fact, that as Philosophy is the guide of private life, elevating it to the knowledge of the true and the good, so it was seated, likewise, on the throne of government, and exhibited the eternal ideas of social good and truth, modifying society after their pattern; and hence is it, that (as Aristotle observes in the second Book of his Politics, Chapter 2) Plato overlooks impossibilities in his arrangements, and sacrifices all to the one great object of sketching the idea of good as a social principle, apart from the evil influences of society.

We shall now proceed to describe at some length the subject-matter of the Republic; and we shall just remark, that if the work itself had been more studied, there would have been far less difference of opinion respecting the nature and object of this Dialogue. In fact, no exposition or theory can explain Plato, who is, above all others, a writer to be studied in his own works; and his character as a writer and philosopher would have been far higher in general estimation at the present day, if there had been fewer to pronounce sentence on him without having read a single syllable of his writings.

The Republic of Plato is a development of the analogy between the ideas of the perfect man and the perfect state, the two principles being elaborated throughout the Dialogue, in perfect harmony and mutual dependence on each other. He exhibits, indeed, the image of perfect and consummate virtue, such as ought to be seen in the whole life of man, whether in his private capacity simply, as a sentient and moral agent, or in his public position as the member of a State. As man, moreover, has certain special social relations and social functions, he considers him also collectively, as part of a State, and is hence led to inquire into the best or pattern form of a State, a proceeding quite in unison with the custom of the Greeks, who treated Politics rather as a branch of Ethics than a separate science. This Dialogue, therefore, one of that splendid group of which the Timaeus, the Critias, and the Laws are the other members, comprises two subjects constantly connected and cohering, the contemplation of the perfectly good man, composed of body and soul on the one hand, and on the other the perfectly good State, composed of many members in different classes, performing their respective functions. Justice, then, the principle, cause, and uniting bond of all the other virtues, one, too, that is essentially of a political character forms a very suitable discussion by way of introduction to this Dialogue. The refutation of incorrect or inadequate definitions of this virtue, occupies a large portion of the first Book; and Socrates (the hero of this, as of most other of the Platonic Dialogues) then proceeds, with the view of educing some abstract definition of justice, to explain his notion of a perfect State, as one in which all ranks of its members accurately fulfill their respective functions, dwelling together in harmony.

Symposium

The understanding of the Symposium has sometimes been hampered by failure to recognize the vital distinction between the second and third types of lover. Comparison with the Phaedrus, which is also largely concerned with the subject of love, confirms the existence of the distinction, if confirmation is needed. There too we are presented with the same three types, the purely sensual, those who are called in the Phaedrus 'lovers of honour', and the lovers of wisdom. The second type, who have not entirely passed beyond physical love, and who correspond to the nobler lovers of Pausanias, are not condemned in either dialogue; in the Phaedrus it is positively stated that these lovers are capable of growing wings which may lift them again into the eternal world of the Forms which the soul once inhabited. Such lovers may have trouble in subduing their physical desires, and may never rise above the level of the 'lover of honour', but they are infinitely to be preferred to the merely sensual lover, who is severely indicted, and they have made some progress towards the state from which they fell at birth. The best type, however, the lover of wisdom, though he may still feel some pleasure in the things of sense, will never allow them to divert him for an instant from the pursuit of real beauty. But it is to be remembered that the first impulse to that pursuit, even in his case, is provided by the physical beauty of particular persons. Plato's opinions, when he wrote these two dialogues, had not yet crystallized into the complete reprobation of all physical homosexuality which we find in the Laws, and there can be little doubt that he, as well as Socrates, was strongly attracted by beautiful young men. Socrates frequently speaks of himself as being in love with them, and we must recognize that such language is not wholly ironic; the irony consists in such love having a meaning for him quite different from that which the common man attaches to it. Such considerations lead us to the final scene of the dialogue, the speech of Alcibiades in praise of Socrates.

The best commentary on such a situation is provided by Plato himself in the Republic (494), where, no doubt with Alcibiades in mind, he shows that it is the most promising natures which go most disastrously wrong if they succumb to the temptation offered by public life. Alcibiades' condition may in fact be excellently summed up in the famous words Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor, and it seems odd that, faced with the example of his conscious rejection of the higher for the lower, both Socrates and Plato should have remained unshaken in their profound belief that all wrong-doing is the result of ignorance.

However that may be, it is not to be doubted that one object of the Symposium in general and of Alcibiades' speech in particular is to make plain that Socrates was in no way responsible for Alcibiades' betrayal of his country in the Peloponnesian War two years after the dramatic date of the dialogue. It had been one of the main charges against Socrates at his trial that he had corrupted several of the most prominent and talented young Athenians by his conversation, and led them to abandon traditional morality and embark upon courses subversive of the Athenian democracy. The fact that an act of oblivion made it necessary to veil all reference to this in general terms in no way diminished the strength of the prejudice against Socrates on this account. Among those of his associates who had proved enemies of the state none bore a heavier share of guilt than Alcibiades, and, as far as he is concerned, Plato supplements in the Symposium the defence of Socrates against the charge of 'corrupting the young' which he has already elaborated in the Apology and elsewhere. So too the anecdotes of Potidae and Delium serve a double purpose, revealing Socrates as patriotic citizen as well as true philosopher; there is indeed no end to the implications which may be traced in almost every line of Alcibiades' apparently unmethodical and extempore effusion.

One final point remains. Although, as has been said, the views which Socrates expresses as the teaching of Diotima cannot be attributed to the historical Socrates, we need not hesitate to accept as a veracious portrait the picture presented to us by Alcibiades. The Symposium is a companion piece to the Phaedo; it represents Socrates in life as the Phaedo represents him in the hour of death, and in both dialogues historical fact is accompanied by a philosophical theory which cannot have been held by Socrates himself. In this matter the Phaedo is likely to offend the sensibilities of a modern reader even more than the Symposium, because it may seem to violate the sanctity of the hero's last moments; but in considering both we have to remember that however far Plato travelled beyond his master he never ceased to regard his own system as having been implicit in the methods and conclusions of Socrates who remained for him, as he is here represented, the pattern of what human nature can be at its highest, the true philosopher in love.

Conclusion

The early dialogues are, typically, centered on the attempt to provide a definition of a virtue of a kind that meets Socrates' conditions for a dialectically adequate definition. Despite the aporetic form of the discussion, it is possible to form some view about Socrates' conception of the conditions required to provide such a definition. The definition of any one virtue seems to require a synoptic understanding of the nature of virtue in general, and of the relationship between, for instance, virtue and knowledge. Achieving such an understanding seems to require not only a secure grasp of concepts and logical relationships, but also the state of ethical character that is correlated with this synoptic understanding. The nature of these conditions, combined with the very open cast of personae in the early dialogues, goes some way towards explaining why the type of 'shared search' presented in these dialogues does not reach a determinate outcome in the shared possession of the required combination of understanding and character.