Risk Management Strategy for Terrorism in the UK

Risk Management of Terrorism in the UK

The issue of designing a risk management strategy for terrorism in the UK is dependent upon understanding and identifying the commensurate risks attendant with the various extremists groups that are perceived as threats to the UK's safety and infrastructural stability. Challenges include adopting an intelligence and surveillance system, educating the public regarding attendant trouble spots (such as retaliatory violence and discrimination as well as purpose of surveillance) and adopting a position in the global network that facilitates the overall mitigation of threats. The benefits are evident in control and prevention results and good practice recommendations are provided in the conclusion. This study gives a contextual assessment of the risks facing the UK, analyzes the components of risk management that can be utilized to alleviate these risks, defines the term "terror," examines the historical challenges that coincide with these components, and discusses the benefits of implementing these components. It concludes with a summation of the assessment as well as recommendations for future initiation.

Table of Contents

Introduction 3

Contextual Assessment 4

Components of Risk Management 5

Understanding Terror 5

Challenges 7

Benefits of Good Practice 8

Conclusion 10

Recommendations 11

References 13

Risk Management of Terrorism in the UK

Introduction

The UK is under threat from both domestic and foreign terrorism (Wilkinson, 2007). A proper risk assessment would show that the concept of terrorism is itself a dynamic term which finds unique expression with various factions spread throughout the world and in the UK. From animal rights extremists to the IRA to al-Qaeda and ISIS, threats are manifest in myriad sectors. Not only do these threats need to be understood on a cultural level in order to better educate the public and the government as to how to identify them and how to prevent them from leading to violence, but they also need to be understood on a technical level. In an age of total war, when warfare is taken to civilian populations and conducted against populaces instead of against armies in the battlefield, the need to properly assess risk levels and determinants is essential. The aim and purpose of this study is to provide a conceptual framework for managing the risk and threat of terrorism in the UK from both domestic and foreign enemies.

The framework for responding to terrorism at the national level in the UK is based not on reaction but on prevention. If reaction is synthesis of strategic planning and preparation, the mitigation of risk is not the objective but simply a coordination of disaster relief methods. Risk management is about preventing and/or limiting risk. To this end, some of the key explanatory aspects of the strategic management of terrorism at the national level aim at understanding the risk. The UK has years of experience in dealing with both domestic and foreign terrorist threats. Going back to The Troubles in Northern Ireland in the latter half of the 20th century, the lessons learned may be applied to the critical assessment needed today. The collection, analysis, and sharing of intelligence in order to combat the enemy was part of the understanding strategy.

Other key explanatory aspects include the deterrence and disruption of enemy operations, protection against terrorist networks (capabilities, actors, conduct), the prevention of the spread of terrorism and extremism (curbing radicalization processes), and interaction with communities so as to better monitor and establish the protocols listed above. These key aspects serve as the framework for the risk management of terrorism in the UK. A closer examination of these protocols will be discussed in the following sections of the main body: First, the Contextual Assessment will give an overview of the various risks that the UK faces. Second, the Components of Risk Management

Contextual Assessment

The context in which this profile of risk management is situated is global in nature, not just domestic or national, though the effect felt in the UK is national and a threat to national interests abroad. In terms of contextualizing the threat, however, it has to be understood in all of its segments. The threat of violent Wahabbist terrorism (descended from the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, transferred to Saudi Arabia, then to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and now taking control of Syria's oil supply within the ISIS framework) is a complex system that is supported and funded by foreign governments and agencies. Both Turkey and Saudi Arabia are believed to be players in this funding and in the propagation of literature, it is estimated that Western agencies are supportive.

Other threats exist as well, such as the threat of Irish nationalism re-igniting in Northern Ireland so soon after the political peace that was effected a decade ago. There is also the threat of violent radicalism in other spheres, such as among animal rights activists, environmental activists, and other socio-anarchic groups which advocate the fall of government. Each of these groups represents a significant risk to the UK's social, political, and economic infrastructure in the 21st century (Forst, Greene, Lynch, 2011).

Components of Risk Management

Risk identification is the strategy of identifying the factors that present risk and/or threats to UK security and stability among these diverse groups and ranking them in terms of severe or mild. This ties into risk analysis and risk evaluation, both of which look to establish the nature of the threat and its likely manifestation. Risk treatment is the strategy of contending with these threats and mitigating or limiting them, while risk reporting, monitoring and review each deal with intelligence gathering, collecting and analyzing.

At the same time there is the need to apprehend the ways in which guarding against terroristic threats is like guarding against disaster and what this means for UK society as a whole, which feels the impacts of any application or lack thereof of risk management strategy. The social repercussions of any implementation are not to be dismissed as irrelevant; on the contrary, there can develop over time a very vocal and critical response to any method adopted by the government, as was seen throughout The Troubles. Therefore, is important to include in the understanding of terrorism the expectations of the public, since the risk management is ultimately designed to safeguard it.

Understanding Terror

Since 9/11 the ways in which the term "terror" raises flags have shown to be more diverse and amplified than in the decades that preceded (HM Government, 2011). The ceaseless coverage by mainstream media of all things terror-related (and the numerous networks devoted to supplying viewers with non-stop updates on "terror" threats emanating from both within the state and without) may well be categorized as hysterical if it were not for the fact that a great majority of the public appears to be desensitized to modern hysteria. What is the reality of "terrorism"? Dombrowsky's "view that disaster is not and never was a reality and that it is a word that describes something we perceive within the space and time we observe" may equally apply to a view of "terrorism" if we consider the fact that "terrorism" received a gigantic connotative meaning in the wake of 9/11 (Jigyasu, 2005, p. 111).

Indeed, guarding against terrorism in the 21st century has become in many ways like guarding against "disaster." Yet, the sociological aspects of confronting "terrorism" may be deeper than developing a mere risk management strategy. Indeed, Dombrowsky contends that "terrorism" is a term that needs to be viewed from a sociological perspective, especially in a post-9/11 world, where media communications lend "terror" and "disaster" a changing, subjective, and almost mythological significance -- a significance that can be exploited or used damagingly by State regulated institutions and even charitable organizations such as the Red Cross. This is exactly what occurred during The Troubles, when Protestant Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) participated in the same terroristic assassinations as the IRA it was combating, resulting in a negative reaction from the public and censor from the UK administration. Thus, hysteria and overreactions are to be mitigated along with the external threats represented by the terrorist cells. Dombrowsky makes a similar point, as he argues that sociological studies are being marginalized for the preferable viewpoint of pragmatic conceptualizing. If pragmatic conceptualizing opens the doors to policies of retribution on the part of UK agencies, then the risk management framework is decidedly broken. Thus, hysterical reactions need to be monitored and mitigated as well.

Challenges

Challenges often appear in the shape of history repeating itself again. Therefore, numerous lessons can be learned from the UK's war against the IRA in Northern Ireland and the techniques utilized to contain that terrorist group. Kirk-Smith and Dingley (2009), for example, assert that intelligence was and is the main challenge in controlling any war (p. 551). Thus, as can be related to the war against ISIS and the monitoring of other extremist groups within the UK, intelligence and surveillance are keys to success: they require monitoring and simply being aware of what the terrorist organization is and how it operates as well as what it intends to do. Being a step ahead of the organization is the way to overcome this challenge. During The Troubles, the RUC's Special Branch served a significant role in assisting the State to overcome the obstacle of knowing who, where and what the IRA was targeting, who its volunteers were, and what they were coordinating. The method of intelligence utilized by the Special Branch and the State was best characterized by the use of "agents, informers and good old fashioned 'coppers' who knew their patch" (Kirk-Smith, Dingley, 2009, p. 551) -- in other words, on the ground intelligence gathered by agents and officers working hands-on in the field, either in the capacity as a member of RUC, as an informant, or as a mole. This same strategy is what needs to be utilized in the risk management profile for the UK against ISIS and other threats.

Another challenge is the notion of "special interrogation techniques" which have been utilized as a method of gathering intelligence in the past but have in more recent times been viewed as "ineffective" in achieving any kind of decisive counter-strike initiative (Moran, 2010, p. 4). The controversy surrounding special interrogation methods remains and is not one that should be taken lightly in this context, as it can both provoke and aggravate public sentiment. It is for the foreseeable future advised against.

Benefits of Good Practice

There is never a clear line of action or of justice in any conflict between individuals acting from different ideological backgrounds and beliefs, where passions run high and outrage is a driving sentiment and considerable factor in acts of retaliation and murder. The fact is that the British response to the changes of the IRA throughout The Troubles and its response to 7/7 showed a willingness both to confront the new cell system with cells of its own and also to use a political strategy of infiltration and exploitation through the use of electronic surveillance systems. This system has created controversy among voices clamoring for privacy and personal rights. Thus, it is important to assess the benefits of such systems and to offer good practice recommendations for their usage (Moch, Poole, Chapple, Kitteringham, 2011).

First, the benefits of surveillance systems are not situated in the UK government's ability to spy on citizens but rather in the state's exposure to threats and its need to protect itself through monitoring activities. Deterrence is impossible without knowledge, and knowledge is impossible without comprehensive networks of surveillance. The main benefit therefore is the mitigation of risk.

In order to effect this mitigation, a good practice recommendation is for public education as to the role of surveillance and the reason for its usage. An informed public is a less hysterical public, and the less hysteria the less risk involved for all parties (Modood, 2007). .

Education can proceed on a number of levels. For instance, with the threat of ISIS in recent years, Islamophobia has arisen in several sectors of UK society (Halliday, 1999). This is problematic as it undermines the social fabric which is inclusive of all races and ethnicities and does not support discrimination. Halliday (1999) argues that states like the UK are too passive in preventing and limiting Islamophobia, and that this lack of prevention actually facilitates retaliatory measures, like what was seen by the RUC in Northern Ireland against the IRA. In other words, the threat of violence is made more likely by violent reactions from fearful mobs or organizations. Violence begets violence -- when what is needed is reason and understanding. Halliday acknowledges that the overall framework utilized by the state to educate the public is too simplistic and terms need to be more explicitly defined. Instead of using words like "West" and "Islam" the UK should take care to denote specific political and social commentators and be less stigmatizing in its approach to the problem of terrorism. The point is that history is complex and full of diversity within groups that are largely subject to generalization and stereotyping when in reality loose applications are misleading, dangerous, and essentially invalidate any legitimacy to a discussion.

Another way in which the public can be better educated is to process the data already available regarding public sentiment and evaluating it and determining a plan of education based on the needs assessement. For instance, as Sheridan (2006) observes, following 9/11, violent attacks against Arabs living in the UK were reported at record numbers, indicating that bias and racist mentalities prevailed among citizens and that fear was a provocative factor in taking action. Sheridan (2006) shows that reports made by more than 200 Muslims in Britain who alleged to have been racially/religiously discriminated against following 9/11 are indicative of a lack of understanding in UK society. Indeed, when the populace becomes more violent than the supposed "threat" groups, a problem is critically at hand. According to Sheridan (2006), the reports indicated that discrimination occurred 80% more frequently after 9/11 than before. In order for society to be stabilized, understanding why this occurred in the UK is crucial to creating a public education policy program that can help reverse and mitigate such trends in the future.