Policy Direction and Politics

Policy Direction & Politics

Stone captures for me the crux of policy paradox with this statement: "…each type of policy instrument [e.g., inducements, rules rights, for example] is a kind of sports arena, each with its peculiar ground rules, within which political conflicts are continued" (2001, p. 13). Extending the metaphor, arena sports are based on a rational rule-bound game structure that -- as soon as the whistle blows -- is overwhelmed by messy, conflicting and reciprocal interplay. And so it is with policymaking. The calculated, rational market approach to policymaking that was developed to counter the "profound disgust for the ambiguities and paradoxes of politics" does not match what happens in the real world, where political tensions force the hand of those who would create better governance (Stone, 2001, p. xi). We have only to look at the context surrounding the Obama administration to know that this is so -- there has been need for compromise at every turn.

Where Frederickson discusses the neat configuration of the three pillars of public administration -- efficient, economical, and equitable organization and management of public services -- Stone's typology of the formation of policy agendas populates a grid with the poles of a chaotic continuum: Intentional vs. accidental, mechanical vs. inadvertent. This sounds more like politics than policymaking which underscores Frederickson's point that "politics is the mother discipline" of public administration. I firmly believe "you cannot take the politics out of the policy analysis." Mapping backward -- as Elmore would have us do-- Lipsky's street -- level bureaucrats are at once policymakers and policy implementers. In fact, practical and political compromise characterizes the work of the street-level bureaucrat. More so, since "the introduction of social equity to the field following the original Minnowbrook Conference" created a politicized sea change (Frederickson, 2010, p. 140). Frederickson contends that "every public administration generation has its own Minnowbroook" (2010, p. xiv). Regardless, Stone argues, "Problems in the polis are never 'solved' in the way that economic needs are met in the market model" (2001, p.34). Couple that with the eternal economics caveat, "all things being equal" -- which of course, they never are -- and you have two more reasons why the market framework doesn't demonstrate a goodness of fit standard for the policymaking and agenda setting processes.