Political news coverage of presidential campaigns

Presidential Election & TV

The availability of televisions in the late 1940's led to the belief that a new period was arising in public communication. Columbia Broadcasting System President Frank Stanton said,

Television, with its penetration, its wide geographic distribution and impact, provides a new, direct and sensitive link between Washington and the people. The people have once more become the nation, as they have not been since the days when we were small enough each to know his elected representative. As we grew, we lost this feeling of direct contact-television has now restored it. (Campbell)

One of the expectations for TV, then, was in its capacity to inform and motivate the American electorate. Large segments of the public had immediate contact with political events. Television has fulfilled its expectation for reaching the U.S. public. It has become the dominant source of political news. It is also the most important provider of election media coverage of all the media. According to CNN, by 2000, 98% of all American households owned a minimum of one television set. However, it is not only straight factual information that is being covered on TV. Through the well-rehearsed debates, political advertisements, commentaries and talk shows, the audience or voting public hears two completely different sides of an issue. The question thus remains: How much are viewers influenced by what they see and hear on the tube? Do voters make their decisions based on an understanding of the issues? Or, are skeptics correct? Issues no longer count in the presidential race: Votes are bought by professional image makers, pollsters and spin doctors. It appears that there is no consistency across the board to this answer. It varies on factors such as the voters' attitudes before the election as well as the specific vehicle being used to communicate information. In this high-tech age, presidential elections are won by a combination of issue-based and personal-image campaigning (Campbell).

Studying the effects of mass communication on elections began in the beginning of the 20th century. Propaganda in the World Wars made people question the direct and indirect impact of media messages on recipients (Laswell, 1948, p.39). Understanding the connection between TV and final votes is much more difficult now, since analysts can no longer satisfy report elections by stating the actions and views of candidates. "The Press now has to present campaigns in a manner that not only satisfies individuals' expectations in terms of entertainment and information, but also fulfills candidates' needs for communicating to voters" (Owen, 1991, p. xvii). To determine the impact of their increased role in the voting process, journalists must incorporate social science techniques into their coverage of campaigns. This has resulted in a number of changes, including the ongoing broadcast of opinion poll results during presidential races. In addition, reporters dig deep into the candidates' personal lives and supplement news reports with commentary about the political situation surrounding the election.

Although controversy exists regarding the degree of television's impact, there is agreement about the change in political party adherence. Since the 1950s, less people have identified with one particular party (Levine, 2002, p.1). Increasing numbers of individuals are saying they are independents. To some extent, TV is responsible for this trend. Since television lets voters see candidates close-up in their living rooms, viewers form political judgments for themselves rather than by party affiliation.

Political ads play a major role in present-day voting. The amount of advertising has increased significantly over the past several decades. The first presidential television ad spots were first aired in the 1952 campaign between General Dwight D. Eisenhower and Governor Adlai Stephenson and have been growing incrementally ever since. By 1972, 15% of campaign expenditures were put toward broadcasting. By 1988, about 20% went to purchase airtime. The 2004 election beat all records of money spent on advertising -- over a billion dollars. In fact, the total outlaid on spots in the final week of the campaign was more than one-quarter of that during the entire 2000 campaign (Campbell).

Deciding what message to put in the ads, as well as where and when they run, has become a much-desired talent. Like products, campaigners develop their commercials based on game plans to reach the desired target populations. Ed Rollins, Ronald Regan's campaign manager once said in conjunction with the 1984 campaign against Walter Mondale: "We made some fundamental decisions...to take [Mondale] on the tax issue...to try and drive [his] negatives back up...The decision was to go with two negative commercials for every one positive commercial...Let me say that the commercials really worked, we drove [Mondale's negatives back up again, the tax thing because the dominant issue at least in our polling, and it helped us get ready for the final week of the campaign" (Moore, 1986, p. 206).

Results regarding the impact of advertising are mixed. The University of Missouri School of Journalism and Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (see website) conducted a study of the media coverage, political advertising and public opinion in the 2004 presidential election. The analysis examined how the character of the candidates was portrayed in the TV news, advertising and late night comedy programs spanning four months from March to June 2004. The study then surveyed the public about these major campaign themes to see which themes people did or did not believe. It further analyzed their ad and media consumption behavior, controlling for various factors, to isolate which forms of media may have an impact on public attitudes.

They found that 1) the more people pay attention to news coverage, the more likely they are to match the character traits with the candidates the same way as the media; 2) people pay closer attention to candidate news in the battleground states; 3) but advertising has only a limited impact on the public's thinking.

Research by Pew (noted on the website) in the 2000 election found that it is not so much having ads, but not having them that can make a candidate lose. Although the election is mainly won on issues and voter turnout, advertising can make a difference at the margin. This is especially true when there is a one-sided flow of information, and voters are soft in their attitudes towards the two candidates. Pew's analysis of 100,000 voters before the Republican Convention in the 17 contested states, found that Gore had begun to close up the gap with Bush in large part because the Republicans went off the air while Gore stayed on the air with messages that were resonating -- advertising works, particularly when it is not rebutted.

Negative ads have also increased significantly during this past century. There are no fast rules on how do write political advertisements. Prior to the 1980s, however, candidates usually used issue or image ads at the beginning of a campaign to establish their positive image and turned to negative ads at the end of the campaign to attack the opponent. Such strategies were abandoned in the 1980s. Now, instead, the trend is toward negative political advertising throughout the entire campaign. In today's political environment, candidates, either challengers or incumbents, use negative ads from the beginning of a political campaign to the end. After examining more than 1,100 political commercials, Sabato (1981) asserted that:

Even when television is used to communicating political truth (at least from one candidate's perspective), the truth can be negatively packaged -- attacking the opponent's character and record rather than supporting one's own. If there is a single trend obvious to most American consultants, it is the increasing proportion of negative political advertising.... At least a third of all spot commercials in recent campaigns have been negative, and in a minority of campaigns half or more of the spots are negative in tone or substance.

A study conducted in 1999 found that negative ads build in their effectiveness over time with the so-called sleeper effect phenomenon (Lariscy, 1999, np). In an experiement, adult subjects were asked to report their vote and its certainty immediately after negative message exposure and in a delayed telephone callback. Results showed that a defensive advertisement following the attack is initially effective. However, during the next several weeks, the impact of the attack ads increases substantially. Similarly, an initial perception that the assailant has low credibility has only a short-term suppressive impact on the effectiveness of the attack ad. The researchers noted that documentation of both an order-driven and a credibility-driven sleeper effect poses strategic challenges for those candidates who are attacked. In addition, these results offer possible insights into the determinants and the pervasiveness of the sleeper effect in political campaigns

While some researchers support the use of negative advertising, others assert that attack politics boomerang. According to Basil et. al. (1991, p.245), the counterproductive aspects of negative political advertising "may arise from the fact that negative advertisements are rated as 'effective' because the message itself is remembered, but 'ineffective' because the candidate sponsoring the ad is harmed."

Some viewers disapprove of advertising that attacks a candidate and may develop negative feelings toward the advertisers' sponsor. Also, viewers may perceive the negative advertising as an infringement upon their right to decide for themselves. Such a perception may result in reactance, a boomerang effect in which the individual reacts in a manner opposite to the persuader's intention. What these studies show, then, is that a candidate is never going to know how for sure how a negative ad may impact the voters. In the long run, it may be best to keep away from mudslinging unless able to deal with the consequences.

TV debates are another form of communication that provide input on issues and may impact the voters. Naturally, the debate that comes to mind first is the one between Kennedy and Nixon in 1960. Because Nixon hurt himself right before the TV lights came on, so he was not only exhausted but in pain as well. To top it off, his face always had a light beard, even right after he shaved. Regardless of how the debate went for Kennedy or Nixon, this was the start of a new form of communication that has since become an important element in the political voting process.

Unlike today, the first debates went right back to programming when the candidates left the stage. Now, even before the candidates arrive, commentators discuss how the speakers "will" do. This approach began in 1976 with the Carter and Ford matches. Since then, the press experts have had their say directly after the broadcast. Also, the 90-minute debate is reduced to a collection of soundbites that are played over and over again to take the place of the whole program. In the years since the Carter/Ford debate, the journalists have also overcome their hesitation of calling victors. With the assistance of instant poles, reporters can assess the performances within minutes of the closing statements. "The problem with declaring winners and losers," says David Broder of the Washington Post, in most the cases the outcome is murky" (Schroeder, 2000, p.178)

No one disputes, however, that debates attract a wide variety of people. From the first one in 1960, Americans have shown a growing interest in watching the action between the two contenders. In fact, 70 million people viewed this first Nixon/Kennedy debate. The debate between Carter and Reagan had an audience of 100 million; the second largest ever was the Clinton, Bush and Perot 1992 event with 90 million viewers. These debates almost had as large an audience as the top TV shows such as the final broadcast of "MASH" and "Who Shot JR?"

People like watching the debates, because it is actually like viewing movie stars. The debates are human intrigue and drama. New York Times columnist William Safire called these presidential debates "political-emotional events...great moments in American life when the nation comes together to share an experience neither frightening nor artificial."

Debates are to elections what treaties are to wars," says political scientist and democratic debate advisor Samuel Popkin. "They ratify what has already been accomplished on the battlefield." Since the 1960 debates, experts now agree that joint candidate appearances move perceptions more than votes. Research from numerous academic studies and political surveys indicate that these presidential debates are just one of the many factors considered at the ballot box. Further, it is virtually impossible to isolate debates from other influences on the voters' decisions.

If there is any sway by the voters after the debate, it is just to confirm what people already believe. A study by Jarman (2005) reports the reactions by registered voters to the second presidential debate in 2004. Respondents used a continuous response system that provided feedback in one-second intervals. These data were compared to a transcript of the debate to identify the strongest and weakest arguments made by candidates both for their own and opposition parties. Results suggest that political affiliation strongly influences audience reaction in two ways: (a) Republicans always rated Bush's comments higher than Democrats, whereas Democrats always rated Kerry's comments higher than Republicans; and (b) Republicans believed that Bush won the debate, whereas Democrats believed that Kerry won the debate. This research provides new support for the conclusion that debates tend to reinforce the preexisting positions of the audience warns that the amount of learning that takes place could be limited.

One of the newer TV political tactics is having candidates appear on talk and call-up shows. In both talk shows and citizen town meetings, purchased by the campaign, the candidates respond directly to the voters' and interviewers' questions with stock, rehearsed answers. Since it is not a debate, there is no give and take. Further, the question-and-answer period for each call is brief and the responses cursory. On the other hand, notes Levine (2002, p.251), such shows contribute to the public dialogue since they give the voters another opportunity to view their candidates. The call-in sessions also offer people the chance to voice their concerns about certain issues such as crime.

A study of Clinton's talk show appearances from June 2 to July 22, 1992, shows that the viewer questions focused not on personal credibility but on issues, especially domestic policy (Levine, 2002, p. 251). In his answers, Clinton provided fairly detailed policy information. These shows allowed him to convey his substantive message to voters when his campaign themes were being ignored by the press.

These political candidates also used the standard TV talk shows to get additional coverage. Individuals such as John Kerry relied on the television talk shows as a powerful message vehicle. These programs served as an important means for them to reach voters who may not take an interest in other campaign activities, such as debates. A study by William Benoit (2000) found that candidates, when appearing on talk shows, were positive in their overall statements, discussed policy and character on an even scale and primarily targeted their attacks on the incumbent president, rather than on primary contenders. Benoit examined nine candidates in the study: John Kerry, John Edwards, Howard Dean, Wesley Clark, Al Sharpton, Dennis Kucinich, Richard Gephardt, Joe Lieberman and Carol Moseley-Braun. The four most recent interviews for each candidate, on 13 different talk shows, including Good Morning America, The O'Reilly Factor, Larry King Live and Hardball.

The study found that 71% of the candidates' statements were self-praising. The only exception was Sharpton, who attacked in 58% of his statements. In the 2000 primary campaign, the Democrats were positive in 81% of their talk show statements. In terms of policy and character, Benoit found a slight emphasis on character vs. policy, 53% to 47%. The exceptions to this pattern were Moseley-Braun, who discussed policy 86% of the time, and Kucinich, who stressed policy in 68% of his statements. In the 2000 primary, Democrats focused on character at nearly the same rate, 55%, compared with talking about policy in 45% of their statements.

President Bush was the primary target of attack with candidates, who devoted 62% of their statements to him. When the candidates did, in fact, attack a fellow Democratic opponent, they most often attacked Dean, who received 74% of those attacks. In 2000, the Democrats directed 51% of their attacks to one another, 36% to Republicans and 13% to the establishment in general.

It is no wonder that the candidates are looking for other avenues to get their point across in addition to news programs. Conventional news coverage continues to filter opportunities for the candidates to talk directly with the public. In well-known, parallel studies, Adato and Hallin showed that the average candidate "soundbite," the period in which a presidential candidate could speak uninterrupted on the evening news, shrank from about 42 seconds in 1968 to about 9 seconds in 1988 (Fishkin). Recent studies by the Center for Media and Public Affairs show that during the 1992 primary season, this shrinkage continued. The average candidate soundbite has now diminished to 7.3 seconds.

The Norman Lear Center Campaign Monitoring Project conducted a study of the amount of time the news gave to candidates in the 2000 election. The analysts looked at news programming on 74 stations in 58 markets in the last 30 days before the election. They wanted to see whether a White House panel's recommendation of airing five minutes of candidate centered discourse (CCD) a night in the last month of a campaign had an impact.

The center found that the 74 stations ran an average of 74 seconds of CCD per night. The 74 stations fell into two groups. One group - 23 stations - had made a public commitment to meeting the 5/30 standard; their nightly average CCD was 2 minutes, 17 seconds. The other group - 51 stations - averaged 45 seconds of CCD a night. Thus, most stations in the study aired less than a minute of CCD a night, far short of the five-minute target. However, stations committed to the 5/30 standard aired more than three times as much CCD as stations that did not make the commitment. The political stories on the 5/30 stations differed from the non-5/30 stations in ways that went beyond CCD. They aired a higher percentage of issue stories, and a lower percentage of horserace or strategy stories, than the non-5/30 stations.

Yet overall, the nationwide nightly average time devoted to political news in the last month of the 2000 campaign was 6 minutes 20 seconds, out of 6-and-a-half hours of broadcast time. As most television viewers were painfully aware, those 6 minutes 20 seconds of political news were not much of a match for the time that broadcasters sold each night for political advertising.

Due to the small amount of time on the regular news, future campaigns are surely going to continually exploit call-in shows. In fact, they are already being use for other purposes, since they offer the promise of even more radical departures from conventional political coverage. In addition to longer, more spontaneous conversation, TV viewers may have their responses tabulated similar to voting. Perot's proposal for the "electronic town hall" was where major issues, such as the budget deficit or health insurance, can be explained on the air in depth, not in soundbites. Viewers called an 800 number by Congressional district. Their feedback, Perot promised, would be tallied and used to get the White House and Congress "dancing together like Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers."

This kind of electronic town is neither representative nor deliberative. It is not representative because the sample is self-selected. Instead of being chosen through the methods of modern survey research, through a random statistical process, viewers at home select themselves by their decisions to call in. It is not deliberative because citizens are expected to call with their off-the-cuff comments, have little opportunity for debate or for considering other views, and often have little background information.

Another innovation beginning in the 1992 race was using television commercials to direct viewers to more detailed statements of a candidate's issue positions (Levine, 2002, p. 251). Beginning in New Hampshire, Clinton and Paul Tsongas told viewers to order their books that elaborated on plans for America. Clinton's "A Plan for America's Future," and Tsongas' "A Call to Economic Arms" were widely distributed to voters.

The results of research to date regarding the effects of various communication vehicles on the voters is so far non-conclusive. Surely, more studies will have to be conducted in order to better understand how voters react to such TV coverage. Yet, there is agreement on one specific aspect: The impact of the campaign on marginal voters and on the role of the campaign in influencing candidate evaluations and highlighting resonant issues. To explore this area, Kern and Just (Norris, 1997, p.123) investigated the role of news and advertising in stimulating discourse about campaign issues and in the formation of candidate images during the 1990 senate race in North Carolina. The participants were exposed to televised ads and news coverage in the sequence presented during the last stages of the general election between Senator Jesse Helms and black Democractic candidate Harvery Gantt. The purpose of the study was to see how voters build candidate images based on the range of information choices.

At the beginning of the focus groups when the question "Is the country off on the right or wrong track?" was asked, race emerged as a primary issue. Participants then had to imagine they were voters in the election between Helms and Gantt and to use information in video segments to decide how to vote. Gantt's strategy consisted of middle-class issues such as education and health. He did not mention affirmative action. Helms sharply attacked Gantt, including the "Wringing Hands" commercial with a rejected white job applicant and an attack on affirmative action for minorities. Helms won the election with 53% of the vote to 47% for Gantt.