Populism: concepts, characteristics, and political movements

Populism: Appealing but Unrealistic

The United States is a representative democracy, a philosophical concept which is often misunderstood. The premise was essentially a compromise in which the desire of some Founding Fathers to see the nation raised in a democratic spirit was matched with the intention of others to retain a classicist hierarchy based on traditional delineations of social, economic and ethnic distinction. The outcome was this concept in which the people would be given some level of electoral determination in who was to represent them but would be kept at an arm's length from such direct involvement as the drafting of laws, budgetary control or determination of foreign policy. The result is a nation which has often made as a key feature of its rhetorical identity a nation of populism but which has just as fervently engaged its policy decisions and the structure of its government with intent to obstruct any real populist movement. This is important as a discussion on the nature of populism will here indicate. Indeed, such distinctions help us to understand that it was never the intention for the United States to award its publics with the representation and access to decision-making that is espoused by populism. The very functionality of the United States, in fact, depends on the success with which democracy is meted out rather than simply proliferated without discretion as assumed by the populist movement.

In both its history and in the context of our present conversation, it becomes clear that populism always was a fringe movement without the capacity to either effect real change or to achieve an actual place of leadership in the United States. This is largely for the same reason that the discussion here will serve as a critique of its principals. That it to say that populism is ultimately felled by the assumption that its ideology somehow resonates with a large cross-section of the American public. The truth is somewhere closer to the reality of capitalism, which requires most men and women to work from day-to-day in order to remain viable and economically mobile members of society. To these individuals, there is a far greater concept in seeing that the business of government is conducted. In a manner, this is contrasted in the article by Hightower, which stresses his upbringing under the premise of community interactivity. Here, Hightower characterizes populism as the ideology of his father and an aspect of the American identity which contends "that everyone should pool efforts when the common good calls for it, whether pitching in locally to start a Little League or being taxed nationally to assure everyone's social security." (Hightower, 133) in a large part, this conjures an appealing and utopian vision like those that helped to fuel the explosion of Marxist thinking and leadership in the late 19th and early 20th century, but like the Marxist movement, this would prove highly unrealistic. Many were enlivened by the premise that the collective efforts of the common and oppressed would lead to economic and political equality but would channel this into careless revolutionary aggression. This unrestrained idealism is captured in a history of the populist movement, within which a mission statement underscores the unrealistic orientation of its leaders. Here a motive for the formation of the party is cited, with populists being driven by economic struggles and the impression that these could be traced to the economic successes of the wealthy elites. Accordingly, Edwards (2000) indicates that "on the 1880s, as drought hit the wheat-growing areas of the Great Plains and prices for Southern cotton sunk to new lows, many tenant farmers fell into deep debt. This exacerbated long-held grievances against railroads, lenders, grain-elevator owners, and others with whom farmers did business." (Edwards, 1)

These grievances would take root as the formative ideals for the populist party, driving those who had responded to economic despair toward political organization. While this would be an admirable step, Hightower's article does describe the ideology which was to spring from it, showing that populism is essentially impractical under the constructs of the U.S. government. This is particularly because even as it worked to establish itself as a moderate group, the Populist movement essentially reflected more extreme positions. As Edwards denotes, "These Populists advocated staying 'in the middle of the road,' between the two larger parties, and not merging with either. In practice, these Populists were not 'in the middle,' but more sweeping in their political goals than either of the major parties." (Edwards, 1) Indeed, it is for this reason that we find in populism a view that is particularly vulnerable to rational deconstruction. Hightower observes of the leaders of the two party system from which populism sought relief that "these privileged and powerful ones have severed themselves from the common good because they can, and because there is a 'screw you' imperative built into the corporate system that commands top managers to produce as much money as possible for the big shareholders (including the top managers) as quickly as possible, no matter who or what has to be run over." (Hightower, 134)

Given the events of the last decade in which corporate and federal indiscretions had coalesced into a single heap of uncontrollable corruption, there is some reality to the criticisms that Hightower makes, just as there was some validity to the claims and ambitions of populism during its height at the turn of the century. However, the response of the populist movement was to form a policy that required totally dismantling of a capitalist system which was to help the U.S. recovery from recession. To Hightower, for instance, there are no viable political leaders in the United States, a position which suggests populism to be driven by malcontented ideology rather than political credibility. This may be noted in Hightower's hostility toward both major political parties, such that he resolves "a change is coming because there is no party representing the worker majority in our country, creating a political vacuum that a civil society cannot survive." (Hightower, 136) in this alarmist perspective, we see that the primary flaw of the populist movement was its determination to confront a class-war rather than to assert itself into a more diversified political context. The article's perspective underscores this problematically hostile approach to institutional forms. Indeed, as Hightower indicates, "in the class war of the past couple decades, the corporate and investor elites have made out like bandits by shortchanging the middle class on economic gains that the whole society has produced." (Hightower, 133)

As a political movement intended to promote interventionist government, populism has also shown itself as problematic in the controversial policies of our current president. These presume a public support which is also implied by Hightower. Hightower naively contends that "there is no need to 'create' a progressive movement, because it already exists in the hears and minds of America's ordinary folks." (Hightower, 138) Evidence suggests that this, like populism as a whole, does not truly recognize the implications of democratic representation, instead presuming 'progressive' ideology to be universal. Indeed, debate on the subject has demonstrated the nuance of positions since the election of President Obama. Indeed, in reflection on the populist policy platform, we can see some of the steps which have been taken by the Obama Administration as it perpetrates a government takeover of many previously private agencies. This is consistent with the type of anti-capitalist intervention which has always been a platform of the populists. Reflecting on their early history, "compared with silver Democrats, Populists advocated more sweeping federal intervention to offset the economic depression, curtail corporate abuses, and prevent poverty among farming and working-class families. They made a stronger statement than the major parties in support of Cuban independence and raised other issues -- such as statehood for Territories and the District of Columbia -- that Republicans and Democrats did not address." (Edwards, 1)

In large part, this denotes the role of a third party in America's two-party system, which is another subject upon which Hightower touches. He remarks that "there are now serious-minded third parties that are beginning to crack the lock that the Democrat and Republican parties have had on the system." (Hightower, 137) This ideal, now more than a decade away from Hightower's discussion, strikes as quaint and in the shadow of the Bush presidency, an explanation for the left wing splintering that allowed such republican dominance. Such is to say that the premises espoused by the populists were, like the ideals today of the Green, Reform and Libertarian parties, fringe perspectives which carry merit in the discussion of issues and function as election spoilers but are poorly qualified to truly lead or represent. This balance is shown by the degree to which populist ideals can be said to have entered into the leadership dialogue at important moments in our history but also the degree to which they have failed to actually drive leadership effectivey. This would be true even with the demise of its political movement, in spite of which, "populist ideas survived into the new century. Progressive Republican Theodore Roosevelt resurrected many Populist planks and re-cast them in new forms as he tentatively expanded federal regulations of business corporations. . . Other Populist planks -- particularly those calling for aid to farmers and employment on public works in time of depression -- became reality during the 1930s, under the New Deal administrations of Democrat Franklin Roosevelt." (Edwards, 1)