Leisure May Be the Death of Europe

Leisure May Be the Death of Europe

Economics

Time to Kill

In his article, Time to Kill - Europe and the Politics of Leisure, Steven Muller examines the efforts of Europe to reconstitute itself in the aftermath of the Cold War. By analyzing such factors as economics, politics, social functions, labor and unemployment, the author concludes that, in contrast to the prevailing sense of optimism, Western Europe is in fact facing a period of, "acute economic stagnation, the undermining rather than the expansion of democracy, and serious social upheaval" (Muller, 26). The primary cause of this crisis, according to Muller, is Europe's inability to rapidly or effectively deal with revolutionary changes in the human condition, which will result in a decreasing number of individuals enjoying the privilege of employment, and an increasing amount of leisure and idleness. I agree with the author that, unlike the other technologically advanced nations such as the United States and Japan, the existing conditions within Western Europe will contribute to, rather than guard against, impending economic, political, and social crisis.

Muller's assertion that within the most technologically advanced nations, a reversal is taking place between the social functions and values of labor and leisure is already becoming increasingly apparent. Termed 'smart machines', electronic technology and virtual intelligence are indeed performing more of the production and service tasks that society requires, and which used to be provided by human labor. The introduction of labor policies such as job sharing, shorter working hours, and increased holiday entitlements may initially stem the tide of mass unemployment but, as Muller correctly asserts, the rate of unemployment in most European nations has already begun to climb. The reason that this situation will prove damaging to Western Europe, and not America or Japan, lies in the economic policies of European governments, and in particular their welfare systems. In European Union countries, the costs of honoring their welfare promises to an increasing number of unemployed will be an enormous increase in public expenditure. It also places those governments into a 'catch 22' situation, whereby historical and political tradition make it extremely difficult, and electorally dangerous, to cut the present welfare benefits, so, in order to raise the additional revenues, they require to stimulate either public or private sector economic growth. To assist economic growth in the public sector places additional pressure and expense upon the already strained government budget, yet by favoring private sector growth they risk furthering the development of technological advances, and causing an unwanted increase in unemployment. The only viable solution to this crisis is to make cuts to the present levels of welfare: a policy that would be viewed by Europeans as being against their traditions of social justice and democracy, and which could potentially lead to outrage and social unrest.

Although the United States, and other technologically advanced nations outwith Europe, do not suffer from this historical bondage to an inflexible and costly welfare system, they do share certain similarities with Western Europe. The most obvious, as pointed out by Muller, is a common commitment to a free market economy and to political democracy, both of which are dominated by middle class values. However, there are vital differences within these broad areas of agreement, and it is these deviations that place Europe at a disadvantage when dealing with the demise of employment and the growth of leisure. America is better placed to deal with these social changes, and the subsequent economic and political fallout, because of its emphasis upon individualism, commercialism, and its perception of state assistance only as a last resort. Therefore America, as with Japan, is better able to adapt to changes in labor requirements by capitalizing on the social and economic values of competition, individual and corporate enterprise, and minimal regulation. In contrast to this frontier spirit, Europe continues to be guided, and indeed haunted, by a value system that is founded upon class conflict, class consciousness, and state regulation. So, whereas America and Japan will successfully adapt their labor functions to take advantage of the increase in leisure, by diversification and specialization, the danger in Europe is the creation of a Marxist style social conflict between the unemployed 'proletariat', and the employed 'bourgeoisie'. I also believe that Muller is accurate when he extends this European ethos of 'us' against 'them' beyond the limits of class to include the racial element. As he perceptively points out: at the same time as America is growing increasingly multiracial, Europe is veering more and more towards the politics of anti-immigration and racial discrimination. The recent rise in the popularity of Jean Le Pen's 'National Front Party' in France, Jorg Haider's 'Freedom Party' in Austria, and the Italian neo-fascist movement, are evidence of an alarming tendency towards xenophobia and racial intolerance. I feel that the author is correct to highlight the likelihood of anti-social and violent reactions by the indigenous majority, as a result of leisure induced boredom, against racial or cultural minorities.