Nuclear Strategy and War

¶ … seventh and eighth chapters of Lawrence Freedman's book The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. Indeed, the use or threatening of use of nuclear weapons has been a prominent and controversial topic for the last half century and change since the weapons were dreamt up and brought to reality. What follows this introduction is meant to be an abstract of what Friedman had to say. While the use of weapons of mass destruction was and remains a very charged subject, there is no doubt that it has altered the course of human history both when it is used and not used (Freedman).

It is indeed interesting how the different motives and obligations can make the opinions about things like destructive bombs ebb and flow. While some may focus on the death, destruction and later fallout of Japan post-World War II, others still focus on the threat of these weapons being used against the United States and/or its allies. Other people still focus on the amount of money that is spent on these weapons as compared to boots on the ground and other more conventional forms of warfare. All of those factors came up at one or more points during the Cold War with the Soviet Union as much was made about spending, the Soviet nuclear threat, the proxies that both the United States and the U.S.S.R. used and so on. Politicians toiled and worked but had to admit at the end of the day that using nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union or another threat could actually lead to the destruction of the United States, completely or in part, in retaliation and transform much of the civilized world into cinder. Indeed, winning at all costs could mean that many people lose including the supposed "winners" of the fight. A further complication of warfare, even war that is intended to be limited in scope and action, is that "limited objectives would be a necessary condition for limited war" but "they would not guarantee a limited war." The key to at least helping keep a war limited is to "restrictthe purposes for which they fight to concrete, well-defined objectives that do not demand the utmost military effort of which the belligerents are capable and that can be accommodated in a negotiated settlement (Freedman).

Nuclear weapons seem to have had a calming effect, and for two reasons. First, airstrikes are now a more common way to attack one's foes so ground wars and the mass chaos and disorder that come with them is mitigated a bit as surviving the blast is usually the only major thing to survive. This is further true when dealing only with conventional bombs and not nuclear weapons. The unabashed violence and conquering notions of yesteryear seemed to largely quickly stop after World War II. Given the advent of nuclear weapons, world leaders are much more gun-shy about bombing other countries and invading them due to the very nasty consequences that could result. Indeed, unless a world leader is unhinged, they dare not act like Hitler or the conquerors of the past did. There is no shortage of bravado but there are very few people as brazen or mentally ill enough to call a bluff and flip the nuclear switch or anything approaching it. Further, it has become clear that overt warfare is not needed to win wars and, as James King said, "(w)e cannot win the Cold War by military means alone." (Freedman)

Kissinger had words about the above when he said "(t)he more moderate the objective, the less violent war is like to be." However, there are two sides to a war and if one side wants to play it slow while another wants to go for the jugular, then something will have to change and it would usually require the more moderate side ramping up themselves to match the aggression of the other. The Soviets were not nearly as concerned about keeping the peace and, as the book states, "it takes two to keep a war limited." An idea in between those extremes was expressed by Buzzard when he said, among other things, "we will not use any mass destruction weapons against centres of population, unless you do so deliberately." In other words, they would express disdain for using such weaponry but the refused to take it off the table entirely lest someone engage in the behavior first. Deterrence and avoidance of these weapons tends to be the goal but it is ostensibly intended to send the message that brute weapon-laded force will be responded to in kind if or when it happens. (Freedman).