Prince Is the Political Theorist

Prince is the political theorist Niccolo Machiavelli's most famous work. The Prince is also one of the few political treatises that have spawned an adjective -- 'Machiavellian.' Call someone 'Machiavellian,' and you are suggesting, more likely than not, that he or she is corrupt, self-serving, and only interested in advancement, not in morality. There may also be the implication that the person is rapacious, even cruel or tyrannical. However, a closer examination of the Prince demonstrates that, although Machiavelli was hardly what we would call a prince of ethics, the text he is known for writing is more of an amoral, rather than an immoral work.

Machiavelli lived and wrote during an era when the peninsula that would later be called Italy was filled with warring city-states jockeying for power. He was a political servant, and a Medici loyalist. His writings reflect his experiences, and also his historical context. Yet his thoughts influenced many philosophers subsequently. They continue to influence individuals in our own era, despite his dismissal of republics as case studies of little interest, and his focus on principalities, what we would call hereditary or non-heredity dictatorships.

Summary

In discussing the different types of principalities, hereditary and mixed, Machiavelli's pragmatism, not his cruelty, quickly become apparent. When dealing with older, that is interdicted principalities, he advises the ruler, to tread more cautiously for: "the hereditary prince has less cause and less necessity to offend; hence it happens that he will be more loved; and unless extraordinary vices cause him to be hated, it is reasonable to expect that his subjects will be naturally well disposed towards him; and in the antiquity and duration of his rule the memories and motives that make for change are lost, for one change always leaves the toothing for another" (II).

Thus, the first chapters of Machiavelli's work concern themselves with defining exactly what is a principality, and the different types of administration required by different principalities: It does not advise ruthless plundering and cruelty towards the populace. In fact, showing a calculated display of kindness can be tactically useful. When a principality acquires new territory, when it is dominating a republic for example, a different strategy is required out of tactical demands. A principality cannot allow the republic to stand as it was, for fear of rebellion. "He who becomes master of a city accustomed to freedom and does not destroy it, may expect to be destroyed by it, for in rebellion it has always the watch-word of liberty and its ancient privileges as a rallying point, which neither time nor benefits will ever cause it to forget" their former liberty (V).

Show cruelty when necessary, kindness when necessary. "It cannot be called talent to slay fellow-citizens, to deceive friends, to be without faith, without mercy, without religion; such methods may gain empire, but not glory" and the empire is likely to quickly be lost (IIIV). Machiavelli has no respect for sadists, or those princes who use their power in an emotional and mindlessly cruel manner. Cruelty must be calculated, with an eye upon the populace's history and psychology: "Hence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a state, the usurper ought to examine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary for him to inflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have to repeat them daily; and thus by not unsettling men he will be able to reassure them, and win them to himself by benefits. He who does otherwise, either from timidity or evil advice, is always compelled to keep the knife in his hand; neither can he rely on his subjects, nor can they attach themselves to him, owing to their continued and repeated wrongs. For injuries ought to be done all at one time, so that, being tasted less, they offend less; benefits ought to be given little by little, so that the flavor of them may last longer" (VIII). A wasting disease, in other words, is more painful and causes more ire to the body politic than a swift blow.

Having dealt with definitional questions regarding types of ruler, Machiavelli then moves on to an even more important subject -- protecting the territories the leader possesses. Machiavelli believes, first and foremost, that independent leadership is the key to the success, and the strongest state is the state that is reliant upon no other state or ruler's protection for its security. He looks down upon states that must rely upon alliances: "It is necessary to consider another point in examining the character of these principalities: that is, whether a prince has such power that, in case of need, he can support himself with his own resources, or whether he has always need of the assistance of others. And to make this quite clear I say that I consider those are able to support themselves by their own resources who can, either by abundance of men or money, raise a sufficient army to join battle against any one who comes to attack them; and I consider those always to have need of others who cannot show themselves against the enemy in the field, but are forced to defend themselves by sheltering behind walls" (X). A strong military is necessary for a strong state; merely having a well-fortified state is no security. And alliances are dangerous -- if Machiavelli was alive during the years preceding World War I, he would have said that the tangle of unprofitable alliances and agreements to go to war between the European powers made the conflict inevitable.

Machiavelli believes in ruling by controlled fear -- ruling over one's populace with as much fear of consistent punishment as is necessary to subdue the populace, without being unduly and unnecessary harsh when enforcing justice. Ruling by fear over one's potential aggressors in neighboring territories likewise makes a prince strong and confident in his position, and meant less need for entangling alliances. Machiavelli's fear of alliances perhaps is due to his own advice about the need for princes to dissemble and to be all things to all people. After all, if the ideal prince is untrustworthy to everyone but himself, how can he expect different behavior from others?

Machiavelli's work is seeped in mistrust, even of soldiers' loyalty. A strong military is not simply strong in might, it must also be loyal, he stresses: "Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds his state based on these arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for they are disunited, ambitious and without discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies; they have neither the fear of God nor fidelity to men, and destruction is deferred only so long as the attack is; for in peace one is robbed by them, and in war by the enemy" (XII). Using auxiliary forces or forces provided by an ally, is also dangerous because of their questionable loyalty, and the debt which this incurs the ideal prince to another, inferior prince. The untrustworthiness of everyone is why a truly successful prince is always preparing for war, because no network of territories can be relied upon.

Regarding the treatment of the populace, Machiavelli advises cultivating favor: "I say that it would be well to be reputed liberal" (XVI). But a prince should not be too liberal, because if he cuts back on his generosity the population may grow dissatisfied and miss what they lost, like a dominated republic's citizens will miss their liberty more than the dominated residents of a tyrannical prince. "A prince, therefore, provided that he has not to rob his subjects, that he can defend himself, that he does not become poor and abject, that he is not forced to become rapacious, ought to hold of little account a reputation for being mean, for it is one of those vices which will enable him to govern" (XVI). To bankrupt a populace, especially for one's own self-aggrandizement is foolish, but to be overly generous is equally unwise. Likewise, "say that every prince ought to desire to be considered clement and not cruel. Nevertheless he ought to take care not to misuse this clemency" (XVII).