Public and Privacy Issues State

Public and Privacy Issues

State Supreme Court of Nevada: Hiibel v. Dist. Ct. 118 Nev.

According to the State Supreme Court of Nevada in 2002, the United States Supreme Court had "twice expressly refused to address whether a person reasonably suspected of engaging in criminal behavior may be required to identify" himself or herself. Thus, the issue remained "unresolved" and was in need of further clarification

In its 2002 decision in Hiibel v. Dist. Ct, the Nevada Court attempted to address the issue. In issues regarding the Fourth Amendment, the State Supreme Court stated that all courts must balance the individual's reasonable expectation of his or her right to privacy, and "the public interest" in a safe society.

In the specific facts of the case of Hiibel, Humboldt County Sheriff's Deputy Lee Dove was alerted by a concerned citizen that the citizen had observed someone striking a female passenger inside a parked truck. Dove found the truck parked by the side of the road. There were skid marks in the gravel, "suggesting the truck had been parked in a sudden and aggressive manner." Dove saw Larry D. Hiibel standing outside the truck and thought he was intoxicated. Hiibel's minor daughter was sitting in the passenger side. Therefore, Dove suspected that a crime had been committed, and that there was a danger to the minor and to the public at large.

Dove asked Hiibel to identify himself. Hiibel refused and "placed his hands behind his back and challenged the officer to take him to jail." Hiibel was charged and found guilty of resisting a police officer by refusing to identify himself. The justice of the peace in Humboldt County determined that "failure to provide identification obstructed and delayed Dove as a public officer in attempting to discharge his duty." The failure to identify himself was found to support Hiibel's conviction, and on appeal, the District Court also held it was "reasonable and necessary" for Dove to request identification under the circumstances. The Nevada District Court noted that evidence "over and above simply failing to identify himself" was found to support Hiibel's arrest and conviction, including the reasonable suspicion of the arresting officer that Hiibel was driving under the influence and was guilty of domestic violence against his daughter. Hiibel's Fifth Amendment right to remain silent had to be balanced against the public interest of the officer's need to know the identity of the suspect.

Upon appeal, the Nevada State Supreme Court underlined that while the Fourth Amendment allowed for a reasonable expectation of privacy, that right was not absolute. The Supreme Court noted that the Fourth Amendment only protects against "unreasonable" invasions of privacy, or searches and seizures, by the government and held that "the public interest in requiring individuals to identify themselves to officers when a reasonable suspicion exists is overwhelming…American criminals have a long tradition of armed violence, and every year in this country many law enforcement officers are killed in the line of duty, and thousands more are wounded… The most dangerous time for an officer may be during an investigative stop when a suspect is approached and questioned…Knowing the identity of a suspect allows officers to more accurately evaluate and predict potential dangers that may arise during an investigative stop." In support of Hiibel's conviction, and writing for the majority, the Nevada State Supreme Court held that knowing the identity of a suspect was essential in identifying child molesters outside of schools, enforcing restraining orders, and identifying terrorists.

The dissenting Nevada justices, however, noted that the United States Supreme Court had stated that although the officers may question a suspect, the detainee need not answer any questions based upon his or her right against self-incrimination. Furthermore, anecdotally it must be reflected that Dove did have other grounds on which to arrest Hiibel. The contention by the majority that simply knowing a suspect's name makes the police officers safer seems curious, at least in the case of this domestic violence or DWI stop. If Hiibel had been arrested for driving under the influence and striking a minor child, his identity would not matter. In some of the other instances cited by the majority, such as the case of a violation of a restraining order, requesting identification under the reasonable suspicion a crime was being committed might be defensible, but under the circumstances of the case, it would seem that the conviction should have stood, but not for the reasons alleged by any of the reasons cited by the majority. Furthermore, in apprehending criminals suspected of sex offenses, terrorism, and other unspeakable acts, the minority found, that these arrests should be based upon conduct, not upon a failure to provide identification.

Volunteering one's identity is a right one has, the minority stated: "purchasing an airline ticket is a business transaction, and the airlines may condition the sale on knowing who is the purchaser. In contrast, being forced to identify oneself to a police officer or else face arrest is government coercion precisely the type of governmental intrusion that the Fourth Amendment was designed to prevent. Furthermore, it is not necessary to have one's name on a credit card or checkbook in order to effect a purchase. A dedicated libertarian, for example, might deliberately eschew financial institutions, credit cards and checkbooks, engaging solely in cash transactions, in order to jealously protect his individual rights, especially his right to be anonymous, to be left alone, to wander freely." The dissenting minority opinion also noted that creating a bogeyman of terrorists and suspected child molesters was dangerous for a court entrusted to protect the rights of the public. "The court must not be blinded by fear," it wrote.