Public Policy and Public

¶ … Lecturer:

I have two observations- one small but interesting and one for which I would like a response.

The first- you have transposed the authors names as Ingram and Schneider- in deed this is small but important - you will want to cite them as Schneider and Ingram going forward- as I said - small but important

Next I think you can develop your response to item 3 regarding your research interest.(my research interest is African-American women in the gas and oil field and how minority set aside programs fail them)

You have made a few claims that public policy is weak and that public policy fails- What is the weakness you have identified? How are you understanding failure? What kind of policies are you including in these statements and what is the connection to your research? I ask that you spend a bit more time on this section and submit a revision or addendum no later than April 7th.

Breath and think and write a bit more - you already know what you want to say- take this time to say it as clearly as you typically do

Critically Assessing the Debates and Critiques of Rationality and Public Policy

In spite of facing great disapproval, the theory of rational choice has attained exceptional importance among the general theories that account for human action. Its importance ranges across the whole continuum of social scientific subdomains (Chai, 2001). Similar to economists, proponents of the theory of rational choice maintain the premise that humanity is rational, and that it has preferences regarding outcomes. Successively, a person opts for preferable options above those that are less preferable. Furthermore, proponents of this theory typically assume such preferences stem from and simply reflect the self-interests of different individuals (Hampsher-Monk & Hindmoor, 2009). Normally, at the foundation of the theory of rational choice is a consideration of at least one discrete decision-making entity's choice behavior. Rational choice theoreticians usually assume the entity above is characteristic of (i.e., represents) a bigger group. After the establishment of individual behavior, the analysis commonly progresses to determine the interaction of individual choices for generating results (Green, 2002).

Espeland (2000) believes rational decision theories are formulated by a single group of an agency with the aim of resolving a couple of pressing issues: offering a structure to facilitate broad and effective individual participation in decisions impacting them, and coming up with a way to integrate incongruent facts. Decision-making under rational choice necessitates integration of diverse elements of value, via a succession of tradeoffs, into one common measure (e.g., utility or price) (Espeland, 2001). Typically, rational choice examinations commence on the basis that an individual agent or some agents maximize utility (in other words, selecting the preferable option). The existence of limitations is a second key facet of this choice process. Limitations necessitate making choices. An advantage of the theory is its clear tradeoffs between alternatives.

Through knowledge and tools of rational decision-making, a transformation has been witnessed in when, how, and which individuals could take part in bureaucratic decision-making. One means this was accomplished by making people a key extrajudicial instrument to diffuse the administrative "interest group" theory. Citizens' aforementioned expanded scope of participation in agency decisions is an extension of democratic practices apparently challenging entities that place emphasis on the irresoluble strains between democratic and bureaucratic governance. Nevertheless, despite a greater number of individuals taking part in decisions, terms of involvement continued to be stringently regulated by technical agency experts as well as the notions of rationality informing agency models. In the case of certain groups, decision-making access was limited by a kind of stringent instrumental rationality considered to be misrepresenting their decision-making interests (Espeland, 2000).

Meanwhile, Elinor Ostrom's take on the theory of rational choice involves a criticism of a few suppositions posited by it. One critiqued postulation is that of zero contribution: this theory claims self-regarding conduct is required even when cooperating assures remunerations exceeding non-cooperative options in value. Some exceptions are instances of disproportionately high private utility, with a single player or a tiny special cluster having the inducement to deliver public goods. However, frequently, independent contribution to providing a public good is improbable, because sensible, self-interested people won't take steps to accomplish group (i.e., shared) interests. The idea that people are unable to rise above issues about joint action, and require externally imposed directions for accomplishing personal long-run self-interests, is the structure logically and painstakingly picked apart by Ostrom in the former half of her article. Largely utilizing lab evidence of the theory of rational choice, within scenarios of joint action (Auer, 2014).

In Ostrom's article, an attempt has been made to prove the human personality's flexibility about equity considerations and joint decision-making. But results which prove good for all happen on account of the unique experiences and expectations of participants. The author discovered consistent proof of the working of a collection of design doctrines for long-lasting resource management systems; this includes contexts that involve conveniently available, expensive-to-safeguard, easily "deplete-able" natural resources (i.e., CPRs or "common pool resources"). Further, the author knows of no empirical research which has challenged design doctrines' validity. Still, the main finding of her research was: there are several kinds of people in our world, some of whom show greater readiness, as compared to other people when it comes to initiating exchange and enjoying the advantages of joint action. Therefore, a key question revolves around how prospective collaborators identify and communicate with each other, creating institutions which strengthen, and not damage, conditional cooperation. Although there is still no complete collective action model, evolutionary models seem most capable of explaining different field and laboratory findings and bearing an all-encompassing model's nucleus (Ostrom, 2000).

Schneider and Ingram discuss the notion of rationality in their work titled, "Policy Design for Democracy." They state that within public choice or rationality theories, the self-interest-governed rule of utility maximization has been integrated with utilitarian justice tenets for developing a deductive model of what governments ought to and ought not to do as well as a theory on kinds of institutions required for delivering public policy. Pluralist democracy, public choice, critical, and policy science theories are the four major theories accounting for public policy (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p.8).

Schneider and Ingram (1997) indicate that a majority of the proponents of public choice theory ascribe the present policy related crisis to public institution design issues and governmental attempts at doing things other organizations, particularly economic markets, are better capable of doing. The self-interest focused rule of utility maximization has been integrated with utilitarian justice tenets for developing a deductive model of what governments ought to and ought not to do as well as a theory on kinds of institutions required for public policy delivery (p. 40).

The public choice or rational theory is based on the following assumptions:

1) The market represents a central societal institution which may be better depended on when compared with other institutions to offer a fair, free and just society; and

2) Markets have a focal position since they incorporate voluntary exchange between entities, with each entity ending up gaining an advantage from the exchange. Hence, the sole just public policy role is rectifying market malfunctions and offering goods the market cannot access. The above conclusions stem from the argument of public choice that individual rational action (or self-interested maximization of utility) results in joint unreasonable outcomes unless there are institutions in place for changing incentive systems for ensuring self-interested decisions yield jointly ideal outcomes (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p.40).

Nevertheless, it is suggested by Schneider and Ingram (1997) that if non-specialists were questioned regarding their public policy expectations, they would almost surely accept the fact that policy ought to resolve issues effectively and efficiently. That it be receptive to public wishes, represent their interests, and settle any conflicts of interest; and foster democracy and justice in every domain of life through the provision of equality of opportunity, decreased subjugation, supporting disadvantaged population groups, and community empowerment for gaining increased control over their environment and lives. Additionally, most individuals would argue that, usually, the policy doesn't successfully achieve any of the above goals (p. 8).

Social Justice Impacts of Public Policy

Espeland's "Bureaucratizing Democracy, Democratizing Bureaucracy" article fails to address public policy's social justice effects on marginalized and excluded groups. But the article does state that untangling the links between democratic practice and bureaucratic rationality is a difficult challenge. Democracy's extension has driven bureaucratic authority variants, as mass democracy necessitates bureaucracy. It is not possible to achieve legal equity and political representation in the absence of complex judicial systems, intricate, sturdy kinds of administration, and sound regulation. Balancing social gaps has been counted among bureaucratic authority's most salient consequences, in addition to forming an antecedent of it. Bureaucracy-promoted "formalistic impersonality" and its employment depending on knowledge and technical know-how instead of property or social status challenged past privilege forms (Espeland, 2000).

Additionally, Espeland (2000) claims such social leveling resulted in novel societal divisions privileging bureaucrats, whose power has been assigned to tenure and technical training, demonstrated by certificates, credentials, diplomas and examinations. In bureaucratic systems, a delegation of decision-making authority to specialists might be termed 'rational,' though not 'democratic.' Bureaucratic systems' technical dominance, unreachability to external parties, and secrecy may foster expertise in monopolies which obstruct democratic politics. Frequently, bureaucrats oppose democratic reform as reformer goals of expanding elections, limiting terms, eliminating barriers, recruiting the public and controlling discretion constrains administrative experience- and technical know-how- based power. Bureaucratic systems' ability of means-to-ends transformation, in addition to that of changing from effective administrative tools to achieve objectives to powerful institutions committed to self-preservation, represents a common pattern. Elected persons might control or limit bureaucracies' increasing influence. Bureaucratization's overwhelming advancement and state bureaucracies' growing authority and indispensability greatly threaten democracy. How can democracy work even in such a narrow sense? This challenge represents one among the major predicaments of modernism.

Ostrom (2000) fails to address public policy's social justice effects on marginalized and excluded groups. The author remarks that there is a need for understanding the impact of institutional, biophysical, and cultural settings on the kinds of people enlisted. For and leaving specific sorts of joint action scenarios, type of accessible information regarding prior actions, and the way people are themselves able to alter structural variables and increase the potential involvement and growth in strength of norm-using kinds with time. Additional developments in the same vein are vital to developing public policies which improve socially advantageous, collaborative conduct partially based on societal norms. Prior policy initiatives for inducing joint action grounded chiefly in externally-varying payoff systems for rational egotists might be misdirected; they may have possibly even 'crowded out' societal norm development facilitating increased cooperation. Enhancing individual power to formulate rules for themselves might lead to processes which enable societal norm evolution, thus increasing individual potential to better resolve joint action issues.

On the other hand, Schneider and Ingram (1997) forcefully explain public policy's societal effects. The authors are of the opinion that some policy designs comprise of a degenerative political system's footprints wherein societal understandings of target groups and problems are controlled strategically to achieve political advantages. The designs segregate target groups by whether they are 'undeserving' or 'deserving,' thus justifying the bestowal of helpful rules or subsidies for the deserving and penalty or disregard for the undeserving. For example, the American government's employment and economic growth connected policies have failed to offer the lasting economic security coveted by citizens. Incremental regulatory policy and tax modifications worsened gaps in income. Further, welfare policies enacted by the government have failed to ensure the eradication of destitution. In fact, these policies haven't even been able to decrease poverty levels in the long run. Rather, they seem (at the very least) partly to blame for the enduring economic dependency plaguing the American social structure (p. 5).

Federal, State and local findings account for a significant portion of policies that aim to decrease aggression and offenses. A record number of members from excluded and marginalized groups have been imprisoned for them. America's public policy hasn't succeeded in putting an end to environmental degradation, natural resource depletion, or the global population explosion. Schools, colleges, universities, governmental, educational bodies/departments and educational policies have faced constant criticism for resisting reforms and for their seeming incapacity to generate graduates who can meet societal expectations regarding thinking, reading, writing, or calculate. Despite over a hundred years of implementing public policy programs, the society has failed in the endeavor of eliminating sexism and racism. In fact, the income gap grew appreciably towards the end of the previous century (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p.6).

Research Topics in Public Choice Theory

Schneider and Ingram (1997) remark in their book that, the subject of public policy revolves around individual and societal human agency. These are mechanisms through which values have been allotted authoritatively for the masses. Policy-makers' formulations are reflected via debate, written works, practices, and symbols which explain and present values like services, goods, laws, status, income, and other negatively or positively valued traits. Policy design denotes the matter or content inherent in public policy structures, plans, aesthetics, and discussions in its symbolic as well as necessary forms. Policy schemes represent visible phenomena seen in statutes, court decrees, street-level processes and methods, administrative guidelines, and initiatives. Policy provisions (i.e., text) belong to the policy design, as do practices revealing who is responsible for performing distinct tasks, at what time, in collaboration with whom, for what purpose, using what resources, and by applying what types of motivators.

The empirical approach reveals policy designs that encompass distinct observable facets like target groups (policy beneficiaries or those suffering from it). Issues or objectives to be resolved (values needing distribution), guidelines (limiting or driving action), suppositions (logical links tying other components together), and rationales (which justify or provide an explanation for the policy's development). Designs aren't mere instrumental means aimed at targets. Rather, they include interpretive and symbolic components which prove just as significant as instrumental components. They are created via a design procedure which often involves various individuals at different times, typically with contradictory or divergent goals in mind. Policy designs are a normative, decisive enterprise through which policy components are organized for serving specific interests, values, and aims. Policies are not a mere political process and arbitrary, chaotic outcome, as believed by other approaches. Rather, public policies possess intrinsic rationality and patterns, with ideas inherent in policies having actual, real-world consequences. Typically, policies cater to various interests and achieve various goals at the same time, thus having consequences on many levels. A large number of consequences are largely dependent on the interpretations and meanings making up policies' social construction regarding value (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p.3-4).

Schneider and Ingram (1997) explain in their book that public policy contents are greatly accused in the present democratic crisis. Policy design related issues don't form the expected outcome of a swiftly transforming world which will encounter joint rational solutions. Rather, they have assumed the shape of long-run policy failures. Instead of presenting symbols and institutions for ensuring functionality of self-correcting pluralist democracy apparatuses, policies are apparently deceptive, confusing, and even deter active citizenship. Furthermore, they minimize self-correction potential and worsen or propagate the tendencies which gave rise to dysfunctional public policy. My chief research focus is the weaknesses of public policy and rationale for why public policy appears to continually fail even in today's world.

Given the above claims, research and outcomes that have been seen thus far, there should now be a drilling down upon a precise manifestation of how public policy has failed people that are vulnerable and marginalized. There is a number of directions that can be taken in terms of arguments and example populations that could be used. The precise one that will serve as an example in this situation are how African-Americans are not served and supported well when it comes to careers in the oil and gas career sphere and how even "set aside" programs are less than efficient in remedying that problem. This subsection of careers and the associated people is a great example of the policy of governments in the world not being on par with the results that could or should be garnered. Further, it should be (but is not always) the goal of government to level the proverbial playing field and at least give equality of opportunity even if the actual demographics never completely merge and resolve themselves. Even so, there should be some modicum of narrowing and changes so as to show that those that wish to have a strong career within the oil and gas or any other sector can have one if they want it. Up to this point, however, it simply is not happening and it must be explored what policy decisions, policy indecisions and methods are in play so as to figure out what is working, what is not working and what should be done instead.

One part of this larger paradigm that must be addressed is that good intentions and what "feels" right in terms of law and policy should (and needs to) take a backseat to what actually works and what is actually constructive. Politicians are wont to give lofty promises and they say they wish to be fair and effective, but so many of the policies that they champion or enact simply do not get the job done. Sometimes, they even choose winners and losers rather than trying to bring equality to all. Even with that, African-Americans have faced such rampant subjugation in the United States since its inception and some of that degradation persists to this very day. The prominent question to be answered is what could or should be done from a policy standpoint so as to further progress and level the playing field for all involved rather than protect it for the rich and a few other groups. As recently as 1966, it was found that the number of black people in the gas/utility industry was a paltry 3.7% as compared to the 13% or so that they represent in terms of national population. The meetings between the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the industry stalwarts date back to just after the Civil Rights Act in the 1960's. Even with the fact that the EEOC chairman admonished the oil and gas industries at the time, not nearly enough progress has been made since then (Shaffer & Dallas, 1974).