Philosophy: key questions and contemporary issues

¶ … Philosophy

The murder-cannabalism of Bernd Brandes by Armin Meiwes is disturbing, yet brings about interesting ethical questions regarding the occurrence.

Whether or not what Meiwes did was legally right, has nothing to do if it was ethically right. Utilitarianism and Kantianism are used to investigate the ethical aspects of this event.

When considering the Brandes-Meiwes incident, several aspects of the news story come to light that are of importance when utilizing a Utilitarianism framework for ethics. First, one must understand that in Utilitarianism it is the utility - or result - of an action that determines whether or not it was ethical. An action that produces the greatest good is the ethical choice. According to Leth's article, the result of Meiwes' and Brandes' actions were two men who able to complete their ultimate fantasy, reaching "ultimate climax."

For these two men, it was the greatest good possible. However, one must also consider the effects of their actions on society.

The utility of these two men's actions has now led to an increased risk of copy-cat cannibalism, with the possibility that the victim may not be a willing participant, as Brandes was.

In contrast, Kantian ethics is focused on the intent of someone's actions. If one makes a decision that appears to be morally right, but is doing it for the wrong reason, it is unethical. The relevant piece of the Brandes-Meiwes story is the intent of Meiwes. Meiwes' intent was not noble. He did not kill and eat Brandes out of some form of mercy killing, but instead his motives were to satisfy some deviant sexual fantasy. Therefore, even if Brandes had been suffering and the act, in the end merciful, Meiwes' intentions were morally reprehensible. In the end, both Utilitarianism and Kantianism demonstrate that Meiwes' behavior was unethical.

Question 2:

The concept of gay marriage is a hotly contested subject in today's society. Advocates and opponents fiercely support their positioning. Most definitions of marriage include the concept that marriage is the union of a man and woman, or husband and wife and some courts have further specified that marriage is designed for the creation and raising of children (Bolte, 2005, p. 400).

Therefore many argue that this excludes homosexual marriages. Bolte, however, argues that the creation and raising of children is an ineffective reason for banning gay marriage.

The fertility clause in marriage laws has been removed; therefore this is no longer a barrier to gay marriage. Bolte (2005) notes that if this was a legitimate reason for withholding a marriage license, infertility would not only deny marriage to homosexuals, but also to elderly and infertile heterosexual couples as well.

And, even if this were a stipulation to marriage, the requirement for creating and raising children would not truly exclude gays and lesbians. "Gays and lesbians are increasingly becoming parents through new avenues such as adoption or artificial insemination. Many gays and lesbians also have children from previous marriages" (p. 400).

Sodomy laws and the idea that homosexual sex is perverse is reflection of Lord Devlin's legal moralism.

In this concept, laws are created to reflect the morality of the majority of society. However, as Bolte (2005) indicates, the existence of sodomy laws may no longer be a clear expression of public morality.

Oftentimes, sodomy laws are ignored and offenders not prosecuted. Furthermore, "the fact that these laws are applied differently to heterosexuals and homosexuals distorts their moral message" (p. 405).

Schulman (2005) offers a differing viewpoint by surmising that gay marriage is not a marriage.

He insists that those in support of gay marriage are trying to impose dramatically new perspectives regarding laws and institutions that are very old and fundamental to humanity (p. 286).

By granting gay marriage rights to one minority group, it is a slippery slope to being forced to grant these same rights to other non-traditional relationships such as: polygamy, polyandry, and polyamorism (p. 288).

Schulman further cites Gallagher by noting that gay marriage "would require society at large to gut marriage of its central presumptions about family in order to accommodate a few adults' desires" (p. 289). For Schulman, marriage is the sanctioning and solemnizing of the connection of opposites, which alone creates new life, despite whether it actually does create new life or not. In a marriage, these opposites are surrendered and come together to form a new entity. Marriage is not about romantic love or sexual desire. For these reason is not applicable to gay relationships (p. 290).

Personally, I do not feel that gay marriages should be allowed. Marriage is more than a legal definition, as Schulman so eloquently describes it, but includes a spiritual definition that supercedes any laws of man. Although our nation has always strived to separate Church and State, the reality is that society's morality, for the most part, is derived from the Church.

The Church defines marriage as a union between a man and woman and despite the changing laws created by man, this definition will not change.

Question 3:

Goering (2005) notes that the betterment of humanity and/or one's own children is morally acceptable. Society has little challenge with the use of education for the betterment of children, or providing proper medical care to survive and thrive.

Indirect actions are taken to better humanity and the future of today's children, such as the efforts to balance the national budget, the passing of legislature to save the environment, and the use of federal and state funds for exploratory research whose benefits will likely only be seen by future generations. However, the advancement of genetic technology is both fascinating and frightening (p. 659-660).

The Rawlsian "veil of ignorance" is a proposed means of devising a fair distributive justice system.

In this philosophical experiment, each individual is blind to his or her own societal position. From this veil of ignorance, they are then asked to determine rules of justice that would be fair for all society.

Because of the uncertainty of where they stand in society, Rawls theorized that people would choose rules of justice that would consist of equal basic liberties (Goering, 2005, p. 664). When one uses this veil of ignorance to determine whether or not it would be right to genetically alter the physiology of a person to prevent breast or prostate cancer, it sheds new light on this subject.

It is likely that people would agree that genetic modification, in this case, should be permissible, as when making the decision, they have no knowledge if they are afflicted with the disease, have an increased risk of the disease, have a loved one with the disease, or are not affected at all.

There is an elimination of suffering with this decision, and although it is unknown what effects would occur with the correction or elimination of this gene, it is unlikely that some beneficial attribute is linked to breast and prostate cancer. This genetic alteration would be treatment and not simply enhancement.

Question 4:

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, in 1948, asserted the need for protection of basic human rights. Today, more than 50 years later, most nations strongly endorse human rights, on a domestic level, through their constitutional and legal systems. In addition, the media has been key to covering human rights stories, putting national and international pressure on those governments who do not comply with these standards.

However, in spite of these formal commitments to human rights, many countries demonstrate consistent violations of human rights in their actions both at home and abroad. This disparity between policy and action is a paradox in human rights (An-Na'im, 2005, p. 102).

Of particular challenge to countering this paradox is the issue of national sovereignty. It is "national sovereignty that is necessary for the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination" (An-Na'im, 2005, p. 103) and therefore the cultural delineations of what constitutes human rights come into play.

When one considers the argument that support of human rights infringes upon national sovereignty concern is given for the inconsistencies that may occur between international standards and cultural traditions, as well as philosophical and ideological perspectives of the nation in question, the paradox is easily seen. An-Na'im's revision surmises that only through formal participation of citizens in the formulation and implementation of human rights policies can this paradox be overcome (p. 104).

There are two "horns" of the legitimacy dilemma. The first is that many Eastern nations have not allowed their populations to be involved in the formation of human rights policies. The second is that every cultural tradition has, to some effect, problems with human rights (An-Na'im, 2005, p. 105).

In the Muslim context this legitimacy dilemma is seen in the discrimination of women in Shari'a, the discrimination of non-Muslims in Shari'a, and their restrictions on the freedom of religious belief.