2006 Global Terrorism Nie Like Any Intelligence

2006 Global Terrorism NIE

Like any intelligence product, the declassified Key Judgments of the 2006 National Intelligence Estimate "Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States" relies on certain explicit and implicit assumptions as a part of its analysis. Identifying these assumptions is crucial for evaluating the accuracy of any piece of analysis, and intelligence products in particular. Explicit assumptions may be identified by looking out for key words, while implicit assumptions require more in-depth consideration.

The explicit assumptions in the 2006 NIE are identified by certain key words which inform the reader that the following information is not verified fact, but rather based on an assumption, which itself may or may not be based on specific evidence. These key words include terms like "probably," "likely," "could," and "would," because all of these words signify that the statements being made are conditional, rather than definitive. In other instances, the explicit assumption is revealed through a more lengthy hedge; for example the first significant explicit assumption in the 2006 NIE appears when the authors state "although we cannot measure the extent of the spread with precision, a large body of all-source reporting indicates that activists identifying themselves as jihadists, although a small percentage of Muslims, are increasing in both number and geographic dispersion" (ODNI, 2006). Though the authors reference "a large body of all-source reporting," the notion that jihadists are increasing in number and geographic dispersion must be taken as an assumption, because the authors cannot be sure, and thus are careful to state as much (though in strictly legal terms this would likely be termed a presumption rather than an assumption, for the purposes of this study the latter term will suffice).

The second major explicit assumption appears when the authors state that "new jihadist networks and cells, with anti-American agendas, are increasingly likely to emerge," because the word "likely" signals to the reader that the statement is an assumption, rather than a statement of fact (ODNI, 2006). Another significant explicit assumption comes in the section concerning vulnerabilities in the jihadist movement, when the authors state that "exposing the religious and political straightjacket that is implied by the jihadists' propaganda would help to divide them from the audiences they seek to persuade," because this statement assumes that individuals are motivated to join the jihadist movement due to a desire to enact the movement's ultimate goals, rather than any wide variety of reasons that individuals have been known to join violent or extremist groups (ODNI, 2006). The last two significant explicit assumptions in the 2006 NIE concern the importance of democratic reforms and the centrality of key figures in the jihadist movement. The authors state that if democratic reforms proceed in Muslim majority nations, "political participation probably would drive a wedge between intransigent extremists and groups willing to use the political process to achieve their local objectives" (ODNI, 2006). Later, they assume that "the loss of key leaders […] in rapid succession, probably would cause the group to fracture into smaller groups," and "exacerbate strains and disagreements" (ODNI, 2006). This is a significant assumption because it assumes that certain key leaders are extremely valuable to a group that, as the NIE notes, is already extremely fractured and frequently operates independent of central control.

Implicit assumptions are somewhat harder to identify, because they are not flagged with obvious key words. Instead, one must determine whether or not a statement is an assumption based on whether or not it contains supporting evidence. For example, the authors assume that "perceived jihadist success [in Iraq] would inspire more fighters to continue the struggle elsewhere," while arguing that perceived defeat would do the opposite; this is significant because it assumes that defeat can only serve to discourage jihadists, rather than spur them on (ODNI, 2006). Another important implicit assumption in the NIE is the notion that "most jihadist groups" will focus "primarily on soft targets to implement their asymmetric warfare strategy," because although soft targets are frequently the most visible objects of terrorist attack, the American experience in Afghanistan and Iraq seems to suggest that jihadists are more than willing to attack hard targets, especially because they frequently represent a means of enhancing the organization's perceptions (ODNI, 2006). Finally, the statement that "Iran, and to a lesser extent Syria, remain the most active state sponsors of terrorism," represents a significant implicit assumption, because it seemingly ignores the well-established evidence that Israel, and even some U.S. officials, have offered logistical, financial, and rhetorical support to the People's Mujahedin of Iran, a group listed as a terrorist organization by the State Department; obviously, the authors of the NIE are prohibited from performing this kind of analysis on the United States itself, and would likely be unwilling to do the same for one of its major allies, but that does not change the fact that the aforementioned statement represents a significant implicit assumption (ODNI, 2006).