Radicalization concepts and processes

Islam Radicalization

The Radicalization of Islam

The forces of economic, political and religious distinction which have driven a wedge between the Western World and the Arab world are steeped in a long history of divergent interests. The conflict as we know it today, largely waged between the United States and such long-standing allies as the United Kingdom and Australia, is the fallout of centuries of subjugation, exploitation and occupation. The colonial forces of Europe and the United States exist on a continuum within which Arab states and cultures, once themselves a dominant and imperial global entity, have developed both historical and modern motives for violent and militant resistance. These motives relate as much to a sense of political resentment as they do to a belief in religious martyrdom, with the realities of western exploitation, a permeation of objectionable living conditions and the presence of deceptive governmental or media forces have collectively created a divide between East and West that implicates the Arab culture as a militant defender of a waning tribalism. Today, the greatest visible identifiers of this militant disposition are those 'terrorist' groups which perpetrated the attacks of September 11th and who continue to obstruct American interests in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. The degree to which this identity has come to be seen as the primary face of Islam in the world is both a testament to the distortions imposed by Western society and the degree to which these extreme sects of Islam have come to dominate impressions. So is this evidenced in the text by Husain (2007), which details the experience of one Briton who would move from a life of normal devotion to one of extremist engagement with little warning.

A consideration of Husain's experience reveals that in such contexts as Europe, the U.K. And the U.S., the experience of humiliation and disenfranchisement which has been foisted upon Muslims living as second class citizens has helped to stimulate a virulent form of political and ideological resentment. This is a reality which can be correlated to a modern history of exploitation connected both the colonialism and to the Cold War. For Europe, this is especially the case, as the Muslim population continues to proliferate. As Leiken (2005) indicates "the mass immigration of Muslims to Europe was an unintended consequence of post-World War II guest-worker programs. Backed by friendly politicians and unsympathetic judges, foreign workers, who were supposed to stay temporarily, benefited from family reunification programs and became permanent. Successive waves of immigrants formed a sea of descendents. Today, Muslims constitute the majority of immigrants in most western European countries." (Leiken, 1)

Not only is this so, but Muslims also constitute a particularly disaffected part of the population, often deeply isolated into ethnic neighborhoods and schools as was the case for Husain. He would report that "I was sixteen years old and I had no white friends. My world was entirely Asian, fully Muslim. This was my Britain. Against this backdrop, the writings of Sarwar's guru, Mawdudi, took me to a radically new level." (Husain, 35) for an individual such as Husain, the motives for engagement in jihad were somewhat muddled, but also consistent with the experience of indignity suffered by white British society. In some ways, Husain would be a counterpoint to the impression that Islamic extremists are produced by a set of devastating psychological experiences or confrontation of war.

Certainly, these are the qualities that have been emergent in the aftermath of such attacks as those on September 11 ths. To the point, when Islamic extremists used American commercial airliners as missiles and felled the World Trade Center in New York City while simultaneously using the same method to punch a whole in the side of the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., the Western World came to understand the extent to which hatred between the modern and tribal worlds had grown. The ultimate implication of the events of 9/11 is that Islam has become, as a result of American foreign policy, economic patterns and military endeavors, a hostile and radicalized culture. This is largely based on perceptions in the Islamic World that the Western World acts with favoritism toward Israel in diplomacy, demonstrates a tendency to exploit Arab states with military acts and pursues opportunistic relationships based on its dependence on Mid-East oil. One of the reasons that is most noted for anger with the Western World by Muslim leaders of state and by the average Islamist residing in the Middle East, is the fact that the United States has so strongly supported Israeli statehood.

The Mamdani (2004) text captures this geopolitical disposition particularly well, indicating that the United States, the U.S.S.R. And other global powers helped to create the current Islamic cultural tendencies toward violence and armed resistance. Mamdani notes that "as the battleground of the Cold War shifted from southern Africa to Central America and Central Asia in the late seventies, America's benign attitude toward political terror turned into a brazen embrace: both the contras in Nicaragua and later al-Qaeda (and the Taliban) in Afghanistan were American allies during the Cold War. Supporting them showed a determination to win the Cold War 'by all means necessary,' a phrase that could refer only to unjust means. The result of an alliance gone sour, 9/11 needs to be understood first and foremost as the unfinished business of the Cold War." (Mamdani, 13)

This is an important way of framing the discussion because it distinguishes the political and military objectives that were inherently related to the goals of armed Islamic jihad. Recognition that the United States and others had played a key role in fomenting the violent proclivities which are today regarded as somehow historically Muslim suggests that we are under a misimpression to view Islamic extremism as religious in nature. This is a perspective that Gottschalk & Greenberg (?) regard derisively, identifying this as a false stereotype emergent in western media which holds that "ultimately, religious beliefs and acts not only distinguish the terrorists, they motivate the terrorists' irrational violence. The implicit message, then, is that Muslims who do not act religiously can be good, normal Americans, while Muslims who perform Islamic rituals and espouse Islamic beliefs also commit terrorist acts." (Gottschalk & Greenberg, 62)