Religious values in war and peace

Religious Values in War and Peace

It has recently been argued by some atheists such as Daniel Dennett, Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens, and Sam Harris that religion, among other things, is the evil that instigates violence and leads to endless wars. They point at history of religiously-motivated violence as the evidence supporting this assertion. As has been pointed out by scholars, however, this type of reasoning is the other side of the fundamentalist coin and fails to explain the role of religion in a fair and balanced manner. The accusation that religion necessarily leads to, or facilitates, war and violence is the same like the suggestion that science necessarily leads to eugenics (Aslan). In reality, religion can be many things, and there are three main aspects of religion when it comes to the question of war and pace that are common in human practice. Religion can call its adherents to a "holy war," requiring that the forces of unbelief are confronted with force. Religion may value the concept of "just war," suggesting that war can be justified under certain conditions and that the rules of warfare need to be observed during the war. And, finally, religion can be totally pacifist, eschewing war and any resort to violence (Steffen). In this paper, I will look at some major religions and discuss how they can be manifested in all three forms.

Religion is such a multi-dimensional phenomenon that it is even hard to define it. Western secular scholars have defined religion in the past but since these definitions were made with Western attitudes and religions in mind, it is generally accepted among scholars now that religious practices among non-Western peoples might be quite different, rendering Western definitions inadequate. Religious practices and values may also be influenced by history, politics, culture, human exchange of ideas, and many other social factors. Not only it is true that there are so many religions with their specificities and varieties, but even if we take one religion -- let's say, Christianity -- there is so much internal diversity on religious questions pertaining to war, violence, and peace that it is hard to generalize about it. Nonetheless, there are certain characteristics one may note regarding all religions. For instance, any religion may have "maximalist" and "minimalist" characteristics; the former refers to "the conviction that religion ought to permeate all aspects of social, indeed of human existence" and the latter "restricts religion to an important set of (chiefly metaphysical) concerns, protects its privileges against state intrusion, but restricts its activity and influence to this specialized sphere" (Lincoln 4-5).

This does not, however, suggest that religious adherents with "maximalist" characteristics are going to necessarily take the literal interpretation of scriptural texts such as the Bible or the Qur'an and be more prone to accepting war as necessary, while followers of "minimalist" approach are going to be more pacifistic. This again depends on many social, political, economic, and cultural practices one is exposed to throughout his or her life. According to Lincoln, wars and conflicts may be caused by competition over scarce resources such as wealth, power, and territory, and also non-material items such as prestige, dignity, and justice. The resort to violence, however, would be difficult for one if one is only motivated by material desires. But the moral inhibitions against violence wane when non-material desires come into play. "Certain kinds of religious discourse can assist in this task, specifically those which recode otherwise problematic acts as righteous deeds, sacred duties, or the like, as when killing is defined as sacrifice, destruction as purification, or war as Crusade," Lincoln explains. "[C]anonic texts of all religions include passages that can be put to such purpose. Those who are interested in undertaking violence can always find arguments and precedents that sanctify their purpose, but selective reading and tendentious interpretation are an important part of this process. . . .

When social groups constitute their identity in religious terms and experience themselves as a sacred collectivity (the faithful, the righteous, or God's chosen people, for instance), as a corollary they tend to construe their rivals in negative fashion (heretics, infidels, apostates, evil, bestial, demonic, satanic, e.g.). Under such circumstances, the pursuit of self-interest -- including vengeance for slights to one's pride (a.k.a. "honor") -- can be experienced as a holy cause, in support of which any violence is justified (94).

In other words, human beings can mask their pursuit of various profane interests in religious terms, turning their struggle into a "holy war."

Discussing Christian militant groups who resort to violence in present times -- abortion clinics bombers, shooters of Jewish and Muslim centers, Catholic and Protestant sides in Northern Ireland -- Juergensmeyer argues that Christianity, despite its central tenets of peace and love, "has always had a violent side" throughout history; and that "violent conflict is vividly portrayed in both the Old and New Testament of the Bible. This history and these biblical images have provided the raw material for theologically justifying the violence of contemporary Christian groups" (19-20). For instance, militants attacking abortion clinics view their act as not only an attack against immorality but also as a fight between the forces of good against evil. These bombers could easily find theological justifications for their acts in Jesus who said: "Do not think that I have come to bring peace on earth; I have come not to bring peace but a sword" (Mt 10:34, Lk 12:51-52). They could also find justifications in the theological writings of preachers associated with the conservative Dominion Theology.

Mike Bray, one of the notorious abortion clinics bombers described "the abortionist's knife" as "the cutting edge of Satan's attack," which gave him a theological justification to use violence against these people. Eric Robert Rudolph, responsible for bombing abortion clinics, a lesbian bar, and exploding a bomb at the 1996 Atlanta Olympics viewed his acts as war against "the atheistic internationalism," while the theology of Christian Identity was "most likely part of the thinking of Timothy McVeigh, the convicted bomber of the Oklahoma City federal building" (Juergensmeyer 30-31). The case of Northern Ireland is even more instructive. Many perceived the Irish Republican Army's struggle against the British as an anti-colonial liberation movement, but the conflict between the Irish and the British took a religious dimension, prompting one Irishman to describe IRA offensive as "a major convergence of religion and nationalism," terming it "a kind of Holy War" (Juergensmeyer 42).

This kind of interpreting Christian values pertaining to war and conflict is in stark contrast with the views of Quakers, the Amish, or many Christian monks who can find a theological justification for their pacifism again in Jesus who said "love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you" (Mt 5:44). Many early Christian theologians such as Tertullian and Origen were pacifists, preventing Christians from serving in the Roman Army. When Christianity became the state religion of Rome in the fourth century, Christian leaders began to accept the doctrine of "just war," elaborated by theologians such as Cicero and Augustine. The "just war" theory suggested that sometimes the use of violence could prevent the loss of greater number of people than would be lost under no use of force, thus rendering the war "just" from Christian perspective. In the medieval era, the "just war" theory eventually turned in "holy wars" against heretics, real and suspected, and Muslims occupying the Holy Land, punctuating the Christian battle cry Deus volt ("God wills it") (Juergensmeyer 26).

The same variance of values has been expressed in Islamic history. As Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana notes, there is strong Qur'anic emphasis on peace as the word as-Salam is one of the ninety-nine beautiful names of God and that Muslims use the word to greet each other every day: "Although there are verses in the Qur'an that permit war as a legitimate conduct to correct injustice and overthrow tyranny and oppression, various Quranic verses indicate that 'there is a clearly articulated preference in Islam for nonviolence over violence, and for forgiveness (afu) over retribution.'" However, "attitudes of Muslims regarding peace and war display differences over the course of Islamic history. There is no single doctrine of jihad that is accepted by Muslims. These attitudes towards peace and war evolved as a result of different cultural backgrounds, particular historical events, and distribution of power among political units. The juridical perspectives of war and peace that ere generated in the course of history reflect these factors" (86-87).

In the medieval era, there were many manifestations of Islamic discourse on war and peace. There were wars of expansion conducted by dynasties and rulers who justified their expansions under the banner of "holy wars." The concept of jihad was effectively incorporated into such discourse. There was also considerable body of legal treatises limiting the conduct of war, making the Islamic stance on the concept of "just war" almost indistinguishable from the Western understanding (Gopin 83; Tibi 133). The limits of warfare and justification for wars, however, were also dictated by the necessities of time, politics, historical events, and various social and cultural factors. At the extreme side, the September 11 attacks and various Islamist violence perpetrated against civilians in the last two decades is an example of how violence and conflict can be justified in religious terms. Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders often quote from the Qur'an and refer to the West as "Crusaders," emphasizing the religious significance of the struggle they conduct (Lincoln; Juergensmeyer). Historical circumstances may also dictate the totally pacifist manifestations of Islam. An example is Abdul Ghaffar Khan in India, also known as the "Frontier Gandhi," a close associate of Gandhi in non-violent struggle against British rule. Ghaffar Khan was not a minority figure but garnered the support of a hundred thousand official followers and even a greater number of sympathizers (Gandhi).