Joint interoperability: research proposal and framework

Joint Interoperability

Review of the Literature

Seeking to Define and Understand Joint Interoperability

Fundamental Challenges

Lack of Fully Integrated Interoperable Communication Systems

Problem for Military Joint Interoperability Spans Decades

Network Centric Warfare Plays a Prominent/Dominant Role in Emerging Joint Operations

JOINT INTEROPERABILITY

The objective of this study is to examine the definitions and applications of 'joint interoperability' in terms of what joint interoperability means and what it is perceived to mean in terms of benefits and outcomes in the United States Armed Forces and the different divisions of forces in their interactions with one another during actionable crisis and war actions.

STATEMENT of the PROBLEM

The military's purchase and deployment of information systems has been ad hoc and in a hodge-podge manner and has been fragmented to an extent resulting in a lack in interoperability among different missions, units and sectors of the military.

SIGNIFICANCE of the STUDY

The significance of this study is in the additional knowledge that will be gained in this area of study and the knowledge that will be added to already existing knowledge in this area.

INTRODUCTION

The concept of Joint Interoperability in today's military operations suggests creating an environment where meaningful data can easily be exchanged and interchanged between systems, and then transformed into relevant command and control information, from which timely decisions can be made and executed with precision. In recent years, many have come to think of interoperability merely in terms of being able to communicate with each other and share information. But interoperability means so much more than this. More specifically defined, interoperability is the capability of systems or key elements of systems being able to work with each other, both physically and logically. In fact, this more holistic definition of Joint interoperability is vital in order for the Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC) to effectively prosecute military actions. This is being proven out in current operations in the Middle East, where United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) is conducting Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom in Iraq and Afghanistan, respectively in collaboration with nearly 70 partner-allied countries. The Joint Interoperability concept is one of the primary military capability goals outlined in Joint Vision 2020. In order to successfully meet the operational goals of coalition and joint warfare, it is crucial the U.S. And allied forces be interoperable. Many instructions and directives from the Department of Defense (DOD) and other governmental and non-governmental agencies (NGA's) have attempted to address the significance of interoperability and accelerate its implementation. Unfortunately, the direction and guidance tends to be broad and often ambiguous, leading to divergent interpretations, creating major hurdles for the GCC's by levying on them responsibility for improving joint interoperability without directing the authority over title 10 (service components) agencies to do it

This situation is the traditional service model created at the end of World War II and has not kept pace with new directives as set forth in Joint Doctrine, the Unified Command Plan or DOD Instructions predicated on the JTF-GNO NetOps Concepts of Operation, impeding the GCC's ability to effectively fight as a joint force. Given this political environment, it is critical that the GCC's take exercise the authority they do possess to influence to bring about a cultural and operational change in the warfighting process to increase joint interoperability. This paper then will be a survey of the joint interoperability concept; its evolution and challenges and will suggest four potential recommendations that the GCC's might employ to gain the necessary influence to dramatically improve joint interoperability.

BACKGROUND to the STUDY

The Department of Defense has been faced with interoperability concerns and issues for more than 4 decades. Achieving true joint Command, Control, Communications, Computer, and Intelligence (C4I) interoperability continues to be elusive for the DOD. Joint Publication 1 tells us "the nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a team; Joint force commanders choose capabilities they need from the air, land, sea, space and special operations forces at their disposal; Joint warfare is essential to victory."(DOD, 1991) Joint Publication 1 tends to infer that requirements for interoperability are new, and essential only to recent modern warfare doctrine. Nothing could be further from the truth. Efforts to improve interoperability began in 1903, with the establishment of the Joint Army and Navy Board. Although the need to conduct Joint operations has long been acknowledged, the record of success with interoperability has been sketchy. The National Security Act of 1947 reorganized the defense infrastructure and first defined unified and specified combatant commands in hopes of improving interoperability by creating more centralized command structures intended to enforce unity of action and effort amongst the services. 50 years later interoperability problems have continued despite the attempt to increase command centralization. Reorganizations have not improved interoperability because they only treat a symptom of the actual problem; statutory divisions and perceived separate service specific roles and missions that have largely prevented operational interaction between the services. This coupled with lack of enforcement from DOD and a health dose of politics, have led the Services to have historically developed their own C4I systems and suffice it to say that these stove-piped systems have created enormous technical interoperability problems for the Services to operate efficiently and effectively in a joint environment. In the late 1980's and early 1990's DOD Services and Agencies began making progress to improve C4I systems capabilities and interoperability. The Joint Technical Architecture (JTA) was created to define standards governing the implementation of system capabilities and interfaces. The goal of the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) Common Operating Environment (COE) outlined in the JTA is to establish a commonly defined executable environment for systems intended to drive communication hardware and software developers toward a common set of solutions that work together and that compliment each other. Recently, in an ongoing effort to achieve the Joint Vision 2020 Objective Force and the evolving concept of Net-Centricity, the Secretary of Defense signed a delegation of authority letter, designating the Director, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) as the new Commander of the Joint Task Force -Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO). This designation levied the responsibility for directing the operation and defense of the Global Information Grid (GIG) to a centralized Functional Combatant Commander (FCC), including overseeing the movement towards interoperability amongst the services. To this end, in April 2004 the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command approved the Joint Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for Global Information Grid Network Operations. This Network Operations (NetOps) CONOPS outlined a common framework and command and control structure to conduct the Unified Command Plan-assigned mission of Global Network Operations, combining the disciplines of enterprise systems and network management, network defense, and information decision management across all the services enhancing the command and support of combatant commanders. It also created and brought together a very interested and engaged community of interest- the Geographic Combatant Commands- to discuss the best ways of achieving joint communications interoperability. Although these types of initiatives are important they remain insufficient. In my estimation, there are several realities that continue to hinder the achievement of Joint interoperability across system and Service boundaries. First, stove-piped systems still remain the order of the day. Service components and Agencies continue to emphasize the development of systems that enable very specific functional applications, services, and address associated data considerations important to their needs rather than consider ubiquitous open standards interface and interchange. Thus, they do not adequately address the needed interoperable infrastructure nor enable standardization of policies and procedures. Second, even when the Service components and Agencies center on standardization, this term takes a differing connotation within each acquisition branch. More often than not, they have a differing view of what specific requirements are to be met and what capabilities are needed to achieve a level of perceived interoperability. Plainly speaking, system functions then also become stove-piped, and capabilities simply do not interact in a Joint environment. Lastly, even when the stars and planets align and the Services components and Agencies have found agreement on all of the requirements and on the same set of capabilities, the margin for error is wide due to implementation choices generally available for each specific capability. Although the C4I systems may be standards compliant, they still might not and usually are not be able to interoperate with each other, often due to the broad language military standards are written in providing the Service components and Agencies with latitude in interpretation and the incorporation of permissible options and capabilities. The DOD has aggravated the situation further by allowing the Service components and Agencies to circumvent the C4I interoperability standards process via an easy waiver process. Finally, Joint interoperability will continue to remain elusive and difficult to reach because senior DOD leadership has yet to institute processes and firm policy on a common set of joint standards and to ensure Service components adhere them. Furthermore, leadership must also enforce the Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC) authority to control, shape deployed service specific C4I systems into the interoperable forces they require which is clearly within their authority as specified in the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and Joint Publication 6, "The authority of a combatant commander is to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command" (JP 6-0, 2006)

METHODOLOGY

The methodology employed in this brief study and proposal for further research is qualitative in nature and in the form of an extensive review of relevant literature in this subject area.

JOINT INTEROPERABILITY

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

I. Seeking to Define and Understand Joint Interoperability

There has historically been a challenge in attempting to properly understand in complexity in defining joint interoperability. This is related in the work of Faughn (2002) entitled: "Interoperability: Is it Achievable?" published by the Center for Information Policy Research at Harvard University. It is stated by Faughn that: "...the "shortfalls in operability among U.S. forces, first publicized by the press at the time of the Grenada invasion, became the catalysts for legislation and changes in defense policy, guidance, and procedures, and for numerous attempts to ensure joint interoperability. Despite tremendous planning and expenditure of funds, true interoperability, especially in the theaters with the greatest potential for conflict, continues to elude the Department of Defense (DOD)." (Faughn, 2002) Faughn relates that there are seven key factors that: "...hamper the achievement of interoperability." (p.7) These are stated to include: (1) the complex military acquisition culture; (2) the shrinking defense budget; (3) the effect of rapidly changing technology on maintaining our interoperability among multiple generations of command and control (C2) and weapon systems; (4) the changing nature of operations; (5) the new emphasis on multinational operations. (p.2) Faughn (2002) states: "Despite the many programs and activities that have been instituted to achieve interoperability among the U.S. services, finding a concise document dedicated to the issue is nearly impossible." Faughn reports that the "Joint Publication 1-02 of the DOD Dictionary of Military Terms, serves as the core document to which services and agencies refer for official definitions." The definition of 'Interoperability is stated to be: "Interoperability -- 1. (DOD-NATO) the ability of systems (units, or forces) to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. 2. (DOD Only) the condition achieved among communications-electronics equipment when information services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users. The degree of interoperability should be defined when referring to specific cases." (Faughn, 2002; p. 16)

II. Fundamental Challenges

In 1999, the congressionally mandated study "Realizing the Potential of C41: Fundamental Challenges" clarified these definitions relating to the terms operational and technical interoperability stating: "Operational interoperability addresses support to military operations and as such, goes beyond systems to include people and procedures, interacting on an end-to-end basis." (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, December 1999; as cited in Faughn, 2002) Faughn additionally states: "Technical interoperability stops at the systems. If two or more systems can exchange data, then they are considered technically interoperable. By contrast, operational interoperability adds the user and assumes that the information exchange is between two or more users (senders and receivers), who must be able not only to exchange information but also to understand it. "Understand" is the key word." (2002) Faughn states that often the terms "compatibility" and "integration" occur so frequently in discussions of interoperability, they are sometimes considered synonymous with interoperability and can confuse the discussion." (2002; p.16) Integration, in the view of Admiral Nutwell, deputy secretary of defense for command, control, communications, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, is "generally considered to go beyond mere Interoperability to involve some degree of functional dependence." (Faughn, 2002; p. 17) it is noted in Newell's statement that "Compatibility is something less than Interoperability" and that integrated family of systems must of necessity be interoperable, but interoperable systems need not be integrated." (Faughn, 2002; p.17) Newell goes on to state that "Interoperability lies in the middle of an 'Integration Continuum' between compatibility and full integration. It is important to distinguish between the fundamentally different concepts of compatibility, interoperability and integration, since failure to do so sometimes confuses the debate over how to achieve them." (Faughn, 2002; p.19) Faugh reviews U.S. joint operations in the decade of the 1980s and 1990s stating that this reveals "the importance of interoperability." In Grenada Faughn relates that a short-notice decision for deployment of forces jointly into Grenada in 1983 was due to a crisis being perceived resulting in no time being left for the military to "develop mechanisms for communicating with the other services." (2002; p. 19) These joint forces, which were on an "ad hoc basis..." (Faughn, 2002; p.19) are stated to have understood the need for achieving interoperability among the various service branches "essentially on the fly." (Faughn, 2002; p.19)

III. Lack of Fully Integrated Interoperable Communication Systems

Hillman Dickinson states in the work entitled: "Planning for Defense-Wide Command and Control": "The final challenge to invading forces was the lack of a fully integrated, interoperable communications system.... Communications was to have been the glue that would tie together the operation of the four independent United States military service elements. Unfortunately, communications support failed in meeting certain aspects of the mission.... For example, uncoordinated use of radio frequencies caused a lack of interservice communications except through offshore relay stations and prevented radio communications between Marines in the north and Army Rangers in the south. As such, interservice communication was prevented, except through offshore relay stations, and kept Marine commanders unaware for too long that Rangers were pinned down without adequate armor. In a second incident, it was reported that one member of the invasion force placed a long distance, commercial telephone call to Fort Bragg, N.C., to obtain C-130 gunship support for his unit which was under fire.... Commenting overall on the issue of interoperability, Admiral Metcalf [the CINC of Atlantic Command and the overall commander for the operation], wrote, "In Grenada we did not have interoperability with the Army and the Air Force, even though we had been assured at the outset that we did." (Faughn, 2002; p. 19-20)

IV. Problem for Military Joint Interoperability Spans Decades

This problem continued on for the military and it has been reported by former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin as well as former Representative William Dickinson, in the work entitled; "Defense for a New Era, Lessons Learned of the Persian Gulf War' that a pervasive lack of interoperability exists even yet as they state: "Operation Desert Storm demonstrated that tactical communications are still plagued by incompatibilities and technical limitations. At CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] corps and wing levels, a significant portion of the war was conducted over commercial telephone lines because of the volume and compatibility limitations of the military communications system.... Communications were worse in the field.... Faughn relates that in the 1990s the African operations...illuminated the difficulty in interoperability among multinational forces, especially with those of developing countries and international organizations associated with the changing nature of military operations and operations other than war. Lessons learned from Operation Restore Hope (Somalia, 1991) emphasized such challenges." (Faughn, 2002; p. 23)

V. Network Centric Warfare Plays a Prominent/Dominant Role in Emerging Joint Operations

The work of Major David W. Roberts (USAF) and LCDR Joseph a. Smith (USN) (2003) in the work entitled: "Realizing the Promise of Network-Centric Warfare" state that "One look at the Secretary of Defense's transformation plan, at recent defense authorization figures, or at any of the emerging joint and Service operational concepts will confirm that NCW plays a prominent (if not dominant) role in the reshaping of the military." (2003) Roberts and Smith note that history is "littered with good ideas poorly executed" and they state specifically that this is "sometimes with catastrophic consequences." (2003) Noted for having been "instrumental in sparking the dialogues on the future of warfare" is Retired Vice Admiral Cebrowski who stated: "Network-centric warfare...{grows out of and draws}...power from the fundamental changes in American society. These changes have been dominated by the co-evolution of economics, information technology, and business processes and organizations...." (p.4) it is stated by Roberts and Smith to have proliferated and call information technology (it) "the impetus of this 'new age'." (2003; p.5) Roberts and Smith additionally note the statement of U.S. Joint Forces Command in the work entitled: "Toward a Joint Warfighting Concept: Rapid Decisive Operations" (2001): "The Concept for Improving Interagency Operational Planning and Coordination is supported by a Joint Interagency Coordination Group in each combatant command headquarters that is linked to the interagency community. This reduces the ad hoc nature of the interagency community involvement in political and military coordination and enables...collaboration to integrate all elements of national power to more effectively engage the enemy." (2003; p.9) Roberts and Smith state: "Thus, in both these it-enabled trends (reachback and interagency), authority is migrating to the level where the coordination is done, instead of down to the levels where it has enabled increased collaboration. Other factors, especially political factors, also have contributed to this trend." (2003; p.9) Roberts and Smith relate additionally the statement of LCDR Curt Copley in the work entitled: "A Commander's Network-Centric Odyssey" relating the fact that: "Each level of war is complex, and if a decision maker abandons his level even briefly to make decisions at a lower level, effectiveness will be lost. This problem is not new to warfare, but the vast amount of information that network-centric operations provides raises the stakes." (2003; p. 10) Roberts and Smith further relate the statement of Lt Col Gregory Roman, USAF, who is even more so critical in his contention that: "The seductiveness of information technology stimulates military organizational orientation towards greater centralized control and more rigid hierarchical organizations instead of the desired orientation of decentralized control and more flexible organizations." (2003; p.13) Roberts and Smith state that as new generations of technology are deployed the newer systems are required to interface with 'legacy' systems. It is related that the NRC report states the problem as follows:

The military services have tended to retain legacy information systems that were developed in response to 'stand-alone' requirements, were not regarded as subject to connection with other systems and, therefore, are not operationally friendly with their increasingly independent companion systems. The legacy systems issue is one of the greatest challenges faced by the DOD today. This base of information systems comprises thousands of multi-generation electronic systems elements and billions of dollars of capital investment, and is kept alive through the expenditure of many more billions in support costs. In the commercial world, such legacy systems are often kept operational based on a view their cost must be amortized before new capability can be economically justified. The military environment likewise seeks to amortize its investment; but the reasons are both functional and economic: the large-scale modernization of legacy systems entails major changes in training, doctrine, and organization, in additional to the difficulty of securing political support for new investment dollars." (Roberts and Smith, 2003; p. 34)

Roberts and Smith state that changes in technology as well as in the nature of war has changed the role of some weapon and weapon systems. Following the collapse of the Berlin Wall and "the demise of the Soviet Union, several platforms built to deal with the nuclear threat of the cold war were tasked to perform new functions. For example, the B-1 bomber was assigned to a conventional (non-nuclear) bombing role, which changed the nature of its communications and interoperability requirements from strategic to tactical." (Roberts and Smith, 2003) Roberts and Smith state: "When new uses for old systems are discovered, a corresponding change or addition of interfaces is required. The recognition that the strategic warning system designed to detect and correlate a nuclear attack was capable of detecting launches of theater missiles resulted in an effort to adapt the system to provide warning at the tactical level. The new role significantly altered the types of communications systems, interfaces, and interoperability required for the warning systems to interface with theater tactical systems." (2003) the work entitled: "Joint Vision 2020" states that the ultimate goal of the military force is "to accomplish the objectives directed by the National Command Authorities. For the joint force of the future, this goal will be achieved through full spectrum dominance - the ability of U.S. forces, operating unilaterally or in combination with multinational and interagency partners, to defeat any adversary and control any situation across the full range of military operations." (Joint Vision 2020, nd) the full range of operations includes: "...maintaining a posture of strategic deterrence. It includes theater engagement and presence activities. It includes conflict involving employment of strategic forces and weapons of mass destruction, major theater wars, regional conflicts, and smaller-scale contingencies. It also includes those ambiguous situations residing between peace and war, such as peacekeeping and peace and enforcement operations, as well as non-combat humanitarian relief operations and support to domestic authorities." (Joint Vision 2020, nd) it is related that full spectrum dominance is the implication that: "U.S. forces are able to conduct prompt, sustained, and synchronized operations with combinations of forces tailored to specific situations and with access to and freedom to operate in all domains- space, sea, land, air, and information." (Joint Vision 2020, nd; p.8) in order to achieve full spectrum dominance the joint force will fulfill its primary purpose - victory in war, as well as achieving success across the full range of operations, but it does not mean that we will win without cost or difficulty." (Joint Vision 2020, nd; p.9) it is additionally related that the process used in the creation of the joint force of the future "must be flexible - to react to the changes in the strategic environment and the adaptations of potential energies, to take advantage of new technologies, and to account for variations in the pace of change." (Joint Vision 2020, nd; p. 10) Operational concepts in Vision 2020 are stated to include 'dominant maneuver', which is "the ability of joint forces to gain positional advantage with decisive speed and overwhelming operational tempo in the achievement of assigned military tasks." This will be accomplished through joint air, land, sea, amphibious, special operations, and space forces, widely dispersed and capable of scaling and massing force or forces and the effects of fires as required for either combat or non-combat operations and will secure advantage across the range of military operations through the application of information, deception, engagement, mobility and counter-mobility capabilities." (Vision, 2020; p.25) Stated secondly is 'precision engagement' which is defined as: "...is the ability of joint forces..." For the purpose of location, surveillance, discernment, and track objectives or targets; select, organize, and use the correct systems; generate desired effects; assess results; and reengage with decisive speed and overwhelming operational tempo as required, throughout the full range of military operations." (Vision, 2020; p. 28) Stated third is "focused logistics" defined as: "is the ability to provide the joint force the right personnel, equipment, and supplies in the right place, at the right time, and in the right quantity, across the full range of military operations. This will be made possible through a real-time, web-based information system providing total asset visibility as part of a common relevant operational picture, effectively linking the operator and logistician across Services and support agencies. Through transformational innovations to organizations and processes, focused logistics will provide the joint warfighter with support for all functions." (Joint Vision 2020; p. 30) Stated fourth is 'full dimensional protection' defined as: "is the ability of the joint force to protect its personnel and other assets required to decisively execute assigned tasks.