Review of Kinzer's book on U.S. foreign policy

Kinzer's Overthrow

Harkening back to Jacksonian politics of the 1800s, Manifest Destiny, and most certainly the aggressive foreign policy of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Overthrow is a historical roller-coaster ride from the removal of the Hawaiian monarch in 1893 to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Author Stephen Kinzer approaches the material from a journalistic background, and some of the material has been recycled from his earlier books. However, his experience with the New York Times shows in the manner in which he develops his argument; his use of source material in a cogent, but not overwhelming manner; and finds commonalities with past and present action and potential future policy (Kinzer 2007).

Essentially, the book is about using regime change as an implicit foreign policy goal in situations in which foreign governments disagree with United States, or are in the way of other economic or political goals. Kinzer's storytelling is clearly not scholarly, and there is a goodly amount of corrupt politicians, spies, military ineptness and greatness, and even corporate scoundrels. Overall, his theme focuses on the manner in which the United States has helped ensure regime change in Iran, Guatemala, South Vietnam, Chile, Grenada, Panama, Afghanistan and Iraq. While short-term goals may indeed be reached using this paradigm, Kinzer points out that the long-term consequences can be expensive, morally unjust, and even counterproductive to U.S. foreign policy (Kinzer 140-1).

As Bureau Chief in the Istanbul New York Times Office, Kinzer is uniquely qualified to look at American foreign policy through the eyes of what past actions do to present consequences. Being active in journalism in the Cold War and Post-Cold War eras, as well as a rapid student of American foreign policy, Kinzer tells us that it is impossible for the United States to ever be successful in long-term foreign policy goals when we continually use short-term (e.g. Regime change) solutions and install leaders that are either corrupt or unpopular with the populace. This has been a pattern of behavior that has certainly contributed to expensive foreign policy gaffes in South and Central America, the Mid East, and even Africa.

Kinzer does prove his point, and like all material, often biases his views not just for what is included in the material, but what is not. It should be no surprise that the United States often takes the "convenient" and "short-term" solution to many problems; this is part of the American character. However, at times Kinzer seems to be on a pulpit, leading the reader by the nose at whom to laud and at whom to hiss. Since this is not written as a historical book, there is also an expectation that the reader will already have a semblance of the "basic facts" from at least Panama and Guatemala forward.

This is perhaps the largest weakness of the book. There are 14 different regime changes that are critically analyzed, yet some clearly fit his argument more than others. In fact, Grenada and Panama seem like different foreign policy goals than Afghanistan and Iraq. On the other hand, one of the strengths of the book is the manner in which Kinzer outlines the "propagandistic" manner in which these "necessary regime changes" were sold to the American public. Witness, for instance, the way Islam and many Arab countries were characterized after 9/11 (Kinzer 266-75).