Russian History: Did the Lives

Russian history: Did the lives of Soviet citizens improve after Stalin's death (1953-1991)? Why, or why not?

When contending with the question of whether the lives of Soviet citizens improved after the demise of Stalin, one must ask, first and foremost what does one mean by 'Soviet' citizens? The scholar Geoffrey Hosking would first and foremost suggest that the question is considerably more complex than it seems on its surface. (Hosking, p. 402) True, Khrushchev and the period of de-Stalinization removed some of the implements of the regime of terror that had been inflicted upon common Soviet citizens -- people were no longer condemned with a whisper by their neighbors, or found guilty by association. One's love for Stalin was not equated with one's loyalty to one's nation, as the 'cult of personality' that held sway during Stalinism fell out of favor in the eyes of the political rulers of the land.

However, for members of other nationalities than the Russian nationality, the change was not always immediately beneficial or noticeable. Goods were still created in Eastern Europe, the Baltic republics, and the outer lying provinces and shipped to Moscow and Leningrad for the enjoyment of others. Shortages abounded. True, after Stalin, Russia was considerably more advanced than it had been when it "lagged behind" Western Europe in its technology -- but it still also lacked individual farmers, an incentive scheme for increasing industrial production, and full access to Western goods on the part of all nationalities, but particularly non-Russian nationalities. (Hosking, p.9)

There certainly were ideological relaxations, especially in the period between Khrushchev and Brezhnev's coming to power. For example, for a political dissident authors and activists, the agitators could take comfort in the fact that exile rather than death was his fate. Overall, because Soviet Union was more conscious of the West's influence and opinion than it was during the closed regime of Stalin, there were fewer egregious and overt acts of terror.

But economically, other than this lifting of the curtain of fear, the lives of common peoples were not as noticeably different as a scholar might assume. A scholar cannot only look at society with the eye upon the concerns of the Russian intelligentsia, which did indeed breathe a collective sign of relief after withstanding the Great Purge of the late 1930s, Stalin's "Doctor's Plot," and other acts of paranoia. (Fitzgerald, pp.135-161) but many of Stalin's inefficient economic schemes, such as running the economy as a series of five-year plans were retained. One cannot easily separate economic from political growth and development. Finally, under the leadership of Brezhnev, Russian Communist society came to a virtual standstill, leading to its collapse as a viable economic system in 1989. For more than thirty years, the land experienced, rather than growth or use of its considerable natural and human resources, a period of long-term stagnation. During this time, most ordinary Russians had little hope for their futures, that the lives of their children would be better than their current lives, unless they fell into favor with the ruling regime. One could even argue that the Russians of this period were without the motivating hope of things getting better than their grandparents had endured under the czar, or of Russia improving because of the introduction of a new ruling ideology, another consolation granted to their earlier ancestors.