Rwandan Genocide a Philosophical Theory (Jean-Jacques Rousseau\'s

Rwandan genocide a philosophical theory (Jean-Jacques Rousseau's theodicy). How philosophy successful

Philosophical Healing

It is extremely interesting to note how much relevance philosophy -- and in particular that which was propagated by Jean-Jacques Roussueau -- has with very pragmatic and lethal matters of reality such as the Rwandan genocide. Many of the very ideas and notions that were of extreme importance to Rousseau factored quite substantially into the reasons for the systematic killing of the Tutsis at the hand of the Hutus. The relationship between the social and political needs for power, dominance, and self-preservation that inspired this ethnic cleansing are merely manifestations of what Rousseau termed self-love in two principle forms, that known as amour de soi and that known as amour propre. An analysis of the different attributes of each of these types of self-love helps to facilitate an understanding of the lurid actions that took place within Rwanda, and also is suggestive of solutions that may be employed to ensure that such a problem does not repeat itself again. Such an analysis indicates that the feelings that existed for the Hutu authorities and their citizens that wantonly slaughtered Tutsi rebels and civilians are mostly normal -- yet were wrought in a decidedly unhealthy and imbalanced way. By employing Rousseau's conception of theodicy, it becomes apparent that temperance of the innate human nature of self-love, which went awry during the Rwandan genocide, can present a number of palpable solutions to these and other travesties of crimes against humanity.

Rousseau's notion of theodicy essentially states that people are governed by an appreciation and love for themselves, which is one of the predominate determinants in their actions and regards for others. The inherent conflict in this philosophical espousing -- and that which makes it a true theodicy -- is that many people inherently commit egregiously evil or immoral actions that stem from their self-love. In seeking to justify how such good intentions can produce inordinately noxious activities, the author stratified self-love into two distinctions -- amour propre and amour de soi. The influence of the latter of these terms on the action of the Hutus in Rwanda is fairly evident, since amour de soi is generally regarded as "concern with an organism's self-preservation. I exhibit my amour de soi when I seek shelter and sustenance, defend myself against threats, or flee from danger" (Martin). This definition serves as a partial explanation for the actions of the Hutus, who largely believed that by killing their rival Tutsi -- who had controlled much of Rwanda for several years despite their status as a minority of the ethnicities represented within the country (Lemarchand) -- that they were effecting their own self-preservation. The sentiment itself behind amour de soi is understandable, yet the rapid killing of hundreds of thousands of people from a different ethnicity is an extremely egregious way of demonstrating this sort of self-love. Had the Hutus been able to moderate this feeling, by merely repressing the threat that the Tutsi's represented with a less definitive (and bloody solution), they would have been able to avoid wanton bloodshed and the infamy that has accompanied their country ever since.

Yet more tangible solutions for the Rwandan genocide are offered when one examines amore propre, which was traditionally regarded as a more malignant type of self-love for the fact that it has comparative components of it. By definition, amore propre is a form of self-love that is based on advancing one's self beyond that of other people. Amour propre is loving one's self more than one love's someone else. It is quite plain how this form of love could have influenced the actions of the Hutus in Rwanda, since their love for their own ethnicity vastly surpassed that which they had for the Tutus. Yet the solution that amore proper provides for this particular situation lies in the managing of this emotion, and once again providing temperance in its expression and intensity. The key principle for managing amore proper is to demonstrate an egalitarian attribute that allows one to value him or herself, yet still value those others around him. Doing so would essentially rid itself of its comparative aspect in which one would feel the need to love oneself more than one love's others. To that end, "the strategy for the self-containment of amour proper must be the cultivation of stringent Egalite -- both as a social and economic policy and as a preference fostered in the education of individuals" (Martin).

This egalitarian aspect of amore proper, therefore, has extremely pragmatic implications that can curb iniquitous actions of murder and reinforce an understanding and tolerance of others at a systemic level. An institutionalized education of Rwandans based on this concept, bolstered by social and economic policies of egalitarianism, could reinforce a respectful love for both oneself and for others, as well. The following quotation greatly underscores this fact.

The healthy satisfaction of amour proper may, for instance, involve institutions and practices whereby individuals can pursue their passion for being recognized as the best in a certain domain -- an ambition that is one of the first manifestations of amour proper in Rousseau's state of nature narrative (Martin).

This quotation alludes to the solution for the Rwandan genocide and any others that may occur like it. By implementing systemic measures at a political and social level, governments should ideally provide alternatives to the expression of amour proper other than besting one's neighbor in his or her right to live. These provisions, of course, should be firmly entrenched in education, but must also involve practical and accessible alternatives such as expressions of national pride via friendly competitions such as those in academic settings or through sports.