Sago mining crisis: causes and consequences

Sago Mining Crisis began with when a coal mine explosion occurred on January 2, 2006 in the Sago Mine of Sago, West Virginia. The blast and resulting cave-in of the mine trapped thirteen miners for two days. In the end, only one miner survived. It was one of the worst mining-related crisis in United States history.

However, the tragedy of the Sago Mining crisis goes beyond the deaths of the miners. It is a tragedy that captured the attention of the world, due in large part to the mass-media's around-the-clock coverage of the event. Added to this is the broadcasting of much misinformation, including the false announcement that twelve miners had survived and only one had died with the subsequent report that in fact the opposite was true. Further, post-crisis research investigations came to show a vast network of miscommunication and uncoordinated response were partially responsible for the wide-spread death caused by the explosion. All of these factors taken together are what makes this event a national crisis and tragedy.

This case study of the Sago Mining crisis will examine the devastating outcome of the widespread miscommunication that occurred during the Sago Mining crisis and reveal the failures and successes on the International Mining Group, Incorporated crisis management plan.

This case study will begin with a posing of the research questions that guide the study, followed by an in-depth overview of the crisis timeline, including pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis events. Next, the methods of research will be stated, followed by an analysis of the crisis management plan and its implementation. The study will conclude with a look at what caused the crisis management failures and what can be learned from this tragedy in order to prevent a similar future occurrence.

Research Questions

What role did the lack of planning and communication play in the crisis and how should the communication have occurred in order to prevent or at least limit the extent of the crisis?

What were the weaknesses of the crisis response and management plan?

Crisis Timeline

Prior to the Sago Mine explosion, the Federal Mine Safety and Health Administration cited the Sago mine two hundred and eight separate times for regulation violations in 2005 alone. Out of these, ninety-six were considered to be significant and substantial violations. Further, the West Virginia Office of Miners' Health, Safety and Training issued 144 citations on Sago Mines in 2005, many of them for violations that were most likely factors in causing the accident (such as a failure to maintain control over methane and dust accumulation or fix shafts). More so, Sago Mines' emergency planning was cited as for "overall deficiencies."

On January 2, 2006, an explosion occurred at the start of the first shift following the New Year weekend. The mine's fireboss inspected the mine and subsequently cleared it for use, sending two carts of miners into the mine for work approximately ten minutes prior to the second explosion, which occurred at 6:30 A.M.

The second explosion was so powerful that it was not only heard but also felt by people outside of the mine. The cause of the explosion is unknown, although a lightening strike setting off stored up methane gas located in the mine is a popular theory. Fourteen miners were able to escape the explosion and thirteen others were trapped as they had already passed the point of explosion. Immediately the men who had escaped the mine returned in hopes of rescuing those who were trapped, however their efforts were undermined by a high level of carbon monoxide.

It took ninety minutes for the company to begin a specialized mine rescue process, with the first rescue crew arriving on the scene at 8:04 in the morning. The Federal Mine Safety and Health Administration bureau was not notified of the incident until 8:30 A.M and their rescue team arrived at approximately 10:30 A.M. The actual rescue process did not begin until twelve hours following the explosion due to high levels of carbon monoxide and methane gas present in the mine. Initial test estimated that the area of the mine where the miners were trapped contained 1,300 parts per million of carbon monoxide (200 parts per million is the maximum level that can be considered safe). More so, the second blast shut down the company's communication system, thus cutting off all communications between the rescue teams and the trapped miners. It was known that each miner had a self-contained, self-rescue system with one hour of breathable air. It was also known that within the mine emergency supplies were stored but the trapped miners access to these supplies was not known.

Even when the rescue process was able to begin, it was slowed to 1,000 feet per hour due to safety concerns that included water seeps, explosive gas concentrations and unstable roof conditions. The trapped miners were not even located until the following day, as the rescue was initially called off due to a malfunctioning air quality monitoring system.

When the miners were located, it was found that they were two miles into the mine, or two-hundred and eighty feet below the surface. By mid-day, January 3, the rescue team had made it 10,200 feet into the mine. By five p.m. that evening, the initial status indication of the miners was issued when it was reported that a body had been found. Later that day, reports were issued that twelve of the thirteen miners were found alive. Shortly after, this report was changed to state that only one miner had survived.

Following the crisis, the Sago Mines opened on March 11, 2006. However, the International Coal group confirmed that on March 19, 2005 that company had closed the Sago Mines. In the year to follow, substantial investigations as to the cause of the crisis and the failure of the rescue efforts were conducted by both government and private initiatives, with the general conclusion being that a lack of emergency response planning and lack of communication being the cause of the Sago Mining Crisis.

Methods of Research

The research method used in this case study is a literature review. Since there are numerous detailed reports and studies on the Sago Mining crisis, a comprehensive literature review is the most efficient and effective method of reaching a conclusion as to the reasoning for the devastating outcome of the International Coal Group's miscommunication and mismanagement of the emergency response. The literature review will involve news reports and stories of the mining crisis, first hand accounts of the situation, along with investigative studies and reports on the issue of the causation of the Sago Mining crisis.

Analysis

The Sago Mining Crisis involves both an explosion and a disaster, each with their own independent causes, although they are related in that there would not have been a disaster if there was never an explosion in the first place. According to the Sago Mine Disaster Report given to the Governor of West Virginia, there would have been no disaster had the explosion been contained by the purportedly "explosion-proof" seals. If these seals had been explosion proof, all of the miners could have escaped successfully. Further, the report states that there would have been no disaster had the rescue teams been able to start the rescue process immediately, which would have been possible had the air control monitoring systems been functioning properly. More so, there would have been no disaster if the rescuers had been given a means of communicating with the trapped miners had the mine's outmoded system been updated to withstand an explosion. If this were the case, the rescue team could have informed the trapped miners that respirable air was available at the mouth of their section, not far from where the were trapped. More so, there would have not been a disaster if rescue teams were called to the scene sooner but, due to an absence of a gas chromatograph, the rescue process was significantly delayed. Further, there may not have been a disaster if the rescue teams were capable of pinpointing the exact location of the trapped miners. However, the proper equipment needed to accomplish this was never brought to the disaster scene.

Based on this general assessment, it can be concluded that the cause of the Sago Mining crisis was a collection of failures across the board, from prior to the crisis to during the rescue process. Instead, the cause of the Sago Mining crisis was a combination of an across the board failure of communication, planning and implementation of a rapid emergency response procedure. Taken together, these factors took the Sago Mine explosion from an incident to a national crisis and tragic disaster.

One of the main causes of the Sago Mining crisis was the lack of underground communication. Although a lack of communication did cause a media misunderstanding and reporting of the actual reality of the situation, this did not effect the well-being of the trapped miners or contribute to the disaster in any part. Granted, the International Coal Group should have provided the nation with better communication, particularly for the benefit of government officials and the families of the trapped miners, this is incidental to the actual cause of the Sago Mines crisis. However, the lack of internal communication, particularly as to underground communication, is a leading cause of the Sago Mining crisis.

By lack of underground communication, it is meant both a lack of direct communication between the rescue teams and the trapped miners and a lack of scientific communication as to the actual conditions of the underground mines and the ability of the rescue teams to go into the mines for the rescue. If there would have been updated technologies implemented into the mines prior to the explosion, the disaster could have been avoided. Underground communication capabilities would have made it possible for the rescue teams to communicate with the trapped miners, allowing for a more efficient finding of their location and the ability to guide them to a safe area of the mine. Underground communication between the mine's condition and the rescue teams would have allowed for the rescue process to begin quicker and most likely be more successful.