School Finance Aguilar v. Felton

School Finance Aguilar v Felton

EDUCATION AND RELIGION

The Aguilar et al. v Felton et al. Case of 1985

Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 allowed for the reimbursement of the salaries of public employees teaching in parochial schools (LII, 2012). These selected teachers provided instruction to low-income children with special needs. A group of taxpayers filed a case, claiming that the program created an excessive entanglement of church and state. It thus violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution. In a 5-4 decision in 1985, the Supreme Court, in 473 U.S. 42 or Aguilar et al. v Felton et al., invalidated the New York plan (LII).

Majority Opinion by Justice William Brennan

The supervision used by New York City created excessive entanglement between the government and religion (LII, 2012). Advancing religion may not have been its primary effect, but their close interaction produced that result. Justice Brennan argued that a religious school primarily aims at advancing and preserving a particular religion. This aim clashed against the pressure of the presence of state personnel who monitored teachers and students and guarded them against the influence of "religious thought." Furthermore, the state needed to coordinate schedules and other problems with the religious school. While the court recognized the neutrality of the statue, it was also cautious about the potential for religious advancement. The court would no longer want to risk public instructors' engaging in religious instruction by allowing them into religious classrooms (LII).

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Sandra Day O'Connor argued that the Title I program did not present the risk of advancing religion (Carlson, 1986). Supervision of the teachers controlled that risk. The program was furthermore not a state subsidy of religion on account of a statutory provision that the funds supplement rather than supplant services by the local educational agency. O'Connor concluded that there was no unconstitutionality in the state's supervision of the teachers. Moreover, they were fully responsible for the selection of students. They were not answerable to the school administration. Justice O'Connor thus did not see excessive government entanglement with religion (Carlson).

Justice William Rehnquist expressed concern over the Court's support for a purely secular society (Carlson, 1986). He did not interpret the First Amendment as providing for such an extremist intent. He saw the Court straying from that intent. Religious schools were unlikely to be influenced in their sectarian nature because the teachers were carfully supervised by public officials. Furthermore, most of them visited many different schools every week and these did not have the same religion as the parochial students. Justice Rehnquist criticized and called for the abandonment of the Lemon test (Carlson).

Background

Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act aimed at providing adequate education to all children in the United States, whatever their economic conditions (LII< 2012). This Act distributed federal funds to state governments and, in turn, to local education agencies. These funds were for eligible students, whether in public or private schools. Educational services had to be secular, neutral and non-ideological. In 1966, the Board of Education of the City of New York applied for funding. The Board used a plan whereby public school teachers provided instruction in the private school buildings. It also enforced stipulations meant to prevent a violation of the Establishment Clause. When the Court reviewed the plan in the said case, it was found to have resulted in an unconstitutional entanglement between the government and religion. The District Court issued an injunction that ordered the Board from continuing with the plan (LII).

A new plan was formulated to deliver the same service without creating conflict between the Church and state (LII, 2012). It would incur more than $100 million in leasing property and vehicles for the service. The amount would be deducted from the Title I grant before the grant money could be used for actual services. There would, then, be a resulting net decrease for remedial education (LII).

Agostini v Felton

In 1995, the Board and a group of parents filed motions for exemptions in the District Court from the Supreme Court under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (LII, 2012). They were initially denied by the District Court and the Court of Appeals. But on April 15, 1997, the Supreme Court heard their arguments. Their main arguments centered on the huge costs of running the program under the Aguilar rule; the majority of justices believed that the Aguilar decision should be reversed or at least reconsidered; and that its legal basis had weakened and ceased to be a good law (LII).

On June 23, 1997, the Court decided 5-4 on this case, allowing public school teachers to tutor private school students in the latter's private schools, even if these schools are primarily religious in nature (LII, 2012). In her majority opinion, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor cited the ruling in the 1986 Witters v Washington and 1993 Zoberst v Catalina Foothills School District, which allowed the interaction between the church and the state. She also said that not all government aids promoted religion or the location relevant. School boards could also formulate administrative rules to insure that teachers behave in a religiously neutral way. And the Court did not assume that parents of students in secular public schools that the city government was promoted religious education if some of its employees also worked in religious schools. This Court decision strengthened the position that the state could conduct public teaching programs in religious schools without necessarily endorsing or getting entangled with religion. It, therefore, directly contradicts the absolute separation between public and private schools (LII; CPE, 2009).