September 11th and Transportation Law
On the morning of September 11th, 2011, the United States of America felt the full fury of an enemy which had been lying in wait for decades, planning an attack of spectacularly tragic proportions that would shake the nation to its core. The weapons of choice for Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda terrorist network were not bullets or bombs, but airplanes which were ruthlessly hijacked and flown as missiles into New York's World Trade Center, the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and fatefully, an empty field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. With the collapse of both of the Twin Towers and the immediate loss of over 3,000 lives, the American aviation industry was suddenly transformed from a once proud symbol of our national strength into a scapegoat for society's shattered complacency. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, with images of smoldering rubble streaming live on television for weeks on end, the public and politicians alike clamored for Congressional action to address what appeared to a gaping hole in our national security: the ability of lone hijackers to commandeer passenger jets and rain fire down on American cities. Several drafts of aviation and transportation security legislation were proposed to address these concerns, with some falling by the wayside in committee and others paving the way for sweeping revisions to federal and local law. By examining the language and directives found in two examples of this legislation, one of which was voted down in Congress and another which stands today as the law of the land, we can learn how the shock of unexpected tragedy can lead to rash and reactionary decision making by those in a position of power.
The controversial Transportation Security Enhancement Act of 2001, which was proposed just one month after 9/11 and eventually died in committee, planned to "amend Federal transportation law to establish in the Department of Transportation (DOT) the Transportation Security Administration & #8230; responsible for security in all modes of transportation, including: (1) civil aviation security; and (2) security responsibilities over nonaviation modes of transportation that are exercised by Administrations of DOT (other than the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA))" (H.R. 3110, 2001). Written hastily in the collective rush to respond to 9/11's devastation, the Transportation Security Enhancement Act of 2001 failed to unite both Democrats and Republicans on certain critical provisions, including the mandate that all checked baggage be screened for explosive devices within one month of passage. While both American citizens and aviation companies like American Airlines were united in their desire to shore up security within the transportation industry, the fact that this bill was voted down pointed to the growing divide between balancing security and privacy concerns.
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