Shark abuse and welfare concerns

Ethics & Sharks

ETHICAL ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH SHARKS Introduction:

The concept of human sensitivity toward non-human animals has taken a long time to develop and in many respects, still lags far behind other moral concerns. In much of modern Western society, dogs and cats are kept as pets, along with various other species of animals, in conjunction with which Americans provide them with veterinary care and other benefits of love and protection from harm. At the same time, we exhibit comparatively little moral concern at all for many of the animal species we raise for consumption.

In other parts of the world, animals are often afforded substantially less consideration and absolutely no thought at all to the excruciating pain and other unnecessary suffering that our treatment of them causes, despite the fact that reducing or eliminating it would take very little effort at all. In much Asia, for example, fishermen harvest shark fins for its high market value as the principle ingredient in shark fin soup.

Typically, they haul the shark aboard by rope lines attached to its tail, simply slice off its pectoral fins with a razor-sharp knife, whereupon they slide the mutilated creature back into the sea to slowly drown and bleed to death as it drifts to the ocean floor in a long trail of blood (Tripp 2003).

Human Decency and Elementary Morality Conflict with Insensitivity Toward Animals: Prior to the scientific understanding of the physiological basis of pain reception in vertebrate animal species, it may have been understandable that humans disregarded the unnecessary pain that they imposed on animals. Likewise, many ancient religious traditions and cultures impose none of the moral duties with respect to animals that they outline for relationships among men. However, today we understand completely that even the animals we raise for slaughter deserve to have any pain, trauma, and discomfort associated with our use of them minimized or eliminated, rather than utterly disregarded.

Nevertheless, the objection persists that animals were "created for us" and, therefore, we are not morally obligated to worry about their pain; after all, the argument goes, animals, (especially predators like sharks) eat each other too, and their prey species suffer as well. While it is certainly true that many animals do hunt and consume one another, there are fundamental distinguishing factors that negate this particular argument. First, the difference between humans and other animals is, precisely, that we possess a superior intellectual capacity for understanding concepts like justice, fairness, and sensitivity to others, which is not among the capabilities of any predatory animals, especially with respect to their prey (Bright 1994). To an owl about to devour a fish or a snake writhing in pain between its needle-sharp talons, it hardly matters whether it starts eating at the tail end or at the head of its catch; however, to the animal being devoured, the difference is comparable to the difference it would make to us, as between being killed relatively quickly by a bite to the back of the neck or excruciatingly slowly, eaten from the toes up a few inches at a time. Similarly, it makes no greater difference to the shark whether it kills its prey swiftly or feeds more slowly, increasing the trauma and pain it experiences in the process.

The argument that what is fair for the prey is fair for the predator is flawed because it relies on the notion of guilt, or fault, in excusing our treatment of the shark relating it to the shark's treatment of its prey. In fact, even on the basis of fault, the shark is morally blameless, in so far as it makes sense to discuss morality in connection with its behavior, precisely because it is totally oblivious to such ideas. We, on the other hand, are absolutely capable of understanding moral issues, which is why only we, and not sharks or big cats, or polar bears have any moral obligation toward prey.

More importantly, the basis of our moral duty to minimize the suffering of our prey is a function of its effect on the animals rather than of what it says about us. In fact, we understand that the objective experience of physical pain is the same in any sentient creature with a sufficiently complex nervous system (Gerrig & Zimbardo 2005). It is the sentience of the victim and not the character of the predator that gives rise to moral obligations of this nature.

Designation as Pet or Food Is a Completely Arbitrary Anthropocentric Distinction:

In this country we consider dogs, cats, Guinea pigs and some horses to be pets, other horses to be working animals, cows and pigs to be food, and rats to be vermin, and we treat them accordingly: dogs, cats, and pet horses are pampered and protected, working animals treated more harshly, cattle slaughtered with concern only for economic factors and very little for their suffering, and rats burned alive, drowned, or poisoned.

However, in other parts of the world, dogs, cats, and horses are raised for slaughter just as we raise pigs, cows are treated with reverence, and depending on what country one has in mind, rats revered as reincarnated human beings or trapped for food as a dietary staple (Tripp 2003). The point is that all these designations are completely arbitrary and reflect much more about the relative anthropocentrism and hubris common to human beings than they indicate the genuine basis for distinction among animals with respect to our moral obligation not to inflict pain on them unnecessarily.

In many parts of Asia, dogs are raised for consumption exactly as we raise pigs; furthermore, in China in particular, they are purposely terrorized and tormented with beatings in the specific belief that the adrenaline produced before slaughter improves the quality of the meat; similarly, in parts of this country hogs are purposely castrated before slaughter for the same reason. In Taiwan it is not uncommon for living donkeys to have scalding water poured over their flanks in order to strip cooked meat from their writhing bodies, and in Japan considerable effort sometimes goes into the "art" of frying fish extremely gradually in order to serve them ready to eat but still alive enough to ensure the ultimate in "freshness" and exotic cuisine (Tripp 2003).

We ourselves consume burgers derived from cows by the millions but revile in horror at the thought of eating dogs and cats. Likewise, we fund municipal agencies dedicated to the rescue, welfare, and placement of stray dogs and cats. At the same time we treat pigs with much less consideration, drag them screaming to the slaughterhouse, and hang their severed limbs with inked markings indicating their date of slaughter and price per pound. In fact, pigs are generally considered superior in intelligence and cognitive abilities to dogs (Moussaieff-Masson 1995), and there is no question whatsoever that they experience physical pain no less than our dogs, or than we do, for that matter (Tangley 2000). Therefore, it should be impossible for anyone who shares his or her home with dogs and cats to maintain that the suffering of pigs "doesn't matter."

The Fundamental Basis of Empathy is Indistinguishable in Relation to its Object:

To some, it is perfectly acceptable to treat animals with no concern for their suffering as though the insensitivity evidenced thereby bears no relation to any other aspect of human character. However, criminologists have long-known the relationship between cruelty to animals and pathological personality disorders common to serial killers and other extreme sociopaths (Gerrig & Zimbardo 2005). That is not to suggest that anyone who fails to appreciate the moral obligation to consider animals' suffering a potential sociopath; still, abundant evidence does strongly establish higher incidence of all forms of domestic violence, as well as clinical depression, and even suicide among slaughterhouse workers and others who routinely inflict physical pain on other creatures, regardless of their species (Schmalleger 1997).