Sixth Amendment right to counsel for defendants with disabilities and competency standards

Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to everyone, but it can be difficult to ensure that it is correctly applied to defendants with disabilities. That has led to major problems, and has been addressed by several cases, including Faretta v. California (1975), McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984), Godinez v. Moran (1993), and Indiana v. Edwards (2008). These cases showcased the issue that the standard for competency to stand trial was linked to the standard for competency to represent oneself. While that seems to make perfect sense, it is actually quite harmful to people who have disabilities, because they may not be able to correctly represent themselves and cannot always be held to the same standards that would be seen with people who do not suffer from any kind of disability. The right to counsel is highly important, because not having counsel can make it very difficult for a defendant to assert any of the other rights he or she has.

Laypeople cannot easily navigate the complexities of the legal system without help from an attorney, and that may be even more accurate for those with disabilities, depending on the particular disability the person has. The Sixth Amendment has remained unchanged since it was created in 1791, but the way in which the right to counsel has been interpreted has changed a great deal between 1791 and the modern day. The original thought was that a person had the right to pay for an attorney to represent them, which meant that people who did not have money were not able to get an attorney. Those with disabilities were often shunned and/or not able to make the kind of money needed for an attorney. If they were accused of something, they could not get counsel, leading to them generally ending up being judged guilty due to their lack of ability to properly understand the proceedings and defend themselves. The right to counsel that is used today does not require deep pockets.

Before 1963, there were no serious public defender programs in the country, with only three percent of cities having anything that could be considered counsel for those who did not have the money to pay for it. Some attorneys did agree to do pro bono work, but they generally lacked quality, and that could be nearly as poor of a choice as representing oneself. As time moved on, though, many more cities offered programs to help people who could not afford to pay for counsel, as the interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was seen not as one where people had the right to pay for an attorney, but where every person had the right to have an attorney to help them. Major court cases in the 1930s enforced the idea that each and every person should be able to have proper representation in a court of law if they were accused of something. That leveled the playing field, but for those with disabilities there was still an issue. They may not be able to properly determine whether they have good legal counsel, and may not understand the value of that counsel.

Another issue to consider, which is related to not understanding or seeing the value of counsel, is whether those with disabilities can properly choose the right attorney for them, and whether they can clearly understand the proceedings against them. Naturally, in this context, the issue is those who have mental disabilities, as these can preclude a person from understanding everything that is taking place around them. Physical disabilities such as blindness or deafness can also be a cause of concern for people who have been accused of a crime, since they may have more trouble than sighted people and those who are not hearing impaired when it comes to court proceedings and related issues. It was not until Gideon v. Wainwright in 1963, however, that it was decided that everyone who was accused of anything that could lead to jail time had a fundamental right to have an attorney present and representing him or her. That overturned the 1942 decision in Betts v. Brady.

That decision indicated that counsel was only a right for people who were charged with felonies, and then only if the person charged had special circumstances. These kinds of circumstances were usually either illiteracy or mental disability. Since that time, even more changes have been made. Faretta v. California (1975) mandated that the judge had to inquire about the mental condition of the defendant, in order to ensure that he or she was competent to select counsel and stand trial for the crime of which he or she was accused. However, it also stated that people could defend themselves and waive their right to counsel, even if that could be detrimental to them. McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984) further emphasized the importance of both legal counsel and mental competence, as it became clearer that the complexities of the legal system were not to be addressed by those who were not well-versed in them.