Enemies of Science Haldane P. 225

HALDANE

"Some Enemies of Science" J.B.S. Haldane

The vivisection debate: J.B.S. Haldane's "Some enemies of science"

The vivisection debate is an old one. As early as 1928, the scientist J.B.S. Haldane rigorously defended the practice of vivisection against its earliest detractors, arguing that even moderate government regulation of scientific behavior to protect animal rights was hypocritical, given the way that animals were treated in other spheres of human life. In contrast, David Suzuki's 1989 essay "The pain of animals" highlights the central paradox of animal experimentation. On one hand, animal experiments are only useful because of our biological similarities to animals. On the other hand, we assert our right to exploit animals based upon our inherent differences from them. The intelligence of animals such as the chimpanzee is analogous to a two-year-old child and yet through logical sleight of hand we justify using chimps in the laboratory by calling them 'lesser beings' (Suzuki 15).

Suzuki's essay is riddled with his ethical conflicts. On one hand, he admits he cannot bring himself to hunt -- yet he is an avid fisherman and uses fishing as one of his primary sources of protein. "How do we know that these other creatures don't feel pain and anguish like we do" he asks, in regards to animal suffering (Suzuki 8). For Suzuki, there are no easy answers about the human-animal relationship. In stark contrast, Haldane asserts plainly and simply that animals do not have higher level thought processes and feelings. "I have seen numerous experiments on animals but I have never seen an animal undergoing pain that I would not have been willing to undergo myself with the same object" (Haldane 9). Haldane feels very confident about his ability to assess the degree to which animals feel both physical and mental anguish, in contrast to Suzuki who believes there is a very compelling case that animals (particularly primates) undergo tremendous physical and psychological suffering. Compare the suffering of a chimp in a laboratory cage to one running free, he counsels, and you will see this (Haldane 16). But Haldane argues that animals cannot anticipate suffering like humans or compare their suffering to others, and even suggests that the cooking to death of dogs in an oven is no worse than a hot bath, save the dog's eventual demise. Haldane presupposes knowledge of what animals 'feel' much like those who assert that wild animals are happy in captivity, despite biological hard-wiring to be in large spaces. Haldane's assertion that he would willingly undergo the suffering he inflicts upon animals for the same purpose to be particularly curious -- yes, this may be true of himself, but not even necessarily true of all humans, much less all animals. And the research which is accrued is designed to benefit humans, rather than animals.

In contrast, Suzuki notes that in a raid upon a laboratory, "baby monkeys deprived of any contact with other animals seized the fingers of their liberators and clung to them, as our babies would to us" (Suzuki 14). Haldane would likely say this is a mere physiological response. However, in both humans and apes it is possible that physiological feelings and physical responses are interconnected. In fact, this is something we share with animals and once again underlines our uncomfortable similarities with the animal world. We are, after all, animals.

Haldane views granting animals any type of intelligence and subjectivity sentiment, versus rationality. He condemns a system which requires him to justify a 'novel' means of killing a mouse but which allows animals to be slaughtered for food and allows his wife to kill rats with poison. He condemns peers who fox hunt yet who would prohibit vivisection (Haldane 7). To some extent, Haldane's point that compassion for animals is not logically consistent is valid. It could also be argued that a perfectly ethical life in regards to animals is virtually impossible. Outlawing all uses of animals for food would condemn certain types of animals (house cats) to ill health or even an early death, since cats are carnivores. Is eradicating a flea or a tick from the body of a dog tantamount to murder or is it better to let the animal live in a state of permanent discomfort? What about intestinal parasites? What about performing experiments on animals for the purpose of life-saving surgeries designed to save animals? No life can be supported without some form of death, and prioritization is inevitable. Not only does tilling a garden cause the death of earthworms as Haldane points out, but large scale agriculture (used to produce vegetarian food) displaces the habitats of animals and causes their early death in many instances.

Haldane's closing argument is his weakest one, as he engages in ad hominem attacks of anti-vivisectionists. But even if Haldane's opponents are not always logically consistent, as an author he seems overly enthusiastic about attributing motives, not only to other beings but also to anti-vivisectionists themselves, asserting that they hate science because they disagree with him. He claims they do not understand science -- and perhaps people as well, picturing the archetypical vivisectionist as a "sour spinster" (Haldane 22-18).