Specific event analysis and context

¶ … 1984 when a toluene storage tank at a bulk petroleum storage facility exploded while firefighters were trying to get to an low-skill worker that was trapped inside said tank. The author of this report will assess the factors involved, what could be done to prevent a recurrence of such an incident, what changes should be made for the same reasons, the regulations or standards involved and so forth. The overall idea behind what the storage facility was trying to do made at least some sense but the execution of adding the portal as well as the way in which the extrication was attempted was shoddy to say the least. Neither of the two people had to die but it happened for two distinct reasons and both pertain to gross negligence on the part of the parties involved.

Analysis

The sheer stupidity and negligence that happened in this case was abysmally bad, especially on the part of the manager that somehow convinced the uneducated worker to engage in a job that led to this death. Further, that death would have almost certainly happened whether or not the tank exploded. However, it did explode in large part because the spray down was not done to completion and this permitted sparks to spark an explosion. Anyhow, the different mistakes that were made along the way will be covered now. First, if there was not a realistic or safe way to add a portal to the tank, a new tank should have been bought. However, the storage facility did do some due diligence and it was established that it could be done but it had to be done the right way. This included completely emptying and cleaning out the tank before doing any work to it. After all, adding the portal when there is a flammable sludge or substance on the surface (inside or out) is less than wise. This is something the firefighters learned and realized the hard way (CDC, 2015).

Next up is the fact that the worker entered the tank during a "dry run" when the tank itself and the way in which it was entered was not safe. While it is perhaps useful to have the SCBA system in place, it does not serve much purpose if the tank cannot be worn and fully active as the tank is being entered. Toluene is extremely nasty stuff. In addition to being flammable, it is extremely toxic in terms of what its fumes can do to someone. Indeed, it is often intentionally huffed and breathed in by drug addicts but in much smaller amounts. It is no surprise that the worker become unresponsive because he was either high as a kite and/or he was suffocating due to the lack of ventilation in the tank. What probably happened is that the worker became extremely high due to the fumes and eventually suffocated due to lack of good oxygen to his lungs and brain (Medscape, 2015).

Further, the way in which the man was lowered into the tank was extremely unwise because he was not attached directly to the tether that lowered him down. This all could have been prevented had a skilled worker that knew how to empty and clean the bank was involved. The best course would be to use a solution, if possible, that does not require that anyone enter the tank. Rather, if the tank could be cleaned through vacuuming or scrubbing the sludge from afar, that would be the optimal way. As for the firefighters, the spraying (both inside and out) of the tank should have been consistent from start to finish while the tank was being cut into. However, it should not have been attempted unless it was clear the person inside was even alive. The conclusion of the case shows that he was probably already dead or at least a goner.

As for what should have been done instead, this was already touched upon in part but will be drilled home now. First, the contractor was wise to not want to touch the tank in terms of adding a portal until it was cleaned and ventilated. Rather than having a clearly unqualified maintenance supervisor hire a poor sap that knows nothing about cleaning up hazardous materials, a knowledgeable contractor to do the cleanup should have been hired, Alternatively, the tank could have been disposed of and replaced with a tank that had the portal preinstalled. Also, given how the supervisor and the worker did behave, the decision to bring the firefighters off the top was a bad, bad idea and should not have happened. If they were not able to make the cut without preventing sparks, they should have called off trying to get the man out in the first place (OSHA, 2015).