Supreme Court Case Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye vs. City of Hialeah

Religious Freedom-First Amendment

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah

Religious Freedom is one of the key principles on which the foundation of our country was laid. United States has always supported and endorsed free exercise of religion and this right has been considered so important that it became part of the First Amendment, which clearly states that:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. (1)

However while this is the golden ideal and a shining example of our country's commitment to religious freedom, there have been several instances in the past when either the government itself or some sections of the public tried to stifle religious rights of minority groups. Closer analysis of the law connected with religious freedom reveals that government has no right to pass a law banning or prohibiting any religious practice unless there is a compelling public interest to do so. For example laws of such nature can be passed and implemented if certain religious practice is considered immoral or harmful to the general public. All laws are thus required to be neutral. However blatant violation of religious freedom clause was witnessed in the case of Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah case in 1993 when city passed some ordinances banning the sacrifice of animals in religious rituals.

The Church of Lukumi follows the ancient religion of Santeria in which animal sacrifice is common on certain occasion like birth, marriage, death etc. When the Church leased land in Hialeah Florida and announced its plans to establish a church, school, and cultural center, city government disapproved. While the Church was only planning to bring their religion to the area so that followers could find a place for congregation etc., the city government saw it as a threat and passed several ordinances specifically targeting Santeria and banning animal sacrifice "in a public or private ritual or ceremony not for the primary purpose of food consumption." (2).

The Church, knowing that such ordinances violated their right to freely exercise their religion, filed suit against these city laws with the District Court. The city in its defense claimed that it has two interests: protecting public health and preventing cruelty to animals. It was also claimed by the defendants that no specific religion was being targeted and suppression of any religious practice was not its main objective. District Court ruled in favor of the city saying that the two interests of the city justified the passing of such ordinances. The case then went to Supreme Court where Justice Kennedy overturned the District Court ruling, specifically stating that:

The principle that government, in pursuit of legitimate interests, cannot in a selective manner impose burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief is essential to the protection of the rights guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause. The principle underlying the general applicability requirement has parallels in our First Amendment jurisprudence. In this case we need not define with precision the standard used to evaluate whether a prohibition is of general application, for these ordinances fall well below the minimum standard necessary to protect First Amendment rights. (3)

Justice Kennedy further rejected the two interests cited by Hialeah city government saying that the ordinances were not specifically designed to meet these interests:

Respondent claims that Ordinances 87-40, 87-52, and 87-71 advance two interests: protecting the public health and preventing cruelty to animals. The ordinances are under inclusive for those ends. They fail to prohibit nonreligious conduct that endangers those interests in a similar or greater degree than [the plaintiffs' conduct does]. The under inclusion is substantial, not inconsequential. (3)