Syria: current political and humanitarian situation

Syria

The "Arab spring" has become one of the most important movements in the Arab world of the last decades. It has resulted in the regime change in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia, with wide reverberations in Libya, Syria, and even Iran.

The countries of the Middle East are now engaged in a process of transformation, not solely in terms of the regime change but also in terms of the mentality and social development. Although the actual spark of the Arab spring is rather hard to determine, as there were sufficient initial signs to point out this inevitable development, the Arab world, and in particularly these countries are now on the path of transformation, regardless of the resolution of this movement.

The case study focuses on Syria, as one of the most important Middle East countries, especially from the point-of-view of the regime that is in place at the moment and the international response to this regime. Currently, the Bashar al-Assad regime is under intense scrutiny from the international community, the Arab League as well as its neighbors for the way in which the regime decided to deal with the uprisings, the demonstrations, and the desire to change and improve the Syrian regime in the country.

The focus of the current research is on the relations between the Syrian state and its neighbor, Turkey, in the current development of the Arab Spring, with particular focus on the way in which Turkey contributes to the rise of the Syrian opposition.

Turkey -- Syrian relations

It is a well-known fact that the power relations in the Middle East have a strong religious component and the way in which the Muslim world is divided plays often represent the diagram of the political support that one country offers to another. The relations between Syria and Turkey are no exception to this rule. The first aspect to be taken into account is the religious one. More precisely, it must be pointed out that the two countries have a wide majority of Sunni population, while the Shiite are clear minorities in both Syria and Turkey. This aspect is important because the religious connection that exists in countries of the Middle East often provides the assurance of political and international support in case of need.

The relations between the two have not always been considered as the most privileged of the Middle East. One of the reasons for this has been the situation of the Kurdish minority in Turkey that had been constantly supported by the Syrian government as a result of the important influence the Kurds exercise in the country. At the same time though, the Kurdish PKK movement has been known to have initiated, led, and fully conducted terrorist attacks on Turkey in an attempt to ensure rights and a different status for the territories with Kurdish majority in Turkey. The leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan was eventually expelled by Syria, reason for which the diplomatic and political ties were reconsidered since 1998. Since then, "Relations steadily grew closer, resulting in a free-trade agreement in 2004 and an unprecedented three-day joint military exercise in 2009. That same year, the two countries lifted visa requirements and began the highly symbolic practice of joint cabinet meetings."

. Therefore it can be said that until the Arab Spring the orientation of the Turkish foreign policy took into consideration the acceptance of the Asad regime and the potential benefic aspects of closer ties with its Syrian counterparts.

That orientation and change of perspective in the Turkish foreign policy was greatly influenced by several aspects on the international scene that made Turkey reconsider its neighbors and especially Syria. Among other issues, the Turkish relation with the European Union changed as a result of the constant Turkish bid to enter the EU to no avail until this day. The reasons for this unsuccessful bid are numerous and include aspects such as population, the size of the country, and the cultural, religious, and political differences that exist between the EU and Turkey, despite obvious attempts from the Turkish side. Therefore, there was a clear shift in orientation towards the Middle East, in the conditions in which Turkey and Israel had no longer a strong common connector in the EU.

The current state of affairs between Syria and Turkey is relatively complex, especially given the policy changed that Turkey had adopted years ago. At the moment the Asad regime is under clear pressure not only from the neighboring countries but also from the Arab League that suspended its seat in the Council. Also, the United Nations has outspokenly condemned the killing of more that 5,000 Syrian people since the riots began in March 2011. Among the crimes committed in Syria since the outbreak of the conflict there are "cases of torture and ill-treatment of detainees; rife or systematic attacks against civilian population, including the killing of peaceful demonstrators and the use of excessive of force against them; and the persecutions of human rights defenders and activists"

. Furthermore, there have been attacks on several embassies and consulates in Syria that further determined the international community to address the issue of Syria and its current regime as being violent and in breach of international law in terms of diplomatic, humanitarian, and political actions undertaken on the ground.

From this point-of-view, the Turkish stand is relatively complex, particularly because of the good relations that were being fostered with the Asad regime until the Arab Spring. The shift in the political stand vis a vis Syria had to change in order to ensure that the Turkish state is not associated with the violent acts undergone by the Asad regime. This is largely due to the fact that Turkey had previously announced a general change in the way in which democracy can be adapted to the Middle East and as a result of the Turkish bid to enter the EU, it also developed a new strategy of becoming an example of Middle East democracy that included, among other aspects, the changes Turkey had to adhere to and which is now considering as elements that can be exported to other Muslim and Arab countries in their transition to democracy. However, such an example was not compliant with the eventual support of the Asad regime and its violent crimes against the Syrian population and international staff stationed throughout Syria.

The shift in the orientation of the Turkish regime did not come immediately after the start of the riots but rather after the constant attempts by the Turkish side to mitigate, moderate, and advise the Syrian authorities failed. More precisely, as presented by Asli Aydintasbas, "four main factors drove Ankara to drop its support for the Asad regime: Assessment that Asad was either too weak or unwilling to reform, Influx of refugees, Sunni sentiments and Hama, Iran's influence."

These aspects focus in fact on several key areas of development that were crucial for the Turkish side. More precisely, on the one hand, the intent that Prime Minister Erdogan had initially envisaged was a clear brokerage of the crisis that was developing in Syria immediately after its offset. This could not however be the case because of the weak leverage Asad had within his own structures and therefore the possibility that Turkey may reduce the impact of the Syrian crisis was no longer viable but only an eventual association of Turkey to this situation, to which the Turkish side was reluctant. Therefore, from a political point-of-view, the failure to ensure Asad's peaceful transition to certain reforms was one of the first signs for Erdogan that the Syrian regime was not able to reform at the velocity required by the riots and that an association with such a regime would not be benefic for the wider long run foreign policy conducted by the Turkish state in the region.

Secondly, the influx of refugees from Syria was a very important aspect to be taken into account from two points-of-view. On the one hand the pressures that a large number of refugees would put on the population near the border with Syria would have been immense. On the other hand, the political visibility of such a crisis was not acceptable for the Turkish side.

Thirdly, the religious part that is present throughout the Middle East took its toll on the Syrian Turkish relations. Despite the fact that the majority in each of the two countries is Sunni, the fact that the Asad family had been previously engaged in massive killings and abuses determined a wide sense of disapproval among the Turkish public. At the same time though, given the wide change in Turkey in terms of the new perceptions on democracy and the role of the civil society, the Turkish government was not able to ignore demonstrations and protests that took place in the country as a result of the abuses undergone in Syria. As a result, the Turkish side further withdrew its support for the Asad regime.

Finally, another aspect is related to the international context in which the crisis is taking place. The presence of the Iranian nuclear problem on the agenda of the Security Council and as a topic for all discussions between heads of states has determined a reluctant attitude in terms of the way in which Iran conducts both its foreign and internal affairs. Despite the fact that Turkey is reluctant to create a situation in which Syria would eventually depend on the support of the Iranian side, given all the above, Turkey cannot afford to invest diplomatic and political efforts that would attract sufficient visibility both internal and external into a Syrian project that cannot rely on the strength and desire of the Asad regime to impose certain reforms that would reduce both the pressure and the expectations of the international community. Therefore, seeing that on the one hand, Syria is reluctant to undergo internal massive reforms and on the other hand is vulnerable to outside influence from Iran, one of the most negatively discussed subjects of the international community, Turkey's stand was deemed to change and take a different stand against the Asad regime. In this sense, with due regard for the fact that aside from the suspended seat in the Arab league, no clear cut action is being taken against the Syrian leader as opposed to the Libyan situation, Turkey cannot undergo any drastic measures against the regime but it can influence the way in which the opposition in Syria can provide support for the riots underway in the Arab state.

In general terms, it can be said that there is a strong opposition organized against the Syrian regime of Asad. However, the major problem with the groups forming the opposition is their lack of organization in the form of a strong unified force that would eventually manage to topple the Syrian regime. Although almost all the population is represented, to a larger or smaller degree inside the opposition groups, it cannot be said that the actions undertaken at this level are visible and identifiable by a single voice that would eventually offer the population a clear identity of the potential successor or replacement of the Asad regime.

There are numerous groups that oppose the regime. These include "the Syrian National Council (SNC), the National Coordination Committee (NCC), the Free Officers Corps and the Free Syrian Army have coalesced under one organizational umbrella"

. One of the most important aspects to be taken into account when discussing the issue of the Syrian opposition is the strong representation of youth activists, Shiite, and Sunni that, in the eventuality of a change in regime can become the base for a new type of democratic government with full representation for all the groups of the society.

Another aspect is related to the successful creation of a political opposition, more precisely, the Syrian National Council and the Syrian National Coordination Committee. They are considered as the main forces of the opposition against the regime in the country. However, despite the consideration for the same outcome, they fail to take full coherent action. The National Council is viewed, according to its leader, Burhan Ghalioun, as "the representative of the Syrian opposition"

. Furthermore, the discourse presented by the Syrian National Council leader points out the "friendship" that exists with the European countries and with the international community. From this point-of-view, it appears that the SNC is strongly anchored as symbol of the opposition.

In terms of the financing that the SNC is being provided, this is largely the contribution of the Syrian businessmen and further pledges from Arab countries as well as the Syrian population are being recorded

. This comes to point out that there is a strong support for the SNC to ensure a strong opposition to the regime in Syria. The main aspects promoted by the SNC are related to the insurance of civilian protection against the atrocities on the Syrian population. However, Ghalioun points out that the main issue is in fact represented by the inability of the Security Council to unblock the stalemate resulted from the reluctance of the Russian and Chinese representatives to the UN to vote for humanitarian assistance in the form of humanitarian corridors. Furthermore, Ghalioun strongly supports the idea that there is no need for military intervention as per the Iraq situation and the regime must topple as a result of the Syrian population and its pressures and not international forces

. This aspect is important to be taken into account because it provides an approach that has not been used in the Middle East. More precisely, the fact that the opposition is reluctant to encourage international intervention comes to point out that the experiences undergone by the other countries in which such means were used for regime change (Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan) did not have the sufficient reverberations that would enable the Arab world to entrust the outcome of a popular revolution, with the casualties as they are, to an international force that would provide sufficient military and political power to change the regime.

Furthermore, the approach provided by the SNC is relevant in the conditions in which the general approach to international intervention, as seen in cases such as Iraq, is met by a reluctant attitude from the local population. In the conditions in which a democracy would take place the regime of Asad, the democratic theory suggests that the change must come from the people and not imposed by outside factors. A popular change of regime offers legitimacy to the forces that replace a toppled regime and ensures a more successful transition. At the same time though, the case of Egypt that had the prerequisites of the popular uprising and lack of international intervention points out as well that the opposition must be a full fledged united body that is able to take control of the state in order to avoid a power vacuum that is imminent after a popular uprising.

The Syrian National Coordination Committee (NCC) was established in June 2011, "to push for democratic reforms (…) and to press ahead with a peaceful uprising"

.To a large extent, the objectives of the NCC are similar in nature to those of SNC; however, they are significantly more vehement against a potential foreign intervention. One of the leading voices of the NCC, Haitham al-Manna considers that "the worse case scenario, (…), would be external powers controlling the destiny of Syria and manipulating the uprising for their own objectives. Of particular fear for Al-Manna is a military intervention that Turkey will seek to monopolize. This Turkish led move would also be conducive to the interests of Syrian Islamists (Muslim Brotherhood)"

. From this point-of-view, the tone of the discourse is slightly changed. While the SNC considers European and other countries as "friends," the NCC views potential threats in an international intervention not to the well-being of the new democratic regime that would be in place, but rather to the influence that one country or another, even Turkey, may exercise on the creation of the new democracy.

As part of the Syrian opposition, the Free Syrian Army represents the armed opposition, the rebel groups that orchestrate constant attacks from the camps established at the Turkish border. They are dissidents of the Syrian Army, "a relatively flat organization, with a command and headquarters in Turkey, possibly a set of regional or area commands with subordinate groups in Syria, and, according to media reports, one or two combat elements in Lebanon"

; however, their actions include offensive attacks across the border. However, this type of opposition is against the principles advocated by the political opposition of the SNC and NCC. Given the different modus operandi, the representatives of the Free Syrian Army argue on the limited means through which the political opposition can achieve positive change in Syria. In this sense, "tensions were rising with Syria's main opposition group, the Syrian National Council, over its insistence that the rebel army limit itself to defensive action. They said the council moved this month to take control of the rebel group's finances.(…) "We don't like their strategy," said Abdulsatar Maksur, a Syrian who said he was helping to coordinate the Free Syrian Army's supply network. "They just talk and are interested in politics, while the Assad regime is slaughtering our people." Repeating a refrain echoed by other army officials interviewed, he added: "We favor more aggressive military action."