The role of empirical evidence in evolutionary debunking arguments

Evolutionary Debunking
The compatibility of evolution and morality is an issue that has attracted numerous concerns throughout history including during Darwin’s time. Recent arguments have been raised to revive these concerns and help resolve the controversy. The various arguments on this issue are commonly known as evolutionary debunking arguments, which primarily focus on evaluative realism.[footnoteRef:1]In some cases, evolutionary debunking arguments focus on evaluate skepticism. Vavova suggests that debunking arguments need to be targeted, and suggests separately that they need to be empirical. On the contrary, Bedke shapes his argument both more narrowly and more broadly that Vavova. He thinks any empirical explanation will do, and nothing evolutionary is specifically needed.[footnoteRef:2] But perhaps he accomplishes targeting by nearly applying his arguments to non-naturalist moral realism, where Vavova and Street address moral realism in general. I will explore whether the empirical (or more specifically evolutionary) element is needed only for targeting debunking arguments. [1: Katia Vavova, “Debunking Evolutionary Debunking”, Mount Holyoke College, May 13, 2019, http://www.mtholyoke.edu/~evavova/files/vavova_ded_penultimate.pdf] [2: Matthew Bedke, “No Coincidence?*” Oxford Scholarship Online, May 13, 2019, DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198709299.001.0001]

Overview of Evolutionary Debunking Arguments
As previously indicated, evolutionary debunking arguments seeks to undermine human’s epistemic status of moral beliefs through appealing to their evolutionary origins. In this regards, these arguments shift from a foundation of the impact of evolutionary forces on moral beliefs to skeptical justifications regarding the beliefs. The idea of evolutionary debunking arguments regarding the epistemic status of our moral beliefs has attracted significant attention in the field of philosophy given the long-standing concern regarding the compatibility between evolution and morality. Most of the existing evolutionary debunking arguments are based on the notion that people believe what they do because they evolved to, which implies that there are no justifications for personal beliefs.[footnoteRef:3] In this regard, these arguments primarily undermine justifications for evaluative beliefs.[footnoteRef:4] The concern that evolution is not compatible with morality and value has existed for as long as the theory has existed. [3: Ibid., 1] [4: Guy Kahane, “Evolutionary Debunking Arguments”, Nous – Wiley Online Journal (2011):103]

Based on this idea, evolutionary debunking arguments tend to focus on evaluative realism, which is the notion that evaluative facts are attitude-independent. This implies that was is valuable remains valuable regardless of whether it is valued. However, there are concerns that as evolutionary beliefs influenced our eyes and ears, they in turn influence our evaluative attitudes. Therefore, evolutionary forces can be deemed to have had a significant distorting impact on evaluative attitudes.
Vavova suggests that these arguments sometime seek to establish evaluative skepticism whose conclusion undermines evaluative realism to a greater extent. Evaluative skepticism emerge from the distorting impact of evolutionary forces on our evaluative attitudes. Therefore, the debunker concludes there are no justifications for our evaluative beliefs from a realist perspective of evolutionary facts. However, the evolutionary debunker needs to first establish learning the evolutionary source of evaluative beliefs provides realists good reasons or justifications to worry about the beliefs. These concerns have been the premise of numerous studies carried out by different philosophers to explain their views on evolutionary debunking arguments. The studies attempt to address the long-standing concerns regarding the compatibility of evolution and morality. An understanding of debunking arguments requires examining the question of targeting.
“Targeting” Evolutionary Debunking Arguments
An important component in evolutionary debunking arguments is answering the question of targeting. Targeting is the foundation with which debunking arguments by different philosophers are established. Existing studies by some philosophers suggests different measures for targeting evolutionary debunking arguments. These suggestions provide different aspects for understanding targeting of debunking arguments. Targeting plays an important role in addressing the concern about the compatibility of evolution and morality.
As previously indicated, Vavova proposes that debunking arguments need to be targeted, and suggests separately that they need to be empirical. Vavova’s arguments raise the question or concern on whether the empirical (or more specifically evolutionary) element is needed only for targeting. In contrast, Bedke shapes his argument both more narrowly and more broadly that Vavova. He thinks any empirical explanation will do, and nothing evolutionary is specifically needed.[footnoteRef:5] While Vavova and Street address moral realism in general in their claims on targeting debunking arguments, Bedke relies on non-naturalist moral realism. In essence, Bedke accomplishes targeting debunking arguments by nearly applying his arguments to non-naturalist moral realism. These differing claims or viewpoints raises several questions as follows… [5: Ibid., 2.] What is required for debunking arguments to be properly targeted? Are specific empirical premises needed, or not? Or are there other ways of accomplishing the right kind of targeting? The exploration on whether the empirical (or more specifically evolutionary) element is needed only for targeting debunking arguments will entail answering each of these questions. It will also incorporate examine the varying components that act as the basis of the claims. In this regard, the analysis will focus on examining whether empirical explanation or evolutionary elements is required for debunking arguments to be properly targeted. The evaluation of the role of empirical explanation in proper targeting of debunking arguments will be based on moral realism underlying Vavova and Street’s claims. Additionally, empirical explanation and evolutionary elements will be assessed based on non-naturalist moral realism used by Bedke to address the question of targeting debunking arguments.
Empirical vs. Evolutionary Explanation
Vavova states that the debunker contents that evolutionary elements or factors have shaped our moral beliefs.[footnoteRef:6] However, the evolutionary psychology underlying this empirical claim is controversial. Based on this evolutionary psychology and empirical claim, empirical facts regarding the origin of our beliefs could legitimately weaken those beliefs. Through this psychology and claim, the evolutionary debunker suggests that if realism is true then it is impossible to obtain moral knowledge. The evolutionary argument has seemingly added an unnecessary supplement to a wider skepticism. However, this argument can be beneficial and significant in another way i.e. as an undermining explanation of moral beliefs. [6: Katia Vavova, “Evolutionary Debunking of Moral Realism”, Philosophy Compass (2015):104]

Street highlights the ineffectiveness of evolutionary argument in targeting debunking argument by demonstrating claims regarding distortion and illegitimate influence. He contends that our system of evaluative judgments is not only saturated, but also contaminated with illegal influence. Through this influence, we are evolving towards upholding any evaluative content that promotes reproductive success instead of shifting toward upholding the independent evaluative truths presented by the realist. Therefore, our understanding of evaluative truths has been based on the wrong influence from the beginning of our evaluative history. Therefore, most of our evaluative judgments are not related to the truth. Using claims regarding illegal influence and distortion, the debunker seeks to give us evidence that we are perhaps mistaken about morality. Similar to evidence of being hypnotized, biased or drugged, evidence of evolutionary influence is problematic since it is based on wrong perspectives regarding morality. Therefore, this evidence of evolutionary influence is likened to evidence of error.
In light of these factors, Vavova contends that we need to target debunking arguments from moral realism and influence. Realism suggests that moral truths are attitude-independent whereas influence postulates that evolutionary elements have shaped our moral beliefs. In this regard, Vavova seemingly implies that targeting debunking arguments require empirical explanations and evolutionary elements. Since realism and influence do not necessary imply that our moral beliefs are perhaps mistaken, more knowledge regarding the functioning of evolution’s influence is required. The debunker needs to understand that the aims of evolution do not correlate with the moral truth.
The understanding of realism, influence and mistaken help the debunker’s argument to incorporate three important features. These important features are in turn based on empirical and evolutionary understanding of the compatibility between evolution and morality. The first important feature is that the empirical foundation is imperative for establishing the conclusion on this issue. Empirical foundation is necessary because it is a necessary component of what enables us to think that we are in error. Secondly, while the debunker argument needs to be targeted, the evolutionary element is also necessary.[footnoteRef:7] The significance of evolutionary premise in this case is attributable to the fact that precision is not adaptive for our moral beliefs though it could be adaptive for some empirical beliefs, which implies that total skepticism does not apply. [7: Ibid., 6]

Bedke thinks that nothing evolutionary is specifically needed for the right kind of targeting of debunking arguments since empirical explanation is sufficient. He considers empirical explanation to be adequate in this process based on non-natural facts. Using the concept of non-naturalist moral realism, Bedke contends that our normative beliefs are beneficial since they enable us to have actual worldly beliefs that promote out survival and reproduction.[footnoteRef:8] We are disposed to have the advantageous normative beliefs because of our intrinsic natural selection. As a result, these beliefs have similar effects regardless of whether they are true or not. While we have no empirical evidence for the beliefs, the wider perspective of moral realism demonstrates that empirical explanation is necessary in proper targeting debunking arguments. [8: Ibid., 2]

From practical and epistemic scenarios, we are increasingly certain or justified in normative claims, which is one of the responses. Therefore, when a belief is deemed true, we have every reason to believe and uphold it. This implies that our natural reaction is to rely on normative commitments and beliefs, especially if the case is about non-natural facts. On one hand, there is evidence that our normative beliefs are not regarding non-natural facts while they are about these facts on the other hand.
Kahane suggests that the truth of any particular evolutionary explanation does not matter after all. The most important thing is that such story is likely to be true as demonstrated by empirical explanation or evidence. The truth of evolutionary explanation does not matter since some of these explanations can be misleading in some cases. According to Kahane, evolutionary explanation sometimes create a misleading impression that evolutionary debunking arguments must assume the general cogency of evolutionary psychology. In some cases, evolutionary explanation suggest that evolutionary debunking arguments must assume a strong adaptationist understanding of evolution. This is erroneous, especially in situations where evaluative disposition is demonstrated by more random evolutionary mechanisms of genetic exaptation or drift. The presumption of evolutionary explanation would make things worse in such situations in relation to truth tracking.
Given this fact, Kahane argues that it would relatively make no sense to reject evolutionary debunking arguments through demonstrating some evaluative disposition originating from a non-adaptive evolutionary process. He likens such attempt to libertarian incompatibilist who thought that defending the free would highlight the complete randomness of our choices.[footnoteRef:9] Therefore, Kahane seemingly supports the idea that empirical explanation is sufficient to proper target debunking arguments instead of evolutionary elements or explanation. [9: Ibid., 4]

Additionally, Kahane supports the idea that empirical evidence is required to proper target evolutionary debunking arguments by using epistemic premise claims regarding natural selection. In this context, he argues that epistemic claims suggest that natural selection is a process that is not based on tracking evaluative truth. This claim has been defended by other philosophers who have examined evolutionary debunking arguments such as Street. Notably, this claim basically addresses evaluative truth rather than truth in general. Therefore, assumptions can be made that evolutionary explanations of perceptual capacities do not incorporate the reliability of those capabilities in empirical truth tracking.
Kahane argues that the truth objectivism is an important presumption in evolutionary debunking arguments though it is usually overlooked or ignored by debunkers in normative ethics. The truth of objectivism generates a metaethical assumption or commitment used to support claims that our eventual evaluate concerns originate from our values. This assumption or commitment is the epistemic premise for evolutionary debunking arguments. In this case, the epistemic premise assumes the truth based on the metaethical assumption that objectivism provides the accurate account of evaluative properties and concepts.
Necessary Components to Proper Target Debunking Arguments
As shown in the previous discussion, debunking arguments continue to dominate philosophy and are characterized by concerns regarding the compatibility between evolution and morality. The underlying concepts in the different perspectives regarding proper targeting debunking arguments are moral realism and non-naturalist moral realism. Philosophers’ claims on evolutionary debunking arguments are based on the perspectives they adopt between moral realism and non-naturalist moral realism. Vavova, Street, and Bedke are examples of authors or philosophers who have utilized these divergent perspectives on evolutionary debunking arguments in attempts to resolve the long-standing controversy.
In light of their arguments, I believe that empirical explanation and evolutionary elements are required for debunking arguments to be properly target. The inclusion of both perspectives helps to ensure a holistic approach is undertaken in debunking arguments, which in turn provides the premise for proper targeting. The exclusion of either components undermines the ability to properly target evolutionary debunking arguments and seemingly provide a one-sided perspective on this issue.
Evolutionary explanation or elements are required for debunking arguments to be properly targeted since they provide a moral objectivist view of morality. Evolutionary explanation attempt to explain the link between evolution and morality using moral objectivism. According to Klenk, evolutionary debunkers of morality use Darwinist view of morality to support moral objectivism.[footnoteRef:10] In this regard, moral objectivism is the notion that there are non-natural, mind/attitude-independent moral truths that we can learn about. These moral truths would in turn commit us to some kind of moral skepticism. Darwinist view of morality, which is the premise for evolutionary explanation of debunking arguments, suggests that none of our objectivist moral beliefs remain justified even if they are prima facie justified.