Jihadist websites and the propagation of terrorist ideology online

The Internet and Terrorism Insurgencies: New Intimidations Modelled by Cyber-Terrorism and Terrorist Culture on the Internet
Introduction
The Internet’s exploitation for perpetrating acts of terrorism is a swiftly growing phenomenon, necessitating coordinated, preemptive efforts on the part of governments and national- level counter- terrorism organizations (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 2012). In the present day, the World Wide Web plays a major role in the international jihadist movement, allowing for ideological networking and organization in a geographically diverse movement; further, all jihadist network levels may be found on the World Wide Web. Jihadist websites are of widely divergent natures, operating fairly independently of one another. But they may be considered interlinked in that they often propagate and redistribute identical content. This suggests that in spite of numerous websites existing, the scope of novel content featuring daily on such sites is basically not that large. With regard to jihadist Internet functions, multiple, largely communicative, goals are fulfilled. The highly- dreaded cyber- terrorism concept, involving destructive information system attacks, fails, up to now, to form a significant goal for jihadist Internet use (Archetti 2015). In this paper, jihadist Internet use will be studied, with the chief focus being Arab jihadist websites, although the subject of European e- jihadism will be touched upon as well. The key questions addressed will be whether the Internet makes terrorism perpetration easier, the Internet’s terrorist custom, and novel intimidations demonstrated by cyber- terrorism.
Overview
Ironically, the decentralized communication network developed by American security services fearing the Soviet works, in the contemporary world, to the advantage of its biggest enemy after the Cold War’s culmination: global terror. Contemporary Internet’s root can be traced to the early 70s (i.e., Cold War era), when the American defense department’s concern was decreasing its communication networks’ susceptibility to nuclear attacks (Combs 2017). The entire system was decentralized through the development of an interconnected computer network grid. Following a two- decade- long period of development and utilization by research scholars, the Internet was made commercially available during the late 80s, when it swiftly expanded, besides also altering its character. By the middle of the last decade of the twentieth century, it connected over 18,000 public, national, and private networks, a figure that grew on an everyday basis. Connected to the networks were roughly 3.2 million host computers as well as, possibly, sixty million users from all over the globe (United Nations Counter- Terrorism Implementation Task Force 2011). As of early- 21st- century, the number of Internet users was estimated to be more than 1 billion.
As the Internet flourished, it was acclaimed as a cultural integrator and a channel for communication between governments, organizations and clients. It seemingly provided incomparable opportunities for developing a forum for the congregation of a “global village”, idea interchange, and worldwide stimulation and sustenance of democracy (Rogan 2006). But its unbridled growth and utilization rendered idealistic visions of its promise challenging (consider, for instance, the dissemination of violent and pornographic material on the internet, and its employment by diverse extremist groups). Groups having highly disparate political motives, though sharing the same willingness to resort to terrorism to achieve them, began exploiting the network for spreading their propaganda, getting in touch with supporters, carrying out criminal operations, and promoting public sympathy and awareness of their malevolent causes.
The World Wide Web’s very nature helps make it the perfect avenue for terror activity facilitation; its most important features contributing to this include:
· Ease of access;
· Minimal censorship, regulation, or other governmental control;
· Anonymous communication;
· Rapid information dissemination;
· Potentially vast audiences spread worldwide;
· Cheap website development and web- presence maintenance;
· The capability of shaping coverage within conventional mass media that has been utilizing the Internet progressively more for stories; and
· A multimedia environment (enabling combining of text, audio, video and graphics, and allowing users access to movies, songs, posters, books, etc.).
The abovementioned advantages have, unfortunately, been noticed by terror outfits as well, irrespective of their political orientations. All forms of extremists – Marxists, Islamists, nationalists, racists, anarchists, and separatists – have realized the allure of the Internet. Currently, nearly every active terrorist group (numbering over forty) has its own website, with several maintaining two or more websites in various languages (United Nations Counter- Terrorism Implementation Task Force 2011).
As demonstrated by the illustrative list below, such outfits originate from all over the world, with this geographical classification revealing geographical diversity though concealing the actual transnational and trans- regional nature of several.
· Middle East: Islamic Resistance Movement – Hamas; Hezbollah of Lebanon (Party of God); Fatah Tanzim; al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades; Kahane Lives movement; PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine); Palestinian Islamic Jihad; Mujahedin- e Khalq or PMOI (People’s Mujahedin of Iran; PKK (Kurdish Workers’ Party); IBDA- C (Great East Islamic Raiders Front); and Turkish DHKP/ C (Popular Democratic Liberation Front Party).
· Europe: Basque ETA movement; IRA (Irish Republican Army); and Corsican Army (Armata Corsa).
· Latin America: Peruvian MRTA (Tupak- Amaru); Peruvian Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path); FARC (Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia); and Colombia’s ELN (National Liberation Army).
· Asia: Al- Qaeda; Iraqi Ansar al Islam or Supporters of Islam; Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo (Supreme Truth); JRA (Japanese Red Army); Kashmir’s Hizb- ul Mujehideen; the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam); IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan); Pakistani Lashkare- Taiba; Chechnya’s rebel movement; and Filipino MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front) (United Nations Counter- Terrorism Implementation Task Force 2011).
How Terrorists Use the Internet
Modern- day terrorists utilize the World Wide Web in a total of 8 separate though slightly overlapping ways. A few parallel the everyday uses of the Internet (e.g., information collection); others parallel the uses conventional political agencies make (e.g., propaganda dissemination and fundraising) (Theohary 2011; Weimann 2004; Weimann 2006; Conway 2016); and still others are a lot more unique and uncommon (e.g., communication of hidden, coded, and encrypted directions, instructions, and manuals).
Psychological Warfare
Quite frequently, terrorism has been theorized to be a kind of psychological warfare, with terrorists definitely seeking to wage this sort of campaign in many ways using the World Wide Web. For example, the Internet may be utilized for misinforming people, circulating horrendous images of their latest terror activities, and threatening them to instill powerlessness and fear (e.g., the replaying of a video of the atrocious murder of Daniel Pearl, an American journalist, by numerous terrorist websites). Furthermore, terrorists may resort to cyber- terrorism or, to be more precise, instilling fear of it, as a kind of psychological attack. “Cyberfear” is created through concerns pertaining to what e- attacks have the potential to do (for instance, deactivating systems of air traffic control to bring down airliners, or wrecking systems regulating stock markets to disrupt nations’ economies) amplifying until people feel they will actually be imperiled in such a way (United Nations Counter- Terrorism Implementation Task Force 2011). The web — an uncensored channel carrying messages, stories, images and threats, irrespective of their likely effect or validity – proves especially advantageous when it comes to helping even small groups amplify their messages and exaggerate their threats and significance.
The al- Qaeda uses a combination of complex communication technology and multimedia propaganda for perpetrating highly sophisticated psychological warfare. Bin Laden’s followers focused on e- propaganda efforts, with visitors to the many websites maintained by the outfit and to websites of aboveground, likeminded organizations having access to prerecorded audio and video tapes, DVDs, CDs, messages, and pictures (Weimann 2014). In spite of the immense onslaught encountered by the organization of late — apprehension and killings of several members, the destruction of its Far Eastern bases, and the breakup of its training camps and operational bases in Afghanistan — it continues to carry out an overwhelming scare campaign. Ever since 9/ 11, its websites feature a series of proclamations of a forthcoming major attack on America (Hafez and Mullins 2015). The warnings have been extensively covered by media channels, cultivating pervasive insecurity and fear among audiences worldwide and particularly in America.
Al Qaeda, intriguingly, has regularly asserted, on its many websites, that its 9/ 11 attacks have wreaked both physical and psychological damage on America’s economy. The events have been portrayed as an attack on the American economy’s trademark, with proofs of their success demonstrated in the dollar’s weakening, the stock market’s decline, and a seemingly lost confidence in its economy nationally as well as internationally, in the aftermath of 9/ 11. The phenomenon has been compared to the Soviet’s deterioration and eventual collapse. Among the publications of bin Laden posted online was one which claimed that: the US was retreating by God’s Grace, with economic attrition persisting to this day; however, more strikes are needed and the youth must find the US economy’s nodes and strike at them (United Nations Counter- Terrorism Implementation Task Force 2011).
Publicity and Propaganda
The web has greatly increased publicity opportunities for terror organizations. Before the Internet, they won publicity only through garnering attention on the TV, radio, and print media channels. These conventional media outlets are characterized by “selection thresholds” (i.e., multilevel editorial selection processes) which they typically failed to reach (Weimann 2015; Jacobson 2010). But such thresholds don’t exist on their own websites, implying that they can now directly control message content, increasing their chances of influencing how diverse target audiences view them, and of manipulating their own as well as their foes’ images.
A majority of terrorist websites don’t celebrate violent acts but, irrespective of their location, schemes, and intents, stress the following couple of issues: 1) The plights of their so- called ‘political prisoners’; and 2) Restrictions imposed on the right to free expression. These topics, whilst resonating strongly with supporters, also garner sympathy from those in the West who set great store by the right to free expression and disapprove of actions taken for silencing political enemies (Conway 2002; Jarvis, Macdonald and Nouri 2014). Moreover, enemy publics might be targeted as well, for such complaints, since terrorist groups underscore the antidemocratic character of measures adopted against them, creating feelings of mortification and uneasiness among enemies. Their objection to being prevented from speaking ideally suits the Internet as a medium for free, unregulated, and unrestricted communication.
Terrorists’ websites normally adopt three metaphorical structures for vindicating their dependence on violent means. Firstly, they state that they have only one choice – violence, which is a necessity the strong impose upon them. Though the websites lack mention of the way terrorists victimize other people, nations’ anti- terrorist actions are greatly underlined and characterized using words like “slaughter,” “genocide”, and “murder” (Jarvis, Macdonald and Nouri 2014). Terror groups are portrayed as relentlessly persecuted, with their leaders facing attempted assassination, their supporters being killed, their right to free expression being limited, and their supporters apprehended. This strategy which depicts terror outfits as weak and small entities fleeing from stronger countries or entities renders the former underdogs (Reinares et al. 2008).
Another rhetorical structure associated with the legitimate utilization of violence involves enemy de- legitimization and demonizing. Terror groups’ members are portrayed as noble freedom fighters, being coerced into falling back on violence as a merciless enemy has been crushing their dignity and rights (Borum 2011). According to several terrorist websites, those opposing the terror outfit or group are the actual terrorists; they largely argue that their violence is trivial compared with that of the opposition. Terrorist rhetoric attempts at shifting the blame to anti- terror entities from terrorist groups, accusing the former of perpetrating cruel, immoral, inhuman acts.
The last rhetorical tool widely adopted by terrorist organizations is the widespread employment of non- violent language for countering their violent image. Whilst they are violent entities by nature, their websites mostly assert that they desire peaceful resolutions to problems, with their goal, eventually, being diplomatic resolutions attained via negotiations and global pressure imposed on an oppressive government.
Data Mining
The World Wide Web can be considered to be a colossal digital library, singly offering billions of pages of largely- free data, a large portion of which greatly interests terrorist groups. Using the internet, terror outfits can acquire various details concerning counterterrorism measures and terror targets (e.g., transport facilities, public places, seaports, nuclear power stations, and airports). Dan Verton’s Black Ice: The Invisible Threat of Cyberterrorism (2003) cites that the al- Qaeda functions with the aid of huge data pools loaded with information on likely American targets. They utilize the Internet for collecting intelligence on targets, particularly crucial economic nodes. Further, contemporary software facilitates their analysis of the structural deficits in any facility and prediction of the cascading effect of launching an attack on a given system. Donald Rumsfeld, Defense Secretary, stated that a training manual issued by al- Qaeda acquired in Afghanistan informs readers that legal, open use of public sources can help amass no less than an alarming eighty percent of overall information needed about an adversary (UNODC 2012).
A Muslim Hackers Club (which, according to American security organizations, attempts at developing software for launching cyber- attacks) website features links to American websites purportedly disclosing sensitive data (e.g., American Secret Service radio frequencies and code names). This very website also provides tutorials to create and spread computer viruses, formulate hacking strategies, develop codes, and sabotage networks, besides providing links to terrorist and militant Islamic website addresses. Key targets discussed on al Qaeda–connected websites are: the Atlanta Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC); organizations controlling online data flow; and FedWire (a Federal Reserve Board- maintained money- movement clearing system) (Archetti 2015; McGilloway, Ghosh and Bhui 2015). Akin to several other web users, terrorist organizations can also access target diagrams and maps, in addition to imaging information on networks and facilities possibly revealing counterterrorist measures at target spots. For instance, a computer seized from an al Qaeda base stored a dam’s structural and engineering features, downloaded online, that would help al Qaeda strategists and engineers simulate calamitous failures. Other seized computers reveal proofs of al Qaeda members spending time on websites providing programming instructions and software pertaining to digital switches running communication, transport, water, and power grids.
A large number of tools help acquire such information (e.g., search engines, chat rooms, discussion groups, and email distribution lists). Several websites have their personal search tools to extract data from databases (Denning 2010; Bertram 2016). Similarly, word- based searches of e- journals and newspapers may generate useful information for terrorists. While a part of this data can be found in conventional media, web- based search capabilities help terrorists acquire it effortlessly, inexpensively, and anonymously.
Fundraising
Akin to several political organizations, terror outfits employ the World Wide Web for raising funds. For example, the Al Qaeda, invariably, relies greatly on donations with its international fundraising platform comprising of NGOs (non- government organizations), web- based forums, chat rooms, charities, and financial institutions which make use of websites. Hizb al- Tahrir, an extremist group, employs an integrated website network that stretches between the African and European continents and petitions its supporters to provide assistance through funding its cause (i.e., jihad) and also urging other people to do so (Von Behr et al. 2013). A Germany- based website offers banking details (e.g., the account numbers to deposit donations into). Similarly, Chechen fighters bank on the Internet for publicizing bank account numbers (one of which is California- based) to deposits donations into. The IRA website also provides a page for visitors to make donations via credit card (UNODC 2012).
Web user demographics (filtered, for example, using personal information gleaned from e- order forms and questionnaires) enable terrorist groups to isolate those sympathizing with a given cause or problem. Subsequently, isolated persons are approached for donations, normally via e- mail forwarded by front groups (or in other words, organizations which broadly support terrorist goals, though operate lawfully and publicly, and generally lack direct links with terror outfits). For example, Hamas funds are amassed using a Texan charity, HLF (Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development) (UNODC 2012, Koehler 2014). The American government confiscated HLF assets in December of 2001 owing to its connections to Hamas. Furthermore, the American government has frozen the following ostensibly legitimate charitable foundations’ assets — Al- Haramain Foundation, Benevolence International Foundation, and Global Relief Foundation — owing to proofs of their proceeds being directed to the al Qaeda.
Another example, from January 2004, is of an Idaho federal- level grand jury which accused a Saudi college- goer of conspiring to aid terror outfits wage jihad through utilizing the web for fundraising, fielding recruits, and locating potential American civilian and military targets within the Middle Eastern region. The doctorate student of computer science at Idaho University (ironically enrolled in an NSA (National Security Agency) - sponsored course), Sami Omar Hussayen, was indicted for developing sites and email groups disseminating messages between himself and a couple of extremist Saudi Arabian clerics (UNODC 2012; Gill et al. 2017).
Recruitment and Mobilization
Besides seeking contributions to their cause, the web can help terrorist organizations enlist and rally supporters for ensuring they carry out terror activities more actively. Terrorist outfits employ the complete array of web technologies (video, audio, and so forth) for enhancing their message’s presentation as well as capture data on users visiting their sites, for identifying potential converts (Torok 2013). Users appearing to be highly interested in their cause or suitable when it comes to performing tasks for the organization are subsequently approached. Additionally, recruiters can employ more interactive web technology for moving across cyber- cafes and chat rooms, seeking amenable people, especially youngsters (Tehrani, Manap and Taji 2013). User nets (bulletin boards and chat rooms focusing on a specific problem) and e- bulletin boards may function as means to get in touch with prospective recruits as well.
A noteworthy point is, a few aspiring recruits utilize the Internet for advertising themselves to terror groups. Consider, for instance, the 1995 case of a Columbia College, Missouri, computer major – Ziyad Khalil – as mentioned in Verton’s Black Ice (Verton and Brownlow 2003). Khalil became an on- campus Muslim activist, creating web links to numerous extremist organizations and running a Hamas- supportive site. Owing, largely, to such online activities, Khalil was spotted by Al Qaeda and recruited as its US- based procurement agent, arranging computer, electronic surveillance device, and satellite phone purchases and facilitating communication between bin Laden and his officers and supporters (Tehrani, Manap and Taji 2013).
But terror outfits more typically seek recruits instead of waiting to be approached. The Washington- based SITE Institute (which is a terrorism research organization) has, after observing the web- based communications of al Qaeda, revealed alarming information pertaining to a sophisticated 2003 recruitment drive for fighters to attack American and coalition troops in Iraq. Prospective recruits are showered with anti- US propaganda and religious decrees, taken across a web of covert chat rooms that offer explicit directions on traveling to Iraq, and offered terrorist training manuals. An especially graphic exchange found on a covert chat room of al Qaeda dated September 2003 displays an Islamic extremist using “Redemption Is Close” as username (UNODC 2012) writing, “Brothers, how do I go to Iraq for Jihad? Are there any army camps and is there someone who commands there?” After 4 days, user “Merciless Terrorist” replies “Dear Brother, the road is wide open for you—there are many groups, go look for someone you trust, join him, he will be the protector of the Iraqi regions and with the help of Allah you will become one of the Mujahidin.” Subsequently, the former solicits explicit details on how to do so. The latter replies with a propaganda video, besides instructing him to get hold of the Pal Talk software that allows un- monitored online communication (Simon et al. 2014; Sageman 2011).
A large number of terrorist sites don’t go as far as recruiting people for perpetrating violence; rather, they urge supporters to display support using other tangible means. For instance, a Kahane Lives site heading goes: “How can I help the struggle: A few suggestions,” whilst a Shining Path site feature is labelled “Action alert: What you can do” (United Nations Counter- Terrorism Implementation Task Force 2011). The World Wide Web’s potential to rally activists is demonstrated by the reaction to PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan’s apprehension (Rudner 2016). When Ocalan was captured by Turkish forces, several thousand Kurds across the globe reacted within only a few hours with protests on account of sympathetic internet sites inciting supporters to do so.
Networking
Several terror outfits, including the Al Qaeda and Hamas, have transformed from rigorous hierarchical organizations having elected heads to associations of semi- independent units without one single chain of command. By utilizing the Internet, such loosely- related units can remain in touch with each other and with other terrorist organizations’ members. Terrorists of the future will probably be organized more ‘decentralizedly’ (Theohary 2011), with a range of transnational web- linked units coordinating and interacting in a horizontal, instead of vertical, way.
Numerous reasons exist for why contemporary communication technologies, particularly computer- facilitated ones, prove so helpful for terrorist organizations when it comes to the establishment and maintenance of networks. Firstly, novel technologies dramatically decrease transmission time, allowing easy and quick communication and efficient coordination by dispersed corporate players. Secondly, novel technologies have appreciably decreased communication expenses. Lastly, through the integration of communications and computing, a substantial growth has been witnessed in the complexity and range of data which may be shared (Bloom 2017; Gates and Podder 2015).
The web facilitates intra- as well as inter- terrorist group interactions. For example, many internet sites are supportive of terrorism carried out in jihad’s name (Weimann 2016). Such websites as well as associated forums allow idea interchange and dissemination of practical information on bomb- building between terrorists located in diverse places like Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya, Lebanon, Palestine, Turkey Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines (Mueller et al. 2015; Ishengoma 2014), besides coordination when it comes to perpetrating terror attacks or establishing terror cells.
Sharing Information
Innumerable sites which offer information on building explosive and chemical weapons may be found online. Several such websites post The Anarchist Cookbook and The Terrorist’s Handbook, a couple of infamous manuals providing in- depth instructions pertaining to bomb construction. Further, Abdel- Aziz’s 1996 Mujahadeen Poisons Handbook, which was “published” on Hamas’s official internet site, is a 23- page- long comprehensive guide to preparing a variety of poisonous gases, homemade poisons, and other lethal material employed in terror attacks. A considerably lengthier (several- thousand- pages- long), al Qaeda- prepared manual, “The Encyclopedia of Jihad”, distributed online, provides comprehensive instructions on establishing covert groups and executing terrorist attacks (Nesser, Stenersen and Oftedal 2016). A laptop belonging to al Qaeda members discovered in Afghanistan was found to be utilized for visiting a French, Société Anonyme- operated website several times (the Société Anonyme is a self- professed fluctuating scholarly and artistic group working expressly on relationships between artistic and critical thinking processes); the site features the Sabotage Handbook, a 2- volume work having sections on subjects like anti- surveillance tactics and assassination planning.
Such data is searched for by hi- tech terror outfits as well as disillusioned persons set on advancing their eccentric agendas using terrorist tactics. For example, in the year 1999, David Copeland was found guilty of placing nail bombs in three distinct London quarters: Soho’s gay neighborhood, the multiracial Brixton area, and Brick Lane’s mostly Bangladeshi community. In three weeks’ time, a total of three lives were claimed and 139 innocents injured (United Nations Counter- Terrorism Implementation Task Force 2011). During his trial, Copeland stated that the lethal tactics he adopted were gleaned from the web; he downloaded and applied information from How to Make Bombs: Book Two and The Terrorist’s Handbook, both of which continue to be easily accessible online. A Google search using keywords “handbook” and “terrorist” furnishes roughly 4000 matches including references to manuals and guidebooks. One website provides instructions on acquiring ammonium nitrate, which was Copeland’s preferred explosive material.
In the year 2002, exceptional Finnish chemistry student “RC” debated over the subject of bomb- making methods with fellow enthusiasts on an explosive- and bomb- specific Finnish site. Occasionally, his posts included queries on matters like nerve gas- making at home (United Nations Counter- Terrorism Implementation Task Force 2011). He frequently exchanged information with Home Chemistry Forum moderator, whose user image was one of his turbaned and bearded face superimposing bin Laden’s body (Taylor, Fritsch and Liederbach, 2014). RC subsequently detonated a bomb at a packed shopping mall which claimed 7 lives, including his own. The site he frequently visited was closed by the sponsor company, though a backup, read- only copy was instantly re- posted.
Planning and Coordination
In addition to gaining information on bomb construction, terrorist organizations utilize the web for planning and coordinating specific attacks. For instance, Al Qaeda terrorists banked greatly on the World Wide Web to plan and coordinate the 9/ 11 attacks. Federal authorities discovered several thousand encrypted messages posted within the password- protected zone of an internet site on the 9/ 11 mastermind, Abu Zubaydah’s computer. The earliest messages dated back to May of 2001 while the last ones were dated 9th September, a couple of days before the attacks. The message frequency was maximum the month before the attacks (Gerwehr and Daly 2006). For maintaining anonymity, al Qaeda members utilized the World Wide Web in public zones, sending messages through public email; further, a few hijackers communicated through the use of free internet email accounts.
For instance, Middle Eastern Hamas activists utilized chat rooms for planning operations; emails were exchanged for coordinating actions across West Bank, Gaza, Israel and Lebanon. Instructions including maps, technical information, photos, and directions of how explosives ought to be used are typically disguised using steganography (entailing concealing of messages within graphic files). But instructions are, at times, conveyed hidden in the plainest codes. For instance, Mohammed Atta’s last message to his 18- strong team of terrorists who perpetrated the 9/ 11 attacks was reportedly: “The semester begins in three more weeks. We’ve obtained 19 confirmations for studies in the faculty of law, the faculty of urban planning, the faculty of fine arts, and the faculty of engineering.” (The different faculties referred to the code names for targeted buildings.)
Ever since the 9/ 11 attacks, American security organizations have been monitoring numerous internet sites believed to have al Qaeda links and apparently comprising of cyber- planning elements (for instance, instructions for operatives, web links to other sites, information for activists and supporters, threats and calls to take action) (United Nations Counter- Terrorism Implementation Task Force 2011; Nesser et al. 2016); these sites include:
· alneda.com: Prior to being shut down in the year 2002, the website was believed by American authorities to contain encrypted data directing al Qaeda terrorists to securer websites, feature international al Qaeda- related news, and publish various books, articles, and fatwas (which generally declared war on Americans, Jews or Christians);
· assam.com: This site was the mouthpiece for Palestinian, Afghan and Chechen jihad;
· almuhrajiroun.com: This website encouraged supporters to assassinate Pervez Musharraf, the then- Pakistani President, during the late 90s and early twenty- first century;
· qassam.net: A website claimed by American authorities to be linked to both al Qaeda and Hamas;
· jihadunspun.net: A website featuring a 36- minute video of bin Laden making threats, lecturing, and preaching;
· 7hj.7hj.com: This site attempted to teach internet network hacking to visitors, besides how to corrupt business and governmental websites using viruses and “worms”;
· aloswa.org: This site featured religious legal rulings and bin Laden quotes that justified attacks on the Western world (including 9/ 11);
· drasat.com: Suspected by specialists to be operated by fictitious organization, Islamic Studies and Research Center; it is reportedly the most reliable source of al Qaeda- related news; and
· islammemo.com, jehad.net, and alsaha.com: Allegedly posted statements by the al Qaeda, terrorist directions, and calls for action.
Conclusion
A briefing in late September of 2001 by Ronald Dick, head of US NIPC (National Infrastructure Protection Center) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s assistant director, revealed that the 9/ 11 attackers used the web “well.” Ever since the 9/ 11 attacks, terrorists’ computer and Internet skills have expanded, and their presence on the internet increased. At present, terrorists of highly divergent ideologies—Islamists, Marxists, racists, nationalists, and separatists — have learned similar lessons on how to exploit the World Wide Web. The internet’s many advantages (e.g., easy information access, unregulated use, swift information flow, and a huge potential audience, to name a few) work to the benefit of groups dedicated to terrorizing people and governments for accomplishing their goals.
What is the right way to react to such societies? This is no place to analyze or give any conclusive answer, though a couple of things are apparently evident. Firstly, counter- terrorism organizations and stakeholders should be more informed when it comes to the uses terrorist outfits put the web to, and more effectively monitor their actions. As observed at the paper’s beginning, journalists, lawmakers, researchers and security organizations typically concentrate on cyber- terrorism’s exaggerated threat, not focusing enough on the Internet’s many, and more routine, uses. These uses prove highly instrumental to terrorists. Thus, security organizations must engage in on- going efforts for improving their capability of studying and monitoring web- based terror activities and exploring measures for restricting this medium’s use by contemporary terror groups.
Secondly, though security organizations need to better safeguard their societies against the threat of terrorism, they should refrain from eroding the values and virtues which render those societies worthy of defending. In several ways, the web is a near- ideal embodiment of democratic values (open communication and free speech), besides being an unparalleled marketplace for ideas. Unfortunately, the liberty the web offers makes it susceptible to abuse by entities which are ironically, themselves, typically hostile to unrestricted expression and thought. However, if, out of fear of terrorist attacks in the future, people restrict their personal internet usage freedom, they are making it an easy victory for terrorists and dealing a blow to democracy. Societies should remember the fact that politicians have earlier manipulated the dread inflicted by terrorism for passing laws undermining individual freedoms and rights. Using advanced technology for monitoring, searching, tracking, and analyzing communication has inherent dangers involved. Whilst these technologies are highly beneficial to the campaign against web- savvy terrorists and cyber- terrorism, they would serve to give participating governmental entities, particularly those that are authoritarian in nature and characterized minimal public accountability, instruments for violating civil liberties on the national as well as international levels. It takes little imagination to understand the fact that great, lasting implications detrimental to democracies and democratic values would crop up, adding heavy prices with regard to curtailed civil rights to terrorism’s steep toll.



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